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SELinux: indicate fatal error in compat netfilter code
[net-next-2.6.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
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1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26#include <linux/init.h>
27#include <linux/kernel.h>
28#include <linux/tracehook.h>
29#include <linux/errno.h>
30#include <linux/sched.h>
31#include <linux/security.h>
32#include <linux/xattr.h>
33#include <linux/capability.h>
34#include <linux/unistd.h>
35#include <linux/mm.h>
36#include <linux/mman.h>
37#include <linux/slab.h>
38#include <linux/pagemap.h>
39#include <linux/swap.h>
40#include <linux/spinlock.h>
41#include <linux/syscalls.h>
42#include <linux/file.h>
43#include <linux/fdtable.h>
44#include <linux/namei.h>
45#include <linux/mount.h>
46#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49#include <linux/tty.h>
50#include <net/icmp.h>
51#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53#include <net/net_namespace.h>
54#include <net/netlabel.h>
55#include <linux/uaccess.h>
56#include <asm/ioctls.h>
57#include <asm/atomic.h>
58#include <linux/bitops.h>
59#include <linux/interrupt.h>
60#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61#include <linux/netlink.h>
62#include <linux/tcp.h>
63#include <linux/udp.h>
64#include <linux/dccp.h>
65#include <linux/quota.h>
66#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68#include <linux/parser.h>
69#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70#include <net/ipv6.h>
71#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72#include <linux/personality.h>
73#include <linux/sysctl.h>
74#include <linux/audit.h>
75#include <linux/string.h>
76#include <linux/selinux.h>
77#include <linux/mutex.h>
78#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79#include <linux/syslog.h>
80
81#include "avc.h"
82#include "objsec.h"
83#include "netif.h"
84#include "netnode.h"
85#include "netport.h"
86#include "xfrm.h"
87#include "netlabel.h"
88#include "audit.h"
89
90#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
91
92extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
93extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
94
95/* SECMARK reference count */
96atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
97
98#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
99int selinux_enforcing;
100
101static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
102{
103 unsigned long enforcing;
104 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
105 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
106 return 1;
107}
108__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
109#endif
110
111#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
112int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
113
114static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
115{
116 unsigned long enabled;
117 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
118 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
119 return 1;
120}
121__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
122#else
123int selinux_enabled = 1;
124#endif
125
126static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
127
128/**
129 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
130 *
131 * Description:
132 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
133 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
134 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
135 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
136 *
137 */
138static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
139{
140 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
141}
142
143/*
144 * initialise the security for the init task
145 */
146static void cred_init_security(void)
147{
148 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
149 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
150
151 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
152 if (!tsec)
153 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
154
155 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
156 cred->security = tsec;
157}
158
159/*
160 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
161 */
162static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
163{
164 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165
166 tsec = cred->security;
167 return tsec->sid;
168}
169
170/*
171 * get the objective security ID of a task
172 */
173static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
174{
175 u32 sid;
176
177 rcu_read_lock();
178 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
179 rcu_read_unlock();
180 return sid;
181}
182
183/*
184 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
185 */
186static inline u32 current_sid(void)
187{
188 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
189
190 return tsec->sid;
191}
192
193/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
194
195static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
196{
197 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
198 u32 sid = current_sid();
199
200 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
201 if (!isec)
202 return -ENOMEM;
203
204 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
205 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
206 isec->inode = inode;
207 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
208 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
209 isec->task_sid = sid;
210 inode->i_security = isec;
211
212 return 0;
213}
214
215static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
216{
217 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
218 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
219
220 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
221 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
222 list_del_init(&isec->list);
223 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
224
225 inode->i_security = NULL;
226 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
227}
228
229static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
230{
231 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
232 u32 sid = current_sid();
233
234 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
235 if (!fsec)
236 return -ENOMEM;
237
238 fsec->sid = sid;
239 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
240 file->f_security = fsec;
241
242 return 0;
243}
244
245static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
246{
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
248 file->f_security = NULL;
249 kfree(fsec);
250}
251
252static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
253{
254 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
255
256 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
257 if (!sbsec)
258 return -ENOMEM;
259
260 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
261 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
262 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
263 sbsec->sb = sb;
264 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
265 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
266 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
267 sb->s_security = sbsec;
268
269 return 0;
270}
271
272static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
273{
274 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
275 sb->s_security = NULL;
276 kfree(sbsec);
277}
278
279/* The security server must be initialized before
280 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
281extern int ss_initialized;
282
283/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
284
285static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
286 "uses xattr",
287 "uses transition SIDs",
288 "uses task SIDs",
289 "uses genfs_contexts",
290 "not configured for labeling",
291 "uses mountpoint labeling",
292};
293
294static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
295
296static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
297{
298 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
299}
300
301enum {
302 Opt_error = -1,
303 Opt_context = 1,
304 Opt_fscontext = 2,
305 Opt_defcontext = 3,
306 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
307 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
308};
309
310static const match_table_t tokens = {
311 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
312 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
316 {Opt_error, NULL},
317};
318
319#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
320
321static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
322 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
323 const struct cred *cred)
324{
325 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
326 int rc;
327
328 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
329 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
330 if (rc)
331 return rc;
332
333 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
334 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
335 return rc;
336}
337
338static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 const struct cred *cred)
341{
342 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
343 int rc;
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
346 if (rc)
347 return rc;
348
349 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
351 return rc;
352}
353
354static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
355{
356 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
357 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
358 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
359 int rc = 0;
360
361 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
362 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
363 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
364 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
365 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
366 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
367 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
368 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
369 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
370 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
371 goto out;
372 }
373 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
374 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
375 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
376 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
377 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
378 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
379 else
380 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
381 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
382 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
383 goto out;
384 }
385 }
386
387 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
388
389 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
390 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
391 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
392 else
393 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
395 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
396
397 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
398 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
400 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
401 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
402
403 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
404 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
405 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
406
407 /* Initialize the root inode. */
408 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
409
410 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
411 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
412 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
413 populates itself. */
414 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
415next_inode:
416 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
417 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
418 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
419 struct inode_security_struct, list);
420 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
421 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
422 inode = igrab(inode);
423 if (inode) {
424 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
425 inode_doinit(inode);
426 iput(inode);
427 }
428 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
429 list_del_init(&isec->list);
430 goto next_inode;
431 }
432 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
433out:
434 return rc;
435}
436
437/*
438 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
439 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
440 * mount options, or whatever.
441 */
442static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
443 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
444{
445 int rc = 0, i;
446 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
447 char *context = NULL;
448 u32 len;
449 char tmp;
450
451 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
452
453 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
454 return -EINVAL;
455
456 if (!ss_initialized)
457 return -EINVAL;
458
459 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
460 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
461 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
462 if (tmp & 0x01)
463 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
464 tmp >>= 1;
465 }
466 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
467 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
468 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
469
470 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
471 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
472 rc = -ENOMEM;
473 goto out_free;
474 }
475
476 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
478 rc = -ENOMEM;
479 goto out_free;
480 }
481
482 i = 0;
483 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
484 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
485 if (rc)
486 goto out_free;
487 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
488 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
489 }
490 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
491 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
492 if (rc)
493 goto out_free;
494 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
495 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
496 }
497 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
498 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
499 if (rc)
500 goto out_free;
501 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
502 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
503 }
504 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
505 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
506 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
507
508 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
509 if (rc)
510 goto out_free;
511 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
512 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
513 }
514 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
515 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
516 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
517 }
518
519 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
520
521 return 0;
522
523out_free:
524 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
525 return rc;
526}
527
528static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
529 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
530{
531 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
532
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
537 return 1;
538
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
541 */
542 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
543 if (mnt_flags & flag)
544 return 1;
545 return 0;
546}
547
548/*
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
551 */
552static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
554{
555 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
556 int rc = 0, i;
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
566
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
568
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
570 if (!num_opts) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
574 goto out;
575 }
576 rc = -EINVAL;
577 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
578 "before the security server is initialized\n");
579 goto out;
580 }
581
582 /*
583 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
584 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
585 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
586 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
587 *
588 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
589 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
590 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
591 * will be used for both mounts)
592 */
593 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
594 && (num_opts == 0))
595 goto out;
596
597 /*
598 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
599 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
600 * than once with different security options.
601 */
602 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
603 u32 sid;
604
605 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
606 continue;
607 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
608 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
609 if (rc) {
610 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
612 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
613 goto out;
614 }
615 switch (flags[i]) {
616 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
617 fscontext_sid = sid;
618
619 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
620 fscontext_sid))
621 goto out_double_mount;
622
623 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
624 break;
625 case CONTEXT_MNT:
626 context_sid = sid;
627
628 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
629 context_sid))
630 goto out_double_mount;
631
632 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
633 break;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
635 rootcontext_sid = sid;
636
637 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
638 rootcontext_sid))
639 goto out_double_mount;
640
641 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
642
643 break;
644 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
645 defcontext_sid = sid;
646
647 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
648 defcontext_sid))
649 goto out_double_mount;
650
651 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
652
653 break;
654 default:
655 rc = -EINVAL;
656 goto out;
657 }
658 }
659
660 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
663 goto out_double_mount;
664 rc = 0;
665 goto out;
666 }
667
668 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
669 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
670
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
672 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
673 if (rc) {
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
675 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
676 goto out;
677 }
678
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
680 if (fscontext_sid) {
681 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
682 if (rc)
683 goto out;
684
685 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
686 }
687
688 /*
689 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
690 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
691 * the superblock context if not already set.
692 */
693 if (context_sid) {
694 if (!fscontext_sid) {
695 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
696 cred);
697 if (rc)
698 goto out;
699 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
700 } else {
701 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
702 cred);
703 if (rc)
704 goto out;
705 }
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
708
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
711 }
712
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
715 cred);
716 if (rc)
717 goto out;
718
719 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
720 root_isec->initialized = 1;
721 }
722
723 if (defcontext_sid) {
724 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
725 rc = -EINVAL;
726 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
727 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
728 goto out;
729 }
730
731 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
732 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
733 sbsec, cred);
734 if (rc)
735 goto out;
736 }
737
738 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
739 }
740
741 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
742out:
743 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
744 return rc;
745out_double_mount:
746 rc = -EINVAL;
747 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
748 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
749 goto out;
750}
751
752static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
753 struct super_block *newsb)
754{
755 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
756 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
757
758 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
761
762 /*
763 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
764 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
765 */
766 if (!ss_initialized)
767 return;
768
769 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
770 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
771
772 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
773 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
774 return;
775
776 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
777
778 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
779
780 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
781 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
782 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
783
784 if (set_context) {
785 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
786
787 if (!set_fscontext)
788 newsbsec->sid = sid;
789 if (!set_rootcontext) {
790 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
791 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
792 newisec->sid = sid;
793 }
794 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
795 }
796 if (set_rootcontext) {
797 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
798 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
799 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
800 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
801
802 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
803 }
804
805 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
806 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
807}
808
809static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
810 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
811{
812 char *p;
813 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
814 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
815 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
816
817 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
818
819 /* Standard string-based options. */
820 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
821 int token;
822 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
823
824 if (!*p)
825 continue;
826
827 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
828
829 switch (token) {
830 case Opt_context:
831 if (context || defcontext) {
832 rc = -EINVAL;
833 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
834 goto out_err;
835 }
836 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
837 if (!context) {
838 rc = -ENOMEM;
839 goto out_err;
840 }
841 break;
842
843 case Opt_fscontext:
844 if (fscontext) {
845 rc = -EINVAL;
846 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
847 goto out_err;
848 }
849 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
850 if (!fscontext) {
851 rc = -ENOMEM;
852 goto out_err;
853 }
854 break;
855
856 case Opt_rootcontext:
857 if (rootcontext) {
858 rc = -EINVAL;
859 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
860 goto out_err;
861 }
862 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
863 if (!rootcontext) {
864 rc = -ENOMEM;
865 goto out_err;
866 }
867 break;
868
869 case Opt_defcontext:
870 if (context || defcontext) {
871 rc = -EINVAL;
872 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
873 goto out_err;
874 }
875 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
876 if (!defcontext) {
877 rc = -ENOMEM;
878 goto out_err;
879 }
880 break;
881 case Opt_labelsupport:
882 break;
883 default:
884 rc = -EINVAL;
885 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
886 goto out_err;
887
888 }
889 }
890
891 rc = -ENOMEM;
892 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
893 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
894 goto out_err;
895
896 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
898 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
899 goto out_err;
900 }
901
902 if (fscontext) {
903 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
904 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
905 }
906 if (context) {
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
909 }
910 if (rootcontext) {
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
913 }
914 if (defcontext) {
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
917 }
918
919 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
920 return 0;
921
922out_err:
923 kfree(context);
924 kfree(defcontext);
925 kfree(fscontext);
926 kfree(rootcontext);
927 return rc;
928}
929/*
930 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
931 */
932static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
933{
934 int rc = 0;
935 char *options = data;
936 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
937
938 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
939
940 if (!data)
941 goto out;
942
943 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
944
945 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
946 if (rc)
947 goto out_err;
948
949out:
950 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
951
952out_err:
953 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
954 return rc;
955}
956
957static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
958 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
959{
960 int i;
961 char *prefix;
962
963 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
964 char *has_comma;
965
966 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
967 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
968 else
969 has_comma = NULL;
970
971 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
972 case CONTEXT_MNT:
973 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
974 break;
975 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
976 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
977 break;
978 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
979 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
980 break;
981 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
982 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
983 break;
984 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
985 seq_putc(m, ',');
986 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
987 continue;
988 default:
989 BUG();
990 };
991 /* we need a comma before each option */
992 seq_putc(m, ',');
993 seq_puts(m, prefix);
994 if (has_comma)
995 seq_putc(m, '\"');
996 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
997 if (has_comma)
998 seq_putc(m, '\"');
999 }
1000}
1001
1002static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1003{
1004 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1005 int rc;
1006
1007 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 if (rc) {
1009 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1010 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1011 rc = 0;
1012 return rc;
1013 }
1014
1015 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1016
1017 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1018
1019 return rc;
1020}
1021
1022static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1023{
1024 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1025 case S_IFSOCK:
1026 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1027 case S_IFLNK:
1028 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1029 case S_IFREG:
1030 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1031 case S_IFBLK:
1032 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1033 case S_IFDIR:
1034 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1035 case S_IFCHR:
1036 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1037 case S_IFIFO:
1038 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1039
1040 }
1041
1042 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1043}
1044
1045static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1046{
1047 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1048}
1049
1050static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1051{
1052 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1053}
1054
1055static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1056{
1057 switch (family) {
1058 case PF_UNIX:
1059 switch (type) {
1060 case SOCK_STREAM:
1061 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1062 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1063 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1065 }
1066 break;
1067 case PF_INET:
1068 case PF_INET6:
1069 switch (type) {
1070 case SOCK_STREAM:
1071 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1072 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1073 else
1074 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1075 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1076 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1077 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1078 else
1079 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1080 case SOCK_DCCP:
1081 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1082 default:
1083 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1084 }
1085 break;
1086 case PF_NETLINK:
1087 switch (protocol) {
1088 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1090 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1096 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1102 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1108 default:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1110 }
1111 case PF_PACKET:
1112 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1113 case PF_KEY:
1114 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1115 case PF_APPLETALK:
1116 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1117 }
1118
1119 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1120}
1121
1122#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1123static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1124 u16 tclass,
1125 u32 *sid)
1126{
1127 int buflen, rc;
1128 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1129
1130 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1131 if (!buffer)
1132 return -ENOMEM;
1133
1134 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1135 end = buffer+buflen;
1136 *--end = '\0';
1137 buflen--;
1138 path = end-1;
1139 *path = '/';
1140 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1141 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1142 if (buflen < 0)
1143 break;
1144 end -= de->namelen;
1145 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1146 *--end = '/';
1147 path = end;
1148 de = de->parent;
1149 }
1150 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1151 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1152 return rc;
1153}
1154#else
1155static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1156 u16 tclass,
1157 u32 *sid)
1158{
1159 return -EINVAL;
1160}
1161#endif
1162
1163/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1164static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1165{
1166 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1167 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1168 u32 sid;
1169 struct dentry *dentry;
1170#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1171 char *context = NULL;
1172 unsigned len = 0;
1173 int rc = 0;
1174
1175 if (isec->initialized)
1176 goto out;
1177
1178 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1179 if (isec->initialized)
1180 goto out_unlock;
1181
1182 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1183 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1184 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1185 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1186 server is ready to handle calls. */
1187 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1189 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1190 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1191 goto out_unlock;
1192 }
1193
1194 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1195 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1196 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1197 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1198 break;
1199 }
1200
1201 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1202 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1203 if (opt_dentry) {
1204 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1205 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1206 } else {
1207 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1208 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1209 }
1210 if (!dentry) {
1211 /*
1212 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1213 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1214 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1215 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1216 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1217 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1218 * be used again by userspace.
1219 */
1220 goto out_unlock;
1221 }
1222
1223 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1224 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1225 if (!context) {
1226 rc = -ENOMEM;
1227 dput(dentry);
1228 goto out_unlock;
1229 }
1230 context[len] = '\0';
1231 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1232 context, len);
1233 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 kfree(context);
1235
1236 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1237 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1238 NULL, 0);
1239 if (rc < 0) {
1240 dput(dentry);
1241 goto out_unlock;
1242 }
1243 len = rc;
1244 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1245 if (!context) {
1246 rc = -ENOMEM;
1247 dput(dentry);
1248 goto out_unlock;
1249 }
1250 context[len] = '\0';
1251 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1252 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1253 context, len);
1254 }
1255 dput(dentry);
1256 if (rc < 0) {
1257 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1258 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1259 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1260 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1261 kfree(context);
1262 goto out_unlock;
1263 }
1264 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1265 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = 0;
1267 } else {
1268 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1269 sbsec->def_sid,
1270 GFP_NOFS);
1271 if (rc) {
1272 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1273 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1274
1275 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1276 if (printk_ratelimit())
1277 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1278 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1279 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1280 } else {
1281 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1282 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1283 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 }
1285 kfree(context);
1286 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1287 rc = 0;
1288 break;
1289 }
1290 }
1291 kfree(context);
1292 isec->sid = sid;
1293 break;
1294 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1295 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1296 break;
1297 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1298 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1299 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1300
1301 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1302 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1303 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1304 sbsec->sid,
1305 isec->sclass,
1306 &sid);
1307 if (rc)
1308 goto out_unlock;
1309 isec->sid = sid;
1310 break;
1311 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1313 break;
1314 default:
1315 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1316 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1317
1318 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1319 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1320 if (proci->pde) {
1321 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1322 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1323 isec->sclass,
1324 &sid);
1325 if (rc)
1326 goto out_unlock;
1327 isec->sid = sid;
1328 }
1329 }
1330 break;
1331 }
1332
1333 isec->initialized = 1;
1334
1335out_unlock:
1336 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1337out:
1338 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340 return rc;
1341}
1342
1343/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1344static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1345{
1346 u32 perm = 0;
1347
1348 switch (sig) {
1349 case SIGCHLD:
1350 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1351 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1352 break;
1353 case SIGKILL:
1354 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1355 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1356 break;
1357 case SIGSTOP:
1358 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1359 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1360 break;
1361 default:
1362 /* All other signals. */
1363 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1364 break;
1365 }
1366
1367 return perm;
1368}
1369
1370/*
1371 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1372 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1373 */
1374static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1375 const struct cred *target,
1376 u32 perms)
1377{
1378 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1379
1380 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1381}
1382
1383/*
1384 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1385 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1386 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1387 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1388 */
1389static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1390 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1391 u32 perms)
1392{
1393 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1394 u32 sid1, sid2;
1395
1396 rcu_read_lock();
1397 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1398 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1399 rcu_read_unlock();
1400 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1401}
1402
1403/*
1404 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1405 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1406 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1407 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1408 */
1409static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1410 u32 perms)
1411{
1412 u32 sid, tsid;
1413
1414 sid = current_sid();
1415 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1416 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1417}
1418
1419#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1420#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1421#endif
1422
1423/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1424static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1425 const struct cred *cred,
1426 int cap, int audit)
1427{
1428 struct common_audit_data ad;
1429 struct av_decision avd;
1430 u16 sclass;
1431 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1432 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1433 int rc;
1434
1435 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1436 ad.tsk = tsk;
1437 ad.u.cap = cap;
1438
1439 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1440 case 0:
1441 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1442 break;
1443 case 1:
1444 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1445 break;
1446 default:
1447 printk(KERN_ERR
1448 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1449 BUG();
1450 }
1451
1452 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1453 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1454 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1455 return rc;
1456}
1457
1458/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1459static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1460 u32 perms)
1461{
1462 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1463
1464 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1465 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1466}
1467
1468/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1469 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1470 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1471static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1472 struct inode *inode,
1473 u32 perms,
1474 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1475{
1476 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1477 struct common_audit_data ad;
1478 u32 sid;
1479
1480 validate_creds(cred);
1481
1482 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1483 return 0;
1484
1485 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1486 isec = inode->i_security;
1487
1488 if (!adp) {
1489 adp = &ad;
1490 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1491 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1492 }
1493
1494 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1495}
1496
1497/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1498 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1499 pathname if needed. */
1500static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1501 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1502 struct dentry *dentry,
1503 u32 av)
1504{
1505 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1506 struct common_audit_data ad;
1507
1508 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1509 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1510 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1511 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1512}
1513
1514/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1515 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1516 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1517 check a particular permission to the file.
1518 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1519 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1520 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1521 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1522static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1523 struct file *file,
1524 u32 av)
1525{
1526 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1527 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1528 struct common_audit_data ad;
1529 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1530 int rc;
1531
1532 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1533 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1534
1535 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1536 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1537 SECCLASS_FD,
1538 FD__USE,
1539 &ad);
1540 if (rc)
1541 goto out;
1542 }
1543
1544 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1545 rc = 0;
1546 if (av)
1547 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1548
1549out:
1550 return rc;
1551}
1552
1553/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1554static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1555 struct dentry *dentry,
1556 u16 tclass)
1557{
1558 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1559 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1561 u32 sid, newsid;
1562 struct common_audit_data ad;
1563 int rc;
1564
1565 dsec = dir->i_security;
1566 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1567
1568 sid = tsec->sid;
1569 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1570
1571 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1572 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1573
1574 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1575 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1576 &ad);
1577 if (rc)
1578 return rc;
1579
1580 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1581 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1582 if (rc)
1583 return rc;
1584 }
1585
1586 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1587 if (rc)
1588 return rc;
1589
1590 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1591 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1592 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1593}
1594
1595/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1596static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1597 struct task_struct *ctx)
1598{
1599 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1600
1601 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1602}
1603
1604#define MAY_LINK 0
1605#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1606#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1607
1608/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1609static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1610 struct dentry *dentry,
1611 int kind)
1612
1613{
1614 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1615 struct common_audit_data ad;
1616 u32 sid = current_sid();
1617 u32 av;
1618 int rc;
1619
1620 dsec = dir->i_security;
1621 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1622
1623 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1624 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1625
1626 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1627 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1628 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1629 if (rc)
1630 return rc;
1631
1632 switch (kind) {
1633 case MAY_LINK:
1634 av = FILE__LINK;
1635 break;
1636 case MAY_UNLINK:
1637 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1638 break;
1639 case MAY_RMDIR:
1640 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1641 break;
1642 default:
1643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1644 __func__, kind);
1645 return 0;
1646 }
1647
1648 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1649 return rc;
1650}
1651
1652static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1653 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1654 struct inode *new_dir,
1655 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1656{
1657 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1658 struct common_audit_data ad;
1659 u32 sid = current_sid();
1660 u32 av;
1661 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1662 int rc;
1663
1664 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1665 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1666 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1667 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1668
1669 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1670
1671 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1672 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1673 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1674 if (rc)
1675 return rc;
1676 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1677 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1678 if (rc)
1679 return rc;
1680 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1682 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1683 if (rc)
1684 return rc;
1685 }
1686
1687 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1688 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1689 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1690 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1691 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1692 if (rc)
1693 return rc;
1694 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1695 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1696 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1697 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1698 new_isec->sclass,
1699 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1700 if (rc)
1701 return rc;
1702 }
1703
1704 return 0;
1705}
1706
1707/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1708static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1709 struct super_block *sb,
1710 u32 perms,
1711 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1712{
1713 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1714 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1715
1716 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1717 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1718}
1719
1720/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1721static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1722{
1723 u32 av = 0;
1724
1725 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1726 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1727 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1728 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1729 av |= FILE__READ;
1730
1731 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1732 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1733 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1734 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1735
1736 } else {
1737 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1738 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1739 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1740 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1741 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1742 av |= DIR__READ;
1743 }
1744
1745 return av;
1746}
1747
1748/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1749static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1750{
1751 u32 av = 0;
1752
1753 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1754 av |= FILE__READ;
1755 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1756 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1757 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1758 else
1759 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1760 }
1761 if (!av) {
1762 /*
1763 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1764 */
1765 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1766 }
1767
1768 return av;
1769}
1770
1771/*
1772 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1773 * open permission.
1774 */
1775static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1776{
1777 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1778
1779 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1780 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1781
1782 return av;
1783}
1784
1785/* Hook functions begin here. */
1786
1787static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1788 unsigned int mode)
1789{
1790 int rc;
1791
1792 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1793 if (rc)
1794 return rc;
1795
1796 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1797 u32 sid = current_sid();
1798 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1799 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1800 }
1801
1802 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1803}
1804
1805static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1806{
1807 int rc;
1808
1809 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1810 if (rc)
1811 return rc;
1812
1813 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1814}
1815
1816static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1817 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1818{
1819 int error;
1820
1821 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1822 if (error)
1823 return error;
1824
1825 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1826}
1827
1828static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1829 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1830 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1831 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1832{
1833 int error;
1834
1835 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1836 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1837 if (error)
1838 return error;
1839
1840 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1841}
1842
1843/*
1844 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1845 * which was removed).
1846 *
1847 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1848 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1849 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1850 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1851 */
1852
1853static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1854 int cap, int audit)
1855{
1856 int rc;
1857
1858 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1859 if (rc)
1860 return rc;
1861
1862 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1863}
1864
1865static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1866{
1867 int buflen, rc;
1868 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1869
1870 rc = -ENOMEM;
1871 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1872 if (!buffer)
1873 goto out;
1874
1875 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1876 end = buffer+buflen;
1877 *--end = '\0';
1878 buflen--;
1879 path = end-1;
1880 *path = '/';
1881 while (table) {
1882 const char *name = table->procname;
1883 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1884 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1885 if (buflen < 0)
1886 goto out_free;
1887 end -= namelen;
1888 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1889 *--end = '/';
1890 path = end;
1891 table = table->parent;
1892 }
1893 buflen -= 4;
1894 if (buflen < 0)
1895 goto out_free;
1896 end -= 4;
1897 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1898 path = end;
1899 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1900out_free:
1901 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1902out:
1903 return rc;
1904}
1905
1906static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1907{
1908 int error = 0;
1909 u32 av;
1910 u32 tsid, sid;
1911 int rc;
1912
1913 sid = current_sid();
1914
1915 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1916 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1917 if (rc) {
1918 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1919 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1920 }
1921
1922 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1923 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1924 if (op == 001) {
1925 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1926 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1927 } else {
1928 av = 0;
1929 if (op & 004)
1930 av |= FILE__READ;
1931 if (op & 002)
1932 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1933 if (av)
1934 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1935 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1936 }
1937
1938 return error;
1939}
1940
1941static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1942{
1943 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1944 int rc = 0;
1945
1946 if (!sb)
1947 return 0;
1948
1949 switch (cmds) {
1950 case Q_SYNC:
1951 case Q_QUOTAON:
1952 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1953 case Q_SETINFO:
1954 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1955 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1956 break;
1957 case Q_GETFMT:
1958 case Q_GETINFO:
1959 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1960 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1961 break;
1962 default:
1963 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1964 break;
1965 }
1966 return rc;
1967}
1968
1969static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1970{
1971 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1972
1973 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1974}
1975
1976static int selinux_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
1977{
1978 int rc;
1979
1980 rc = cap_syslog(type, from_file);
1981 if (rc)
1982 return rc;
1983
1984 switch (type) {
1985 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1986 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1987 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1988 break;
1989 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1990 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1991 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1992 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1993 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1994 break;
1995 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1996 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1997 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1998 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1999 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2000 default:
2001 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2002 break;
2003 }
2004 return rc;
2005}
2006
2007/*
2008 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2009 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2010 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2011 *
2012 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2013 * processes that allocate mappings.
2014 */
2015static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2016{
2017 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2018
2019 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2020 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2021 if (rc == 0)
2022 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2023
2024 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2025}
2026
2027/* binprm security operations */
2028
2029static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2030{
2031 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2032 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2033 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2034 struct common_audit_data ad;
2035 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2036 int rc;
2037
2038 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2039 if (rc)
2040 return rc;
2041
2042 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2043 * the script interpreter */
2044 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2045 return 0;
2046
2047 old_tsec = current_security();
2048 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2049 isec = inode->i_security;
2050
2051 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2052 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2053 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2054
2055 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2056 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2057 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2058 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2059
2060 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2061 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2062 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2063 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2064 } else {
2065 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2066 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2067 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2068 if (rc)
2069 return rc;
2070 }
2071
2072 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2073 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2074
2075 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2076 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2077
2078 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2079 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2080 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2081 if (rc)
2082 return rc;
2083 } else {
2084 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2085 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2086 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2087 if (rc)
2088 return rc;
2089
2090 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2091 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2092 if (rc)
2093 return rc;
2094
2095 /* Check for shared state */
2096 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2097 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2098 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2099 NULL);
2100 if (rc)
2101 return -EPERM;
2102 }
2103
2104 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2105 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2106 if (bprm->unsafe &
2107 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2108 struct task_struct *tracer;
2109 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2110 u32 ptsid = 0;
2111
2112 rcu_read_lock();
2113 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2114 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2115 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2116 ptsid = sec->sid;
2117 }
2118 rcu_read_unlock();
2119
2120 if (ptsid != 0) {
2121 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2122 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2123 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2124 if (rc)
2125 return -EPERM;
2126 }
2127 }
2128
2129 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2130 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2131 }
2132
2133 return 0;
2134}
2135
2136static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2137{
2138 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2139 u32 sid, osid;
2140 int atsecure = 0;
2141
2142 sid = tsec->sid;
2143 osid = tsec->osid;
2144
2145 if (osid != sid) {
2146 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2147 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2148 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2149 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2150 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2151 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2152 }
2153
2154 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2155}
2156
2157extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2158extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2159
2160/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2161static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2162 struct files_struct *files)
2163{
2164 struct common_audit_data ad;
2165 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2166 struct tty_struct *tty;
2167 struct fdtable *fdt;
2168 long j = -1;
2169 int drop_tty = 0;
2170
2171 tty = get_current_tty();
2172 if (tty) {
2173 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2174 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2175 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2176 struct inode *inode;
2177
2178 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2179 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2180 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2181 file may belong to another process and we are only
2182 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2183 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2184 struct tty_file_private, list);
2185 file = file_priv->file;
2186 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2187 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2188 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2189 drop_tty = 1;
2190 }
2191 }
2192 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2193 tty_kref_put(tty);
2194 }
2195 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2196 if (drop_tty)
2197 no_tty();
2198
2199 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2200
2201 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2202
2203 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2204 for (;;) {
2205 unsigned long set, i;
2206 int fd;
2207
2208 j++;
2209 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2210 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2211 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2212 break;
2213 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2214 if (!set)
2215 continue;
2216 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2217 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2218 if (set & 1) {
2219 file = fget(i);
2220 if (!file)
2221 continue;
2222 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2223 file,
2224 file_to_av(file))) {
2225 sys_close(i);
2226 fd = get_unused_fd();
2227 if (fd != i) {
2228 if (fd >= 0)
2229 put_unused_fd(fd);
2230 fput(file);
2231 continue;
2232 }
2233 if (devnull) {
2234 get_file(devnull);
2235 } else {
2236 devnull = dentry_open(
2237 dget(selinux_null),
2238 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2239 O_RDWR, cred);
2240 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2241 devnull = NULL;
2242 put_unused_fd(fd);
2243 fput(file);
2244 continue;
2245 }
2246 }
2247 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2248 }
2249 fput(file);
2250 }
2251 }
2252 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2253
2254 }
2255 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2256}
2257
2258/*
2259 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2260 */
2261static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2262{
2263 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2264 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2265 int rc, i;
2266
2267 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2268 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2269 return;
2270
2271 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2272 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2273
2274 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2275 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2276
2277 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2278 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2279 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2280 *
2281 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2282 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2283 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2284 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2285 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2286 */
2287 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2288 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2289 if (rc) {
2290 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2291 task_lock(current);
2292 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2293 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2294 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2295 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2296 }
2297 task_unlock(current);
2298 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2299 }
2300}
2301
2302/*
2303 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2304 * due to exec
2305 */
2306static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2307{
2308 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2309 struct itimerval itimer;
2310 u32 osid, sid;
2311 int rc, i;
2312
2313 osid = tsec->osid;
2314 sid = tsec->sid;
2315
2316 if (sid == osid)
2317 return;
2318
2319 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2320 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2321 * flush and unblock signals.
2322 *
2323 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2324 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2325 */
2326 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2327 if (rc) {
2328 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2329 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2330 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2331 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2332 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2333 __flush_signals(current);
2334 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2335 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2336 }
2337 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2338 }
2339
2340 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2341 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2342 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2343 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2344 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2345}
2346
2347/* superblock security operations */
2348
2349static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2350{
2351 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2352}
2353
2354static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2355{
2356 superblock_free_security(sb);
2357}
2358
2359static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2360{
2361 if (plen > olen)
2362 return 0;
2363
2364 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2365}
2366
2367static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2368{
2369 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2370 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2371 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2372 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2373 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2374}
2375
2376static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2377{
2378 if (!*first) {
2379 **to = ',';
2380 *to += 1;
2381 } else
2382 *first = 0;
2383 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2384 *to += len;
2385}
2386
2387static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2388 int len)
2389{
2390 int current_size = 0;
2391
2392 if (!*first) {
2393 **to = '|';
2394 *to += 1;
2395 } else
2396 *first = 0;
2397
2398 while (current_size < len) {
2399 if (*from != '"') {
2400 **to = *from;
2401 *to += 1;
2402 }
2403 from += 1;
2404 current_size += 1;
2405 }
2406}
2407
2408static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2409{
2410 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2411 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2412 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2413 int open_quote = 0;
2414
2415 in_curr = orig;
2416 sec_curr = copy;
2417
2418 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2419 if (!nosec) {
2420 rc = -ENOMEM;
2421 goto out;
2422 }
2423
2424 nosec_save = nosec;
2425 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2426 in_save = in_end = orig;
2427
2428 do {
2429 if (*in_end == '"')
2430 open_quote = !open_quote;
2431 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2432 *in_end == '\0') {
2433 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2434
2435 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2436 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2437 else
2438 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2439
2440 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2441 }
2442 } while (*in_end++);
2443
2444 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2445 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2446out:
2447 return rc;
2448}
2449
2450static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2451{
2452 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2453 struct common_audit_data ad;
2454 int rc;
2455
2456 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2457 if (rc)
2458 return rc;
2459
2460 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2461 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2462 return 0;
2463
2464 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2465 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2466 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2467}
2468
2469static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2470{
2471 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2472 struct common_audit_data ad;
2473
2474 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2475 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2476 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2477}
2478
2479static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2480 struct path *path,
2481 char *type,
2482 unsigned long flags,
2483 void *data)
2484{
2485 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2486
2487 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2488 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2489 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2490 else
2491 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2492 FILE__MOUNTON);
2493}
2494
2495static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2496{
2497 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2498
2499 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2500 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2501}
2502
2503/* inode security operations */
2504
2505static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2506{
2507 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2508}
2509
2510static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2511{
2512 inode_free_security(inode);
2513}
2514
2515static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2516 char **name, void **value,
2517 size_t *len)
2518{
2519 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2520 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2521 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2522 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2523 int rc;
2524 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2525
2526 dsec = dir->i_security;
2527 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2528
2529 sid = tsec->sid;
2530 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2531
2532 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2533 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2534 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2535 &newsid);
2536 if (rc) {
2537 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2538 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2539 "ino=%ld)\n",
2540 __func__,
2541 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2542 return rc;
2543 }
2544 }
2545
2546 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2547 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2548 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2549 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2550 isec->sid = newsid;
2551 isec->initialized = 1;
2552 }
2553
2554 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2555 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2556
2557 if (name) {
2558 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2559 if (!namep)
2560 return -ENOMEM;
2561 *name = namep;
2562 }
2563
2564 if (value && len) {
2565 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2566 if (rc) {
2567 kfree(namep);
2568 return rc;
2569 }
2570 *value = context;
2571 *len = clen;
2572 }
2573
2574 return 0;
2575}
2576
2577static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2578{
2579 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2580}
2581
2582static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2583{
2584 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2585}
2586
2587static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2588{
2589 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2590}
2591
2592static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2593{
2594 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2595}
2596
2597static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2598{
2599 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2600}
2601
2602static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2603{
2604 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2605}
2606
2607static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2608{
2609 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2610}
2611
2612static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2613 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2614{
2615 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2616}
2617
2618static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2619{
2620 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2621
2622 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2623}
2624
2625static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2626{
2627 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2628
2629 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2630}
2631
2632static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2633{
2634 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2635 struct common_audit_data ad;
2636 u32 perms;
2637 bool from_access;
2638
2639 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2640 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2641
2642 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2643 if (!mask)
2644 return 0;
2645
2646 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2647 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
2648
2649 if (from_access)
2650 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2651
2652 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2653
2654 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
2655}
2656
2657static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2658{
2659 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2660 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2661
2662 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2663 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2664 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2665 ATTR_FORCE);
2666 if (!ia_valid)
2667 return 0;
2668 }
2669
2670 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2671 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2672 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2673
2674 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2675}
2676
2677static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2678{
2679 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2680
2681 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2682}
2683
2684static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2685{
2686 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2687
2688 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2689 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2690 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2691 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2692 return -EPERM;
2693 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2694 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2695 Restrict to administrator. */
2696 return -EPERM;
2697 }
2698 }
2699
2700 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2701 ordinary setattr permission. */
2702 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2703}
2704
2705static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2706 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2707{
2708 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2709 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2710 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2711 struct common_audit_data ad;
2712 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2713 int rc = 0;
2714
2715 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2716 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2717
2718 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2719 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2720 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2721
2722 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2723 return -EPERM;
2724
2725 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2726 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2727
2728 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2729 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2730 if (rc)
2731 return rc;
2732
2733 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2734 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2735 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2736 return rc;
2737 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2738 }
2739 if (rc)
2740 return rc;
2741
2742 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2743 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2744 if (rc)
2745 return rc;
2746
2747 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2748 isec->sclass);
2749 if (rc)
2750 return rc;
2751
2752 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2753 sbsec->sid,
2754 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2755 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2756 &ad);
2757}
2758
2759static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2760 const void *value, size_t size,
2761 int flags)
2762{
2763 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2764 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2765 u32 newsid;
2766 int rc;
2767
2768 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2769 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2770 return;
2771 }
2772
2773 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2774 if (rc) {
2775 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2776 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2777 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2778 return;
2779 }
2780
2781 isec->sid = newsid;
2782 return;
2783}
2784
2785static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2786{
2787 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2788
2789 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2790}
2791
2792static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2793{
2794 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2795
2796 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2797}
2798
2799static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2800{
2801 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2802 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2803
2804 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2805 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2806 return -EACCES;
2807}
2808
2809/*
2810 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2811 *
2812 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2813 */
2814static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2815{
2816 u32 size;
2817 int error;
2818 char *context = NULL;
2819 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2820
2821 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2822 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2823
2824 /*
2825 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2826 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2827 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2828 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2829 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2830 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2831 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2832 */
2833 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2834 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2835 if (!error)
2836 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2837 &size);
2838 else
2839 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2840 if (error)
2841 return error;
2842 error = size;
2843 if (alloc) {
2844 *buffer = context;
2845 goto out_nofree;
2846 }
2847 kfree(context);
2848out_nofree:
2849 return error;
2850}
2851
2852static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2853 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2854{
2855 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2856 u32 newsid;
2857 int rc;
2858
2859 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2860 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2861
2862 if (!value || !size)
2863 return -EACCES;
2864
2865 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2866 if (rc)
2867 return rc;
2868
2869 isec->sid = newsid;
2870 isec->initialized = 1;
2871 return 0;
2872}
2873
2874static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2875{
2876 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2877 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2878 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2879 return len;
2880}
2881
2882static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2883{
2884 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2885 *secid = isec->sid;
2886}
2887
2888/* file security operations */
2889
2890static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2891{
2892 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2893 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2894
2895 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2896 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2897 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2898
2899 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2900 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2901}
2902
2903static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2904{
2905 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2906 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2907 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2908 u32 sid = current_sid();
2909
2910 if (!mask)
2911 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2912 return 0;
2913
2914 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2915 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2916 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2917 return 0;
2918
2919 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2920}
2921
2922static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2923{
2924 return file_alloc_security(file);
2925}
2926
2927static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2928{
2929 file_free_security(file);
2930}
2931
2932static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2933 unsigned long arg)
2934{
2935 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2936 u32 av = 0;
2937
2938 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2939 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2940 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2941 av |= FILE__READ;
2942 if (!av)
2943 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2944
2945 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2946}
2947
2948static int default_noexec;
2949
2950static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2951{
2952 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2953 int rc = 0;
2954
2955 if (default_noexec &&
2956 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2957 /*
2958 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2959 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2960 * This has an additional check.
2961 */
2962 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2963 if (rc)
2964 goto error;
2965 }
2966
2967 if (file) {
2968 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2969 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2970
2971 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2972 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2973 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2974
2975 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2976 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2977
2978 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2979 }
2980
2981error:
2982 return rc;
2983}
2984
2985static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2986 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2987 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2988{
2989 int rc = 0;
2990 u32 sid = current_sid();
2991
2992 /*
2993 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
2994 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
2995 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
2996 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
2997 */
2998 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
2999 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3000 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3001 if (rc)
3002 return rc;
3003 }
3004
3005 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3006 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3007 if (rc || addr_only)
3008 return rc;
3009
3010 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3011 prot = reqprot;
3012
3013 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3014 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3015}
3016
3017static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3018 unsigned long reqprot,
3019 unsigned long prot)
3020{
3021 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3022
3023 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3024 prot = reqprot;
3025
3026 if (default_noexec &&
3027 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3028 int rc = 0;
3029 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3030 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3031 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3032 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3033 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3034 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3035 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3036 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3037 /*
3038 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3039 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3040 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3041 * modified content. This typically should only
3042 * occur for text relocations.
3043 */
3044 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3045 }
3046 if (rc)
3047 return rc;
3048 }
3049
3050 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3051}
3052
3053static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3054{
3055 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3056
3057 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3058}
3059
3060static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3061 unsigned long arg)
3062{
3063 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3064 int err = 0;
3065
3066 switch (cmd) {
3067 case F_SETFL:
3068 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3069 err = -EINVAL;
3070 break;
3071 }
3072
3073 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3074 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3075 break;
3076 }
3077 /* fall through */
3078 case F_SETOWN:
3079 case F_SETSIG:
3080 case F_GETFL:
3081 case F_GETOWN:
3082 case F_GETSIG:
3083 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3084 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3085 break;
3086 case F_GETLK:
3087 case F_SETLK:
3088 case F_SETLKW:
3089#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3090 case F_GETLK64:
3091 case F_SETLK64:
3092 case F_SETLKW64:
3093#endif
3094 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3095 err = -EINVAL;
3096 break;
3097 }
3098 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3099 break;
3100 }
3101
3102 return err;
3103}
3104
3105static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3106{
3107 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3108
3109 fsec = file->f_security;
3110 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3111
3112 return 0;
3113}
3114
3115static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3116 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3117{
3118 struct file *file;
3119 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3120 u32 perm;
3121 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3122
3123 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3124 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3125
3126 fsec = file->f_security;
3127
3128 if (!signum)
3129 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3130 else
3131 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3132
3133 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3134 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3135}
3136
3137static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3138{
3139 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3140
3141 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3142}
3143
3144static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3145{
3146 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3147 struct inode *inode;
3148 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3149
3150 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3151 fsec = file->f_security;
3152 isec = inode->i_security;
3153 /*
3154 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3155 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3156 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3157 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3158 * struct as its SID.
3159 */
3160 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3161 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3162 /*
3163 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3164 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3165 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3166 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3167 * new inode label or new policy.
3168 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3169 */
3170 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3171}
3172
3173/* task security operations */
3174
3175static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3176{
3177 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3178}
3179
3180/*
3181 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3182 */
3183static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3184{
3185 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3186
3187 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3188 if (!tsec)
3189 return -ENOMEM;
3190
3191 cred->security = tsec;
3192 return 0;
3193}
3194
3195/*
3196 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3197 */
3198static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3199{
3200 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3201
3202 BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3203 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3204 kfree(tsec);
3205}
3206
3207/*
3208 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3209 */
3210static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3211 gfp_t gfp)
3212{
3213 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3215
3216 old_tsec = old->security;
3217
3218 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3219 if (!tsec)
3220 return -ENOMEM;
3221
3222 new->security = tsec;
3223 return 0;
3224}
3225
3226/*
3227 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3228 */
3229static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3230{
3231 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3232 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3233
3234 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3235}
3236
3237/*
3238 * set the security data for a kernel service
3239 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3240 */
3241static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3242{
3243 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3244 u32 sid = current_sid();
3245 int ret;
3246
3247 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3248 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3249 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3250 NULL);
3251 if (ret == 0) {
3252 tsec->sid = secid;
3253 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3254 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3255 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3256 }
3257 return ret;
3258}
3259
3260/*
3261 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3262 * objective context of the specified inode
3263 */
3264static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3265{
3266 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3267 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3268 u32 sid = current_sid();
3269 int ret;
3270
3271 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3272 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3273 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3274 NULL);
3275
3276 if (ret == 0)
3277 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3278 return ret;
3279}
3280
3281static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3282{
3283 u32 sid;
3284 struct common_audit_data ad;
3285
3286 sid = task_sid(current);
3287
3288 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3289 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3290
3291 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3292 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3293}
3294
3295static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3296{
3297 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3298}
3299
3300static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3301{
3302 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3303}
3304
3305static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3306{
3307 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3308}
3309
3310static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3311{
3312 *secid = task_sid(p);
3313}
3314
3315static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3316{
3317 int rc;
3318
3319 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3320 if (rc)
3321 return rc;
3322
3323 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3324}
3325
3326static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3327{
3328 int rc;
3329
3330 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3331 if (rc)
3332 return rc;
3333
3334 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3335}
3336
3337static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3338{
3339 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3340}
3341
3342static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3343 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3344{
3345 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3346
3347 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3348 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3349 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3350 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3351 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3352 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3353
3354 return 0;
3355}
3356
3357static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3358{
3359 int rc;
3360
3361 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3362 if (rc)
3363 return rc;
3364
3365 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3366}
3367
3368static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3369{
3370 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3371}
3372
3373static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3374{
3375 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3376}
3377
3378static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3379 int sig, u32 secid)
3380{
3381 u32 perm;
3382 int rc;
3383
3384 if (!sig)
3385 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3386 else
3387 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3388 if (secid)
3389 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3390 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3391 else
3392 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3393 return rc;
3394}
3395
3396static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3397{
3398 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3399}
3400
3401static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3402 struct inode *inode)
3403{
3404 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3405 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3406
3407 isec->sid = sid;
3408 isec->initialized = 1;
3409}
3410
3411/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3412static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3413 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3414{
3415 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3416 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3417
3418 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3419 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3420 if (ih == NULL)
3421 goto out;
3422
3423 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3424 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3425 goto out;
3426
3427 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3428 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3429 ret = 0;
3430
3431 if (proto)
3432 *proto = ih->protocol;
3433
3434 switch (ih->protocol) {
3435 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3436 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3437
3438 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3439 break;
3440
3441 offset += ihlen;
3442 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3443 if (th == NULL)
3444 break;
3445
3446 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3447 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3448 break;
3449 }
3450
3451 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3452 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3453
3454 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3455 break;
3456
3457 offset += ihlen;
3458 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3459 if (uh == NULL)
3460 break;
3461
3462 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3463 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3464 break;
3465 }
3466
3467 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3468 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3469
3470 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3471 break;
3472
3473 offset += ihlen;
3474 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3475 if (dh == NULL)
3476 break;
3477
3478 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3479 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3480 break;
3481 }
3482
3483 default:
3484 break;
3485 }
3486out:
3487 return ret;
3488}
3489
3490#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3491
3492/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3493static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3494 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3495{
3496 u8 nexthdr;
3497 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3498 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3499
3500 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3501 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3502 if (ip6 == NULL)
3503 goto out;
3504
3505 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3506 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3507 ret = 0;
3508
3509 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3510 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3511 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3512 if (offset < 0)
3513 goto out;
3514
3515 if (proto)
3516 *proto = nexthdr;
3517
3518 switch (nexthdr) {
3519 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3520 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3521
3522 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3523 if (th == NULL)
3524 break;
3525
3526 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3527 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3528 break;
3529 }
3530
3531 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3532 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3533
3534 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3535 if (uh == NULL)
3536 break;
3537
3538 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3539 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3540 break;
3541 }
3542
3543 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3544 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3545
3546 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3547 if (dh == NULL)
3548 break;
3549
3550 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3551 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3552 break;
3553 }
3554
3555 /* includes fragments */
3556 default:
3557 break;
3558 }
3559out:
3560 return ret;
3561}
3562
3563#endif /* IPV6 */
3564
3565static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3566 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3567{
3568 char *addrp;
3569 int ret;
3570
3571 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3572 case PF_INET:
3573 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3574 if (ret)
3575 goto parse_error;
3576 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3577 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3578 goto okay;
3579
3580#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3581 case PF_INET6:
3582 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3583 if (ret)
3584 goto parse_error;
3585 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3586 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3587 goto okay;
3588#endif /* IPV6 */
3589 default:
3590 addrp = NULL;
3591 goto okay;
3592 }
3593
3594parse_error:
3595 printk(KERN_WARNING
3596 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3597 " unable to parse packet\n");
3598 return ret;
3599
3600okay:
3601 if (_addrp)
3602 *_addrp = addrp;
3603 return 0;
3604}
3605
3606/**
3607 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3608 * @skb: the packet
3609 * @family: protocol family
3610 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3611 *
3612 * Description:
3613 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3614 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3615 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3616 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3617 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3618 * peer labels.
3619 *
3620 */
3621static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3622{
3623 int err;
3624 u32 xfrm_sid;
3625 u32 nlbl_sid;
3626 u32 nlbl_type;
3627
3628 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3629 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3630
3631 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3632 if (unlikely(err)) {
3633 printk(KERN_WARNING
3634 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3635 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3636 return -EACCES;
3637 }
3638
3639 return 0;
3640}
3641
3642/* socket security operations */
3643
3644static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec)
3645{
3646 return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3647}
3648
3649static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3650{
3651 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3652 struct common_audit_data ad;
3653 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3654
3655 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3656 return 0;
3657
3658 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3659 ad.u.net.sk = sk;
3660
3661 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3662}
3663
3664static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3665 int protocol, int kern)
3666{
3667 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3668 u32 newsid;
3669 u16 secclass;
3670
3671 if (kern)
3672 return 0;
3673
3674 newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
3675 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3676 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3677}
3678
3679static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3680 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3681{
3682 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3683 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3684 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3685 int err = 0;
3686
3687 if (kern)
3688 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3689 else
3690 isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
3691
3692 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3693 isec->initialized = 1;
3694
3695 if (sock->sk) {
3696 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3697 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3698 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3699 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3700 }
3701
3702 return err;
3703}
3704
3705/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3706 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3707 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3708
3709static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3710{
3711 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3712 u16 family;
3713 int err;
3714
3715 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3716 if (err)
3717 goto out;
3718
3719 /*
3720 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3721 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3722 * check the first address now.
3723 */
3724 family = sk->sk_family;
3725 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3726 char *addrp;
3727 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3728 struct common_audit_data ad;
3729 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3730 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3731 unsigned short snum;
3732 u32 sid, node_perm;
3733
3734 if (family == PF_INET) {
3735 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3736 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3737 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3738 } else {
3739 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3740 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3741 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3742 }
3743
3744 if (snum) {
3745 int low, high;
3746
3747 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3748
3749 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3750 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3751 snum, &sid);
3752 if (err)
3753 goto out;
3754 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3755 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3756 ad.u.net.family = family;
3757 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3758 sksec->sclass,
3759 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3760 if (err)
3761 goto out;
3762 }
3763 }
3764
3765 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3766 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3767 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3768 break;
3769
3770 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3771 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3772 break;
3773
3774 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3775 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3776 break;
3777
3778 default:
3779 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3780 break;
3781 }
3782
3783 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3784 if (err)
3785 goto out;
3786
3787 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3788 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3789 ad.u.net.family = family;
3790
3791 if (family == PF_INET)
3792 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3793 else
3794 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3795
3796 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3797 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3798 if (err)
3799 goto out;
3800 }
3801out:
3802 return err;
3803}
3804
3805static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3806{
3807 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3808 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3809 int err;
3810
3811 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3812 if (err)
3813 return err;
3814
3815 /*
3816 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3817 */
3818 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3819 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3820 struct common_audit_data ad;
3821 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3822 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3823 unsigned short snum;
3824 u32 sid, perm;
3825
3826 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3827 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3828 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3829 return -EINVAL;
3830 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3831 } else {
3832 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3833 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3834 return -EINVAL;
3835 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3836 }
3837
3838 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3839 if (err)
3840 goto out;
3841
3842 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3843 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3844
3845 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3846 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3847 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3848 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3849 if (err)
3850 goto out;
3851 }
3852
3853 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3854
3855out:
3856 return err;
3857}
3858
3859static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3860{
3861 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3862}
3863
3864static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3865{
3866 int err;
3867 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3868 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3869
3870 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3871 if (err)
3872 return err;
3873
3874 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3875
3876 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3877 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3878 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3879 newisec->initialized = 1;
3880
3881 return 0;
3882}
3883
3884static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3885 int size)
3886{
3887 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3888}
3889
3890static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3891 int size, int flags)
3892{
3893 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3894}
3895
3896static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3897{
3898 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3899}
3900
3901static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3902{
3903 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3904}
3905
3906static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3907{
3908 int err;
3909
3910 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3911 if (err)
3912 return err;
3913
3914 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3915}
3916
3917static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3918 int optname)
3919{
3920 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3921}
3922
3923static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3924{
3925 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3926}
3927
3928static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3929 struct socket *other,
3930 struct sock *newsk)
3931{
3932 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security;
3933 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security;
3934 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
3935 struct common_audit_data ad;
3936 int err;
3937
3938 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3939 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3940
3941 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
3942 sksec_other->sclass,
3943 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3944 if (err)
3945 return err;
3946
3947 /* server child socket */
3948 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
3949 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
3950 &sksec_new->sid);
3951 if (err)
3952 return err;
3953
3954 /* connecting socket */
3955 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
3956
3957 return 0;
3958}
3959
3960static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3961 struct socket *other)
3962{
3963 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3964 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
3965 struct common_audit_data ad;
3966
3967 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3968 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3969
3970 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
3971 &ad);
3972}
3973
3974static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3975 u32 peer_sid,
3976 struct common_audit_data *ad)
3977{
3978 int err;
3979 u32 if_sid;
3980 u32 node_sid;
3981
3982 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3983 if (err)
3984 return err;
3985 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3986 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3987 if (err)
3988 return err;
3989
3990 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3991 if (err)
3992 return err;
3993 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3994 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3995}
3996
3997static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3998 u16 family)
3999{
4000 int err = 0;
4001 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4002 u32 peer_sid;
4003 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4004 struct common_audit_data ad;
4005 char *addrp;
4006
4007 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4008 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4009 ad.u.net.family = family;
4010 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4011 if (err)
4012 return err;
4013
4014 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4015 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4016 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4017 if (err)
4018 return err;
4019 }
4020
4021 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4022 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4023 if (err)
4024 return err;
4025 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4026 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4027 if (err)
4028 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4029 } else {
4030 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4031 if (err)
4032 return err;
4033 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4034 }
4035
4036 return err;
4037}
4038
4039static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4040{
4041 int err;
4042 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4043 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4044 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4045 struct common_audit_data ad;
4046 char *addrp;
4047 u8 secmark_active;
4048 u8 peerlbl_active;
4049
4050 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4051 return 0;
4052
4053 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4054 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4055 family = PF_INET;
4056
4057 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4058 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4059 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4060 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4061 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4062 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4063
4064 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4065 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4066 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4067 return 0;
4068
4069 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4070 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4071 ad.u.net.family = family;
4072 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4073 if (err)
4074 return err;
4075
4076 if (peerlbl_active) {
4077 u32 peer_sid;
4078
4079 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4080 if (err)
4081 return err;
4082 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4083 peer_sid, &ad);
4084 if (err) {
4085 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4086 return err;
4087 }
4088 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4089 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4090 if (err)
4091 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4092 }
4093
4094 if (secmark_active) {
4095 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4096 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4097 if (err)
4098 return err;
4099 }
4100
4101 return err;
4102}
4103
4104static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4105 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4106{
4107 int err = 0;
4108 char *scontext;
4109 u32 scontext_len;
4110 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4111 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4112
4113 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4114 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4115 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4116 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4117 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4118
4119 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4120 if (err)
4121 return err;
4122
4123 if (scontext_len > len) {
4124 err = -ERANGE;
4125 goto out_len;
4126 }
4127
4128 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4129 err = -EFAULT;
4130
4131out_len:
4132 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4133 err = -EFAULT;
4134 kfree(scontext);
4135 return err;
4136}
4137
4138static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4139{
4140 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4141 u16 family;
4142
4143 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4144 family = PF_INET;
4145 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4146 family = PF_INET6;
4147 else if (sock)
4148 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4149 else
4150 goto out;
4151
4152 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4153 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4154 else if (skb)
4155 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4156
4157out:
4158 *secid = peer_secid;
4159 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4160 return -EINVAL;
4161 return 0;
4162}
4163
4164static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4165{
4166 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4167
4168 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4169 if (!sksec)
4170 return -ENOMEM;
4171
4172 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4173 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4174 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4175 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4176
4177 return 0;
4178}
4179
4180static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4181{
4182 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4183
4184 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4185 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4186 kfree(sksec);
4187}
4188
4189static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4190{
4191 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4192 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4193
4194 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4195 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4196 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4197
4198 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4199}
4200
4201static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4202{
4203 if (!sk)
4204 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4205 else {
4206 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4207
4208 *secid = sksec->sid;
4209 }
4210}
4211
4212static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4213{
4214 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4215 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4216
4217 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4218 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4219 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4220 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4221}
4222
4223static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4224 struct request_sock *req)
4225{
4226 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4227 int err;
4228 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4229 u32 newsid;
4230 u32 peersid;
4231
4232 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4233 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4234 family = PF_INET;
4235
4236 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4237 if (err)
4238 return err;
4239 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4240 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4241 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4242 } else {
4243 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4244 if (err)
4245 return err;
4246 req->secid = newsid;
4247 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4248 }
4249
4250 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4251}
4252
4253static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4254 const struct request_sock *req)
4255{
4256 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4257
4258 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4259 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4260 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4261 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4262 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4263 time it will have been created and available. */
4264
4265 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4266 * thread with access to newsksec */
4267 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4268}
4269
4270static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4271{
4272 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4273 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4274
4275 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4276 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4277 family = PF_INET;
4278
4279 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4280}
4281
4282static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4283{
4284 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4285 u32 tsid;
4286
4287 __tsec = current_security();
4288 tsid = __tsec->sid;
4289
4290 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4291}
4292
4293static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4294{
4295 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4296}
4297
4298static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4299{
4300 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4301}
4302
4303static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4304 struct flowi *fl)
4305{
4306 fl->secid = req->secid;
4307}
4308
4309static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4310{
4311 u32 sid = current_sid();
4312
4313 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4314 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4315 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4316 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4317 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4318 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4319
4320 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4321 NULL);
4322}
4323
4324static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4325{
4326 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4327
4328 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4329 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4330 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4331 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4332 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4333 * protocols were being used */
4334
4335 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4336 * the sockcreate SID here */
4337
4338 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4339 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4340}
4341
4342static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4343{
4344 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4345 u32 sid = current_sid();
4346 int err;
4347
4348 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4349 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4350 if (err)
4351 return err;
4352 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4353 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4354 if (err)
4355 return err;
4356
4357 sksec->sid = sid;
4358
4359 return 0;
4360}
4361
4362static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4363{
4364 int err = 0;
4365 u32 perm;
4366 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4367 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4368
4369 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4370 err = -EINVAL;
4371 goto out;
4372 }
4373 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4374
4375 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4376 if (err) {
4377 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4378 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4379 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4380 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4381 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4382 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4383 err = 0;
4384 }
4385
4386 /* Ignore */
4387 if (err == -ENOENT)
4388 err = 0;
4389 goto out;
4390 }
4391
4392 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4393out:
4394 return err;
4395}
4396
4397#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4398
4399static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4400 u16 family)
4401{
4402 int err;
4403 char *addrp;
4404 u32 peer_sid;
4405 struct common_audit_data ad;
4406 u8 secmark_active;
4407 u8 netlbl_active;
4408 u8 peerlbl_active;
4409
4410 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4411 return NF_ACCEPT;
4412
4413 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4414 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4415 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4416 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4417 return NF_ACCEPT;
4418
4419 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4420 return NF_DROP;
4421
4422 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4423 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4424 ad.u.net.family = family;
4425 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4426 return NF_DROP;
4427
4428 if (peerlbl_active) {
4429 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4430 peer_sid, &ad);
4431 if (err) {
4432 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4433 return NF_DROP;
4434 }
4435 }
4436
4437 if (secmark_active)
4438 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4439 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4440 return NF_DROP;
4441
4442 if (netlbl_active)
4443 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4444 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4445 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4446 * protection */
4447 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4448 return NF_DROP;
4449
4450 return NF_ACCEPT;
4451}
4452
4453static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4454 struct sk_buff *skb,
4455 const struct net_device *in,
4456 const struct net_device *out,
4457 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4458{
4459 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4460}
4461
4462#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4463static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4464 struct sk_buff *skb,
4465 const struct net_device *in,
4466 const struct net_device *out,
4467 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4468{
4469 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4470}
4471#endif /* IPV6 */
4472
4473static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4474 u16 family)
4475{
4476 u32 sid;
4477
4478 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4479 return NF_ACCEPT;
4480
4481 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4482 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4483 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4484 if (skb->sk) {
4485 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4486 sid = sksec->sid;
4487 } else
4488 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4489 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4490 return NF_DROP;
4491
4492 return NF_ACCEPT;
4493}
4494
4495static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4496 struct sk_buff *skb,
4497 const struct net_device *in,
4498 const struct net_device *out,
4499 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4500{
4501 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4502}
4503
4504static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4505 int ifindex,
4506 u16 family)
4507{
4508 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4509 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4510 struct common_audit_data ad;
4511 char *addrp;
4512 u8 proto;
4513
4514 if (sk == NULL)
4515 return NF_ACCEPT;
4516 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4517
4518 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4519 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4520 ad.u.net.family = family;
4521 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4522 return NF_DROP;
4523
4524 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4525 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4526 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4527 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4528
4529 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4530 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4531 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4532
4533 return NF_ACCEPT;
4534}
4535
4536static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4537 u16 family)
4538{
4539 u32 secmark_perm;
4540 u32 peer_sid;
4541 struct sock *sk;
4542 struct common_audit_data ad;
4543 char *addrp;
4544 u8 secmark_active;
4545 u8 peerlbl_active;
4546
4547 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4548 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4549 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4550 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4551 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4552 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4553#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4554 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4555 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4556 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4557 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4558 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4559 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4560 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4561 return NF_ACCEPT;
4562#endif
4563 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4564 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4565 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4566 return NF_ACCEPT;
4567
4568 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4569 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4570 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4571 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4572 sk = skb->sk;
4573 if (sk == NULL) {
4574 switch (family) {
4575 case PF_INET:
4576 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4577 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4578 else
4579 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4580 break;
4581 case PF_INET6:
4582 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4583 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4584 else
4585 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4586 break;
4587 default:
4588 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4589 }
4590 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4591 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4592 return NF_DROP;
4593 } else
4594 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4595 } else {
4596 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4597 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4598 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4599 }
4600
4601 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4602 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4603 ad.u.net.family = family;
4604 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4605 return NF_DROP;
4606
4607 if (secmark_active)
4608 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4609 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4610 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4611
4612 if (peerlbl_active) {
4613 u32 if_sid;
4614 u32 node_sid;
4615
4616 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4617 return NF_DROP;
4618 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4619 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4620 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4621
4622 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4623 return NF_DROP;
4624 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4625 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4626 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4627 }
4628
4629 return NF_ACCEPT;
4630}
4631
4632static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4633 struct sk_buff *skb,
4634 const struct net_device *in,
4635 const struct net_device *out,
4636 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4637{
4638 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4639}
4640
4641#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4642static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4643 struct sk_buff *skb,
4644 const struct net_device *in,
4645 const struct net_device *out,
4646 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4647{
4648 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4649}
4650#endif /* IPV6 */
4651
4652#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4653
4654static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4655{
4656 int err;
4657
4658 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4659 if (err)
4660 return err;
4661
4662 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4663}
4664
4665static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4666{
4667 int err;
4668 struct common_audit_data ad;
4669
4670 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4671 if (err)
4672 return err;
4673
4674 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4675 ad.u.cap = capability;
4676
4677 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4678 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4679}
4680
4681static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4682 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4683 u16 sclass)
4684{
4685 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4686 u32 sid;
4687
4688 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4689 if (!isec)
4690 return -ENOMEM;
4691
4692 sid = task_sid(task);
4693 isec->sclass = sclass;
4694 isec->sid = sid;
4695 perm->security = isec;
4696
4697 return 0;
4698}
4699
4700static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4701{
4702 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4703 perm->security = NULL;
4704 kfree(isec);
4705}
4706
4707static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4708{
4709 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4710
4711 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4712 if (!msec)
4713 return -ENOMEM;
4714
4715 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4716 msg->security = msec;
4717
4718 return 0;
4719}
4720
4721static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4722{
4723 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4724
4725 msg->security = NULL;
4726 kfree(msec);
4727}
4728
4729static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4730 u32 perms)
4731{
4732 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4733 struct common_audit_data ad;
4734 u32 sid = current_sid();
4735
4736 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4737
4738 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4739 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4740
4741 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4742}
4743
4744static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4745{
4746 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4747}
4748
4749static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4750{
4751 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4752}
4753
4754/* message queue security operations */
4755static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4756{
4757 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4758 struct common_audit_data ad;
4759 u32 sid = current_sid();
4760 int rc;
4761
4762 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4763 if (rc)
4764 return rc;
4765
4766 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4767
4768 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4769 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4770
4771 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4772 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4773 if (rc) {
4774 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4775 return rc;
4776 }
4777 return 0;
4778}
4779
4780static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4781{
4782 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4783}
4784
4785static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4786{
4787 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4788 struct common_audit_data ad;
4789 u32 sid = current_sid();
4790
4791 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4792
4793 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4794 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4795
4796 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4797 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4798}
4799
4800static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4801{
4802 int err;
4803 int perms;
4804
4805 switch (cmd) {
4806 case IPC_INFO:
4807 case MSG_INFO:
4808 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4809 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4810 case IPC_STAT:
4811 case MSG_STAT:
4812 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4813 break;
4814 case IPC_SET:
4815 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4816 break;
4817 case IPC_RMID:
4818 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4819 break;
4820 default:
4821 return 0;
4822 }
4823
4824 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4825 return err;
4826}
4827
4828static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4829{
4830 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4831 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4832 struct common_audit_data ad;
4833 u32 sid = current_sid();
4834 int rc;
4835
4836 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4837 msec = msg->security;
4838
4839 /*
4840 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4841 */
4842 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4843 /*
4844 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4845 * message queue this message will be stored in
4846 */
4847 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4848 &msec->sid);
4849 if (rc)
4850 return rc;
4851 }
4852
4853 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4854 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4855
4856 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4857 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4858 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4859 if (!rc)
4860 /* Can this process send the message */
4861 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4862 MSG__SEND, &ad);
4863 if (!rc)
4864 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4865 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4866 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4867
4868 return rc;
4869}
4870
4871static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4872 struct task_struct *target,
4873 long type, int mode)
4874{
4875 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4876 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4877 struct common_audit_data ad;
4878 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4879 int rc;
4880
4881 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4882 msec = msg->security;
4883
4884 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4885 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4886
4887 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4888 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4889 if (!rc)
4890 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4891 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4892 return rc;
4893}
4894
4895/* Shared Memory security operations */
4896static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4897{
4898 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4899 struct common_audit_data ad;
4900 u32 sid = current_sid();
4901 int rc;
4902
4903 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4904 if (rc)
4905 return rc;
4906
4907 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4908
4909 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4910 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4911
4912 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4913 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4914 if (rc) {
4915 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4916 return rc;
4917 }
4918 return 0;
4919}
4920
4921static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4922{
4923 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4924}
4925
4926static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4927{
4928 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4929 struct common_audit_data ad;
4930 u32 sid = current_sid();
4931
4932 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4933
4934 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4935 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4936
4937 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4938 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4939}
4940
4941/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4942static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4943{
4944 int perms;
4945 int err;
4946
4947 switch (cmd) {
4948 case IPC_INFO:
4949 case SHM_INFO:
4950 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4951 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4952 case IPC_STAT:
4953 case SHM_STAT:
4954 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4955 break;
4956 case IPC_SET:
4957 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4958 break;
4959 case SHM_LOCK:
4960 case SHM_UNLOCK:
4961 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4962 break;
4963 case IPC_RMID:
4964 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4965 break;
4966 default:
4967 return 0;
4968 }
4969
4970 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4971 return err;
4972}
4973
4974static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4975 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4976{
4977 u32 perms;
4978
4979 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4980 perms = SHM__READ;
4981 else
4982 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4983
4984 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4985}
4986
4987/* Semaphore security operations */
4988static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4989{
4990 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4991 struct common_audit_data ad;
4992 u32 sid = current_sid();
4993 int rc;
4994
4995 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4996 if (rc)
4997 return rc;
4998
4999 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5000
5001 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5002 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5003
5004 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5005 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5006 if (rc) {
5007 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5008 return rc;
5009 }
5010 return 0;
5011}
5012
5013static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5014{
5015 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5016}
5017
5018static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5019{
5020 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5021 struct common_audit_data ad;
5022 u32 sid = current_sid();
5023
5024 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5025
5026 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5027 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5028
5029 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5030 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5031}
5032
5033/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5034static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5035{
5036 int err;
5037 u32 perms;
5038
5039 switch (cmd) {
5040 case IPC_INFO:
5041 case SEM_INFO:
5042 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5043 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5044 case GETPID:
5045 case GETNCNT:
5046 case GETZCNT:
5047 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5048 break;
5049 case GETVAL:
5050 case GETALL:
5051 perms = SEM__READ;
5052 break;
5053 case SETVAL:
5054 case SETALL:
5055 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5056 break;
5057 case IPC_RMID:
5058 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5059 break;
5060 case IPC_SET:
5061 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5062 break;
5063 case IPC_STAT:
5064 case SEM_STAT:
5065 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5066 break;
5067 default:
5068 return 0;
5069 }
5070
5071 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5072 return err;
5073}
5074
5075static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5076 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5077{
5078 u32 perms;
5079
5080 if (alter)
5081 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5082 else
5083 perms = SEM__READ;
5084
5085 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5086}
5087
5088static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5089{
5090 u32 av = 0;
5091
5092 av = 0;
5093 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5094 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5095 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5096 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5097
5098 if (av == 0)
5099 return 0;
5100
5101 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5102}
5103
5104static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5105{
5106 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5107 *secid = isec->sid;
5108}
5109
5110static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5111{
5112 if (inode)
5113 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5114}
5115
5116static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5117 char *name, char **value)
5118{
5119 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5120 u32 sid;
5121 int error;
5122 unsigned len;
5123
5124 if (current != p) {
5125 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5126 if (error)
5127 return error;
5128 }
5129
5130 rcu_read_lock();
5131 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5132
5133 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5134 sid = __tsec->sid;
5135 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5136 sid = __tsec->osid;
5137 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5138 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5139 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5140 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5141 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5142 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5143 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5144 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5145 else
5146 goto invalid;
5147 rcu_read_unlock();
5148
5149 if (!sid)
5150 return 0;
5151
5152 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5153 if (error)
5154 return error;
5155 return len;
5156
5157invalid:
5158 rcu_read_unlock();
5159 return -EINVAL;
5160}
5161
5162static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5163 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5164{
5165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5166 struct task_struct *tracer;
5167 struct cred *new;
5168 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5169 int error;
5170 char *str = value;
5171
5172 if (current != p) {
5173 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5174 security attributes. */
5175 return -EACCES;
5176 }
5177
5178 /*
5179 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5180 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5181 * above restriction is ever removed.
5182 */
5183 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5184 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5185 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5186 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5187 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5188 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5189 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5190 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5191 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5192 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5193 else
5194 error = -EINVAL;
5195 if (error)
5196 return error;
5197
5198 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5199 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5200 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5201 str[size-1] = 0;
5202 size--;
5203 }
5204 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5205 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5206 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5207 return error;
5208 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5209 &sid);
5210 }
5211 if (error)
5212 return error;
5213 }
5214
5215 new = prepare_creds();
5216 if (!new)
5217 return -ENOMEM;
5218
5219 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5220 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5221 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5222 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5223 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5224 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5225 tsec = new->security;
5226 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5227 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5228 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5229 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5230 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5231 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5232 if (error)
5233 goto abort_change;
5234 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5235 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5236 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5237 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5238 error = -EINVAL;
5239 if (sid == 0)
5240 goto abort_change;
5241
5242 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5243 error = -EPERM;
5244 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5245 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5246 if (error)
5247 goto abort_change;
5248 }
5249
5250 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5251 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5252 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5253 if (error)
5254 goto abort_change;
5255
5256 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5257 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5258 ptsid = 0;
5259 task_lock(p);
5260 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5261 if (tracer)
5262 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5263 task_unlock(p);
5264
5265 if (tracer) {
5266 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5267 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5268 if (error)
5269 goto abort_change;
5270 }
5271
5272 tsec->sid = sid;
5273 } else {
5274 error = -EINVAL;
5275 goto abort_change;
5276 }
5277
5278 commit_creds(new);
5279 return size;
5280
5281abort_change:
5282 abort_creds(new);
5283 return error;
5284}
5285
5286static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5287{
5288 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5289}
5290
5291static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5292{
5293 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5294}
5295
5296static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5297{
5298 kfree(secdata);
5299}
5300
5301/*
5302 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5303 */
5304static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5305{
5306 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5307}
5308
5309/*
5310 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5311 */
5312static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5313{
5314 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5315}
5316
5317static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5318{
5319 int len = 0;
5320 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5321 ctx, true);
5322 if (len < 0)
5323 return len;
5324 *ctxlen = len;
5325 return 0;
5326}
5327#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5328
5329static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5330 unsigned long flags)
5331{
5332 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5333 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5334
5335 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5336 if (!ksec)
5337 return -ENOMEM;
5338
5339 tsec = cred->security;
5340 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5341 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5342 else
5343 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5344
5345 k->security = ksec;
5346 return 0;
5347}
5348
5349static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5350{
5351 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5352
5353 k->security = NULL;
5354 kfree(ksec);
5355}
5356
5357static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5358 const struct cred *cred,
5359 key_perm_t perm)
5360{
5361 struct key *key;
5362 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5363 u32 sid;
5364
5365 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5366 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5367 appear to be created. */
5368 if (perm == 0)
5369 return 0;
5370
5371 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5372
5373 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5374 ksec = key->security;
5375
5376 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5377}
5378
5379static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5380{
5381 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5382 char *context = NULL;
5383 unsigned len;
5384 int rc;
5385
5386 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5387 if (!rc)
5388 rc = len;
5389 *_buffer = context;
5390 return rc;
5391}
5392
5393#endif
5394
5395static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5396 .name = "selinux",
5397
5398 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5399 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5400 .capget = selinux_capget,
5401 .capset = selinux_capset,
5402 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5403 .capable = selinux_capable,
5404 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5405 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5406 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5407 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5408
5409 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5410 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5411
5412 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5413 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5414 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5415 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5416
5417 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5418 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5419 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5420 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5421 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5422 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5423 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5424 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5425 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5426 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5427 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5428
5429
5430 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5431 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5432 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5433 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5434 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5435 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5436 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5437 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5438 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5439 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5440 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5441 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5442 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5443 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5444 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5445 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5446 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5447 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5448 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5449 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5450 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5451 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5452 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5453 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5454 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5455
5456 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5457 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5458 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5459 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5460 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5461 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5462 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5463 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5464 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5465 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5466 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5467
5468 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5469
5470 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5471 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5472 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5473 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5474 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5475 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5476 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5477 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5478 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5479 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5480 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5481 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5482 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5483 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5484 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5485 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5486 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5487 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5488 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5489 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5490 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5491 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5492
5493 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5494 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5495
5496 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5497 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5498
5499 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5500 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5501 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5502 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5503 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5504 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5505
5506 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5507 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5508 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5509 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5510 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5511
5512 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5513 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5514 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5515 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5516 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5517
5518 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5519
5520 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5521 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5522
5523 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5524 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5525 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5526 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5527 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5528 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5529
5530 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5531 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5532
5533 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5534 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5535 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5536 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5537 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5538 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5539 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5540 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5541 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5542 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5543 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5544 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5545 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5546 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5547 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5548 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5549 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5550 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5551 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5552 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5553 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5554 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5555 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5556 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5557 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5558 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5559 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5560 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5561 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5562 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5563 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5564
5565#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5566 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5567 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5568 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5569 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5570 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5571 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5572 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5573 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5574 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5575 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5576#endif
5577
5578#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5579 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5580 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5581 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5582 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5583#endif
5584
5585#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5586 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5587 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5588 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5589 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5590#endif
5591};
5592
5593static __init int selinux_init(void)
5594{
5595 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5596 selinux_enabled = 0;
5597 return 0;
5598 }
5599
5600 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5601 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5602 return 0;
5603 }
5604
5605 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5606
5607 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5608 cred_init_security();
5609
5610 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5611
5612 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5613 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5614 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5615 avc_init();
5616
5617 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5618 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5619
5620 if (selinux_enforcing)
5621 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5622 else
5623 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5624
5625 return 0;
5626}
5627
5628static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5629{
5630 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5631}
5632
5633void selinux_complete_init(void)
5634{
5635 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5636
5637 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5638 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5639 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5640}
5641
5642/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5643 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5644security_initcall(selinux_init);
5645
5646#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5647
5648static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5649 {
5650 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5651 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5652 .pf = PF_INET,
5653 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5654 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5655 },
5656 {
5657 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5658 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5659 .pf = PF_INET,
5660 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5661 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5662 },
5663 {
5664 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5665 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5666 .pf = PF_INET,
5667 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5668 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5669 }
5670};
5671
5672#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5673
5674static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5675 {
5676 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5677 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5678 .pf = PF_INET6,
5679 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5680 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5681 },
5682 {
5683 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5684 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5685 .pf = PF_INET6,
5686 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5687 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5688 }
5689};
5690
5691#endif /* IPV6 */
5692
5693static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5694{
5695 int err = 0;
5696
5697 if (!selinux_enabled)
5698 goto out;
5699
5700 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5701
5702 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5703 if (err)
5704 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5705
5706#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5707 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5708 if (err)
5709 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5710#endif /* IPV6 */
5711
5712out:
5713 return err;
5714}
5715
5716__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5717
5718#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5719static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5720{
5721 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5722
5723 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5724#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5725 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5726#endif /* IPV6 */
5727}
5728#endif
5729
5730#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5731
5732#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5733#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5734#endif
5735
5736#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5737
5738#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5739static int selinux_disabled;
5740
5741int selinux_disable(void)
5742{
5743 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5744
5745 if (ss_initialized) {
5746 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5747 return -EINVAL;
5748 }
5749
5750 if (selinux_disabled) {
5751 /* Only do this once. */
5752 return -EINVAL;
5753 }
5754
5755 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5756
5757 selinux_disabled = 1;
5758 selinux_enabled = 0;
5759
5760 reset_security_ops();
5761
5762 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5763 avc_disable();
5764
5765 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5766 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5767
5768 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5769 exit_sel_fs();
5770
5771 return 0;
5772}
5773#endif
Clone of davem's net-next-2.6 tree