mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create().

[net-next-2.6.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 885a9a958b8d6181db6e207f31ce1e927ab9bc83..0fac6829c63a7815016f0489c83db5419b990c0a 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
-#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
@@ -1593,9 +1592,10 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
        rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
        if (rc == 0)
                rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
-                                       SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
-                                       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
-                                       NULL);
+                                         SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
+                                         CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
+                                         0,
+                                         NULL);
 
        if (rc == 0)
                cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -1758,12 +1758,11 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
                        }
                }
                file_list_unlock();
-
-               /* Reset controlling tty. */
-               if (drop_tty)
-                       proc_set_tty(current, NULL);
        }
        mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
+       /* Reset controlling tty. */
+       if (drop_tty)
+               no_tty();
 
        /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
 
@@ -2319,7 +2318,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value
        if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-       if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+       if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
                return -EPERM;
 
        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
@@ -2570,12 +2569,16 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
 }
 
 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-                            unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+                            unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+                            unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
 {
-       int rc;
+       int rc = 0;
+       u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
 
-       rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
-       if (rc)
+       if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+               rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+                                 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+       if (rc || addr_only)
                return rc;
 
        if (selinux_checkreqprot)
@@ -3126,17 +3129,19 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 /**
  * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
  * @skb: the packet
- * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only external labels
  * @sid: the packet's SID
  *
  * Description:
  * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
- * the external SID for the packet.
+ * the external SID for the packet.  If only one form of external labeling is
+ * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
+ * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
+ * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
+ * security attributes.  This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
  *
  */
-static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                  u32 base_sid,
-                                  u32 *sid)
+static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
 {
        u32 xfrm_sid;
        u32 nlbl_sid;
@@ -3144,10 +3149,9 @@ static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
        selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
        if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
                                         (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
-                                         base_sid : xfrm_sid),
+                                         SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
                                         &nlbl_sid) != 0)
                nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
        *sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
 }
 
@@ -3692,7 +3696,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
        if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
                selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
        else if (skb)
-               selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peer_secid);
+               selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid);
 
        if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
                err = -EINVAL;
@@ -3753,7 +3757,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
        u32 newsid;
        u32 peersid;
 
-       selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
+       selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid);
        if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
                req->secid = sksec->sid;
                req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -3791,7 +3795,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 {
        struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-       selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
+       selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
 }
 
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -4628,7 +4632,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
                if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
                        error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
                                                     SECCLASS_PROCESS,
-                                                    PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
+                                                    PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
                        if (!error)
                                tsec->sid = sid;
                        task_unlock(p);
@@ -4909,7 +4913,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 
        sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
                                            sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
-                                           0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
+                                           0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
        avc_init();
 
        original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;