.setattr = proc_setattr,
};
-extern const struct seq_operations mounts_op;
-struct proc_mounts {
- struct seq_file m;
- int event;
-};
-
-static int mounts_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+static int mounts_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+ const struct seq_operations *op)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
struct nsproxy *nsp;
struct mnt_namespace *ns = NULL;
+ struct fs_struct *fs = NULL;
+ struct path root;
struct proc_mounts *p;
int ret = -EINVAL;
get_mnt_ns(ns);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
-
+ if (ns)
+ fs = get_fs_struct(task);
put_task_struct(task);
}
- if (ns) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (p) {
- file->private_data = &p->m;
- ret = seq_open(file, &mounts_op);
- if (!ret) {
- p->m.private = ns;
- p->event = ns->event;
- return 0;
- }
- kfree(p);
- }
- put_mnt_ns(ns);
- }
+ if (!ns)
+ goto err;
+ if (!fs)
+ goto err_put_ns;
+
+ read_lock(&fs->lock);
+ root = fs->root;
+ path_get(&root);
+ read_unlock(&fs->lock);
+ put_fs_struct(fs);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p)
+ goto err_put_path;
+
+ file->private_data = &p->m;
+ ret = seq_open(file, op);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_free;
+
+ p->m.private = p;
+ p->ns = ns;
+ p->root = root;
+ p->event = ns->event;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ err_free:
+ kfree(p);
+ err_put_path:
+ path_put(&root);
+ err_put_ns:
+ put_mnt_ns(ns);
+ err:
return ret;
}
static int mounts_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
- struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->private;
- put_mnt_ns(ns);
+ struct proc_mounts *p = file->private_data;
+ path_put(&p->root);
+ put_mnt_ns(p->ns);
return seq_release(inode, file);
}
static unsigned mounts_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct proc_mounts *p = file->private_data;
- struct mnt_namespace *ns = p->m.private;
+ struct mnt_namespace *ns = p->ns;
unsigned res = 0;
poll_wait(file, &ns->poll, wait);
return res;
}
+static int mounts_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return mounts_open_common(inode, file, &mounts_op);
+}
+
static const struct file_operations proc_mounts_operations = {
.open = mounts_open,
.read = seq_read,
.poll = mounts_poll,
};
-extern const struct seq_operations mountstats_op;
-static int mountstats_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+static int mountinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- int ret = seq_open(file, &mountstats_op);
-
- if (!ret) {
- struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
- struct nsproxy *nsp;
- struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns = NULL;
- struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
-
- if (task) {
- rcu_read_lock();
- nsp = task_nsproxy(task);
- if (nsp) {
- mnt_ns = nsp->mnt_ns;
- if (mnt_ns)
- get_mnt_ns(mnt_ns);
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ return mounts_open_common(inode, file, &mountinfo_op);
+}
- put_task_struct(task);
- }
+static const struct file_operations proc_mountinfo_operations = {
+ .open = mountinfo_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = mounts_release,
+ .poll = mounts_poll,
+};
- if (mnt_ns)
- m->private = mnt_ns;
- else {
- seq_release(inode, file);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- }
- }
- return ret;
+static int mountstats_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return mounts_open_common(inode, file, &mountstats_op);
}
static const struct file_operations proc_mountstats_operations = {
.read = proc_loginuid_read,
.write = proc_loginuid_write,
};
+
+static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct inode * inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ ssize_t length;
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+
+ if (!task)
+ return -ESRCH;
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
+ audit_get_sessionid(task));
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_sessionid_operations = {
+ .read = proc_sessionid_read,
+};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
#endif
+/*
+ * We added or removed a vma mapping the executable. The vmas are only mapped
+ * during exec and are not mapped with the mmap system call.
+ * Callers must hold down_write() on the mm's mmap_sem for these
+ */
+void added_exe_file_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ mm->num_exe_file_vmas++;
+}
+
+void removed_exe_file_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ mm->num_exe_file_vmas--;
+ if ((mm->num_exe_file_vmas == 0) && mm->exe_file){
+ fput(mm->exe_file);
+ mm->exe_file = NULL;
+ }
+
+}
+
+void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
+{
+ if (new_exe_file)
+ get_file(new_exe_file);
+ if (mm->exe_file)
+ fput(mm->exe_file);
+ mm->exe_file = new_exe_file;
+ mm->num_exe_file_vmas = 0;
+}
+
+struct file *get_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ struct file *exe_file;
+
+ /* We need mmap_sem to protect against races with removal of
+ * VM_EXECUTABLE vmas */
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ exe_file = mm->exe_file;
+ if (exe_file)
+ get_file(exe_file);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ return exe_file;
+}
+
+void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *newmm)
+{
+ /* It's safe to write the exe_file pointer without exe_file_lock because
+ * this is called during fork when the task is not yet in /proc */
+ newmm->exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(oldmm);
+}
+
+static int proc_exe_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *exe_path)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ struct file *exe_file;
+
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (!task)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ mm = get_task_mm(task);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ if (!mm)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
+ mmput(mm);
+ if (exe_file) {
+ *exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
+ path_get(&exe_file->f_path);
+ fput(exe_file);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+
static void *proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
unsigned int fd, ino;
int retval;
struct files_struct * files;
- struct fdtable *fdt;
retval = -ENOENT;
if (!p)
if (!files)
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
- fdt = files_fdtable(files);
for (fd = filp->f_pos-2;
- fd < fdt->max_fds;
+ fd < files_fdtable(files)->max_fds;
fd++, filp->f_pos++) {
char name[PROC_NUMBUF];
int len;
LNK("root", root),
LNK("exe", exe),
REG("mounts", S_IRUGO, mounts),
+ REG("mountinfo", S_IRUGO, mountinfo),
REG("mountstats", S_IRUSR, mountstats),
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR
REG("clear_refs", S_IWUSR, clear_refs),
REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, oom_adjust),
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, loginuid),
+ REG("sessionid", S_IRUSR, sessionid),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, fault_inject),
LNK("root", root),
LNK("exe", exe),
REG("mounts", S_IRUGO, mounts),
+ REG("mountinfo", S_IRUGO, mountinfo),
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR
REG("clear_refs", S_IWUSR, clear_refs),
REG("smaps", S_IRUGO, smaps),
REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, oom_adjust),
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, loginuid),
+ REG("sessionid", S_IRUSR, sessionid),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, fault_inject),