2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
18 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
21 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
22 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
25 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/security.h>
31 #include <linux/xattr.h>
32 #include <linux/capability.h>
33 #include <linux/unistd.h>
35 #include <linux/mman.h>
36 #include <linux/slab.h>
37 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
38 #include <linux/swap.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
43 #include <linux/namei.h>
44 #include <linux/mount.h>
45 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
50 #include <linux/tty.h>
52 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
53 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
54 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
56 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
57 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
58 #include <asm/atomic.h>
59 #include <linux/bitops.h>
60 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
61 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
62 #include <linux/netlink.h>
63 #include <linux/tcp.h>
64 #include <linux/udp.h>
65 #include <linux/dccp.h>
66 #include <linux/quota.h>
67 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <linux/parser.h>
70 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
72 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
73 #include <linux/personality.h>
74 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
130 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
131 static struct security_operations *original_ops;
133 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
134 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
135 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
136 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
137 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
139 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
140 before the policy was loaded. */
141 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
142 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
144 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
147 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
150 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
151 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
152 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
153 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
156 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
158 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
161 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
163 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
172 task->security = tsec;
177 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
179 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
180 task->security = NULL;
184 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
186 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
187 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
189 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
193 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
194 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
196 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
197 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
198 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
199 inode->i_security = isec;
204 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
206 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
207 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
209 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
210 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
211 list_del_init(&isec->list);
212 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
214 inode->i_security = NULL;
215 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
218 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
220 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
221 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
223 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
227 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
228 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
229 file->f_security = fsec;
234 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
237 file->f_security = NULL;
241 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
243 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
245 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
249 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
250 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
251 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
252 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
254 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
255 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
256 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
257 sb->s_security = sbsec;
262 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
264 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
266 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
267 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
268 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
269 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
271 sb->s_security = NULL;
275 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
277 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
279 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
283 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
285 sk->sk_security = ssec;
287 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
292 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
294 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
296 sk->sk_security = NULL;
300 /* The security server must be initialized before
301 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
302 extern int ss_initialized;
304 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
306 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
308 "uses transition SIDs",
310 "uses genfs_contexts",
311 "not configured for labeling",
312 "uses mountpoint labeling",
315 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
317 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
319 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
330 static match_table_t tokens = {
331 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
333 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
334 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
338 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
340 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
341 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
342 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
346 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
347 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
351 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
352 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
356 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
358 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
361 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
362 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
366 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
367 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
371 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
373 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
374 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
375 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
378 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
379 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
380 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
381 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
382 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
383 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
384 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
385 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
386 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
390 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
391 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
392 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
393 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
394 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
397 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
398 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
399 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
404 sbsec->initialized = 1;
406 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
407 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
408 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
410 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
411 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
412 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
414 /* Initialize the root inode. */
415 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
417 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
418 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
419 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
421 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
423 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
424 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
425 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
426 struct inode_security_struct, list);
427 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
428 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
429 inode = igrab(inode);
431 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
435 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
436 list_del_init(&isec->list);
439 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
445 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
446 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
447 * mount options, or whatever.
449 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
450 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
453 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
454 char *context = NULL;
458 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
460 if (!sbsec->initialized)
467 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
468 * settings this is going to need a mask
471 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
472 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
474 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
478 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
479 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
484 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
485 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
491 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
492 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
495 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
496 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
498 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
499 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
502 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
505 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
506 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
509 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
510 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
512 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
513 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
514 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
516 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
519 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
520 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
523 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
528 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
532 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
533 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
535 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
536 if (sbsec->initialized)
537 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
538 (old_sid != new_sid))
541 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
542 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
544 if (!sbsec->initialized)
545 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
551 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
552 * labeling information.
554 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
555 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
558 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
559 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
560 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
561 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
562 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
563 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
564 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
565 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
566 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
567 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
569 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
571 if (!ss_initialized) {
573 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
574 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
575 server is ready to handle calls. */
576 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
577 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
578 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
579 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
583 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
584 "before the security server is initialized\n");
589 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
590 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
591 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
592 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
594 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
595 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
596 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
597 * will be used for both mounts)
599 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
604 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
605 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
606 * than once with different security options.
608 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
610 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
611 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
614 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
615 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
622 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
624 goto out_double_mount;
626 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
631 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
633 goto out_double_mount;
635 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
637 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
638 rootcontext_sid = sid;
640 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
642 goto out_double_mount;
644 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
648 defcontext_sid = sid;
650 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
652 goto out_double_mount;
654 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
663 if (sbsec->initialized) {
664 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
665 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
666 goto out_double_mount;
671 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
674 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
675 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
677 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
678 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
682 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
685 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
689 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
693 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
694 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
695 * the superblock context if not already set.
698 if (!fscontext_sid) {
699 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
702 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
704 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
708 if (!rootcontext_sid)
709 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
712 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
715 if (rootcontext_sid) {
716 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
720 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
721 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid) {
725 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
733 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
739 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
754 struct super_block *newsb)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
757 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
759 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
768 if (!ss_initialized) {
769 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
770 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
771 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
772 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
776 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
777 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
779 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
780 if (newsbsec->initialized)
783 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
785 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
787 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
788 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
789 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
792 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
796 if (!set_rootcontext) {
797 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
798 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
801 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
803 if (set_rootcontext) {
804 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
805 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
806 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
807 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
809 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
812 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
813 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
816 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
817 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
820 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
821 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
822 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
824 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
826 /* Standard string-based options. */
827 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
829 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
834 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
838 if (context || defcontext) {
840 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
843 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
853 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
856 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
863 case Opt_rootcontext:
866 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
869 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
877 if (context || defcontext) {
879 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
882 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
891 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
898 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
902 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
903 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
904 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
909 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
910 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
913 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
914 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
917 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
918 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
921 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
922 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
925 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
936 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
938 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
941 char *options = data;
942 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
944 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
949 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
951 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
956 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
959 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
963 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
965 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
967 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
969 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
971 return SECCLASS_FILE;
973 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
977 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
979 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
983 return SECCLASS_FILE;
986 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
988 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
991 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
993 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
996 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1002 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1003 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1005 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1012 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1013 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1015 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1017 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1018 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1020 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1022 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1024 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1030 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1031 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1032 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1033 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1034 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1036 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1038 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1039 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1040 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1042 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1043 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1044 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1045 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1046 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1047 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1048 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1050 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1053 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1055 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1057 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1060 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1063 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1064 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1069 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1071 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1076 end = buffer+buflen;
1081 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1082 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1086 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1091 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1092 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1096 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1104 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1105 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1107 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1108 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1110 struct dentry *dentry;
1111 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1112 char *context = NULL;
1116 if (isec->initialized)
1119 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1120 if (isec->initialized)
1123 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1124 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1125 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1126 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1127 server is ready to handle calls. */
1128 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1129 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1130 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1131 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1135 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1136 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1137 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1138 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1142 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1143 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1145 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1146 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1148 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1149 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1152 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1153 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1158 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1159 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1165 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1167 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1168 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1169 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1177 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1183 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1189 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1190 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1191 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1192 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1196 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1197 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1200 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1204 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1205 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1206 __func__, context, -rc,
1207 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1209 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1217 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1218 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1220 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1221 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1222 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1224 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1225 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1226 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1234 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1235 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1238 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1239 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1242 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1244 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1245 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1256 isec->initialized = 1;
1259 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1261 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1262 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1266 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1267 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1273 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1274 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1277 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1278 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1281 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1282 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1285 /* All other signals. */
1286 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1293 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1294 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1295 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1296 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1299 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1301 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1302 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1303 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1304 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1307 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1308 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1311 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1312 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1315 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1316 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1318 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1320 tsec = tsk->security;
1322 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1326 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1328 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1331 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1335 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1338 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1341 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1342 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1345 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1347 tsec = tsk->security;
1349 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1350 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1353 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1354 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1355 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1356 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1357 struct inode *inode,
1359 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1361 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1362 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1363 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1365 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1368 tsec = tsk->security;
1369 isec = inode->i_security;
1373 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1374 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1377 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1380 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1381 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1382 pathname if needed. */
1383 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1384 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1385 struct dentry *dentry,
1388 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1389 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1390 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1391 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1392 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1393 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1396 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1397 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1398 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1399 check a particular permission to the file.
1400 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1401 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1402 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1403 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1404 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1408 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1409 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1410 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1411 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1414 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1415 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1417 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1418 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1426 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1428 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1433 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1434 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1435 struct dentry *dentry,
1438 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1439 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1440 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1442 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1445 tsec = current->security;
1446 dsec = dir->i_security;
1447 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1449 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1450 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1452 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1453 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1458 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1459 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1461 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1467 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1471 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1472 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1473 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1476 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1477 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1478 struct task_struct *ctx)
1480 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1482 tsec = ctx->security;
1484 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1488 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1491 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1492 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1493 struct dentry *dentry,
1497 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1498 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1499 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1503 tsec = current->security;
1504 dsec = dir->i_security;
1505 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1507 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1508 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1511 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1512 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1527 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1532 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1536 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1537 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1538 struct inode *new_dir,
1539 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1541 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1542 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1543 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1545 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1548 tsec = current->security;
1549 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1550 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1551 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1552 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1554 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1556 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1557 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1558 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1561 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1562 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1565 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1566 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1567 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1572 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1573 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1574 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1575 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1576 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1579 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1580 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1581 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1582 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1584 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1592 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1593 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1594 struct super_block *sb,
1596 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1598 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1599 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1601 tsec = tsk->security;
1602 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1603 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1607 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1608 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1612 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1613 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1614 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1615 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1618 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1620 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1624 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1626 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1628 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1636 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1639 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1641 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1643 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1645 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1649 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1650 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1651 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1652 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1653 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1654 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1655 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1658 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1659 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1664 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1665 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1669 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1671 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1672 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1679 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1687 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1689 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1693 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child);
1697 return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1700 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1701 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1705 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1709 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1712 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1713 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1717 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1721 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1724 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1725 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1727 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1730 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1734 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1738 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1741 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1744 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1747 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1752 end = buffer+buflen;
1758 const char *name = table->procname;
1759 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1760 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1764 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1767 table = table->parent;
1773 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1775 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1777 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1782 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1786 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1790 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1794 tsec = current->security;
1796 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1797 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1799 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1800 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1803 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1804 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1806 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1807 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1815 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1816 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1822 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1835 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1841 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1845 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1851 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1853 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1856 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1860 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1865 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1866 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1867 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1869 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1870 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1871 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1872 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1874 case 0: /* Close log */
1875 case 1: /* Open log */
1876 case 2: /* Read from log */
1877 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1878 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1880 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1887 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1888 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1889 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1891 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1892 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1893 * the capability is granted.
1895 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1896 * processes that allocate mappings.
1898 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1900 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1901 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1903 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1905 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1906 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1907 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1914 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1918 * task_tracer_task - return the task that is tracing the given task
1919 * @task: task to consider
1921 * Returns NULL if noone is tracing @task, or the &struct task_struct
1922 * pointer to its tracer.
1924 * Must be called under rcu_read_lock().
1926 static struct task_struct *task_tracer_task(struct task_struct *task)
1928 if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
1929 return rcu_dereference(task->parent);
1933 /* binprm security operations */
1935 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1937 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1939 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1943 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1946 bprm->security = bsec;
1950 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1952 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1953 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1954 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1955 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1957 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1960 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1964 bsec = bprm->security;
1969 tsec = current->security;
1970 isec = inode->i_security;
1972 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1973 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1975 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1976 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1977 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1978 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1980 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1981 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1982 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1985 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1986 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1987 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1992 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1993 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
1995 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1998 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1999 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2000 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2004 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2005 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2006 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2010 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2011 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2015 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2016 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2018 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2026 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2028 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2032 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2034 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2037 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2038 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2039 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2040 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2041 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2043 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2046 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2049 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2051 kfree(bprm->security);
2052 bprm->security = NULL;
2055 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2056 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2058 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2059 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2061 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2062 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2063 struct tty_struct *tty;
2064 struct fdtable *fdt;
2068 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2069 tty = get_current_tty();
2072 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2074 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2075 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2076 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2077 file may belong to another process and we are only
2078 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2079 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2080 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2081 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2087 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2088 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2092 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2094 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2096 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2098 unsigned long set, i;
2103 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2104 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2106 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2109 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2110 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2115 if (file_has_perm(current,
2117 file_to_av(file))) {
2119 fd = get_unused_fd();
2129 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2130 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2137 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2142 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2145 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2148 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2150 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2151 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2155 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2157 tsec = current->security;
2159 bsec = bprm->security;
2162 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2164 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2165 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2166 unchanged and kill. */
2167 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2168 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2169 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2176 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2177 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2178 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2179 struct task_struct *tracer;
2180 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2184 tracer = task_tracer_task(current);
2185 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2186 sec = tracer->security;
2192 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2193 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2205 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2207 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2209 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2210 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2211 struct itimerval itimer;
2212 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2215 tsec = current->security;
2216 bsec = bprm->security;
2219 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2222 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2225 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2226 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2228 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2229 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2230 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2231 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2232 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2233 will be checked against the new SID. */
2234 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2235 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2237 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2238 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2239 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2240 flush_signals(current);
2241 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2242 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2243 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2244 recalc_sigpending();
2245 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2248 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2249 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2251 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2252 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2253 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2254 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2255 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2256 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2257 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2258 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2259 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2261 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2262 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2264 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2265 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2266 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2267 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2269 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2271 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2274 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2278 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2279 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2280 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2283 /* superblock security operations */
2285 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2287 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2290 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2292 superblock_free_security(sb);
2295 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2300 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2303 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2305 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2306 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2307 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2308 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2311 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2318 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2322 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2325 int current_size = 0;
2333 while (current_size < len) {
2343 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2345 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2346 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2347 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2353 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2361 in_save = in_end = orig;
2365 open_quote = !open_quote;
2366 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2368 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2370 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2371 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2373 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2375 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2377 } while (*in_end++);
2379 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2380 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2385 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2387 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2390 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2394 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2395 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2396 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2399 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2401 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2403 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2404 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2405 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2408 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2411 unsigned long flags,
2416 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2420 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2421 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2422 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2424 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2428 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2432 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2436 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2437 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2440 /* inode security operations */
2442 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2444 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2447 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2449 inode_free_security(inode);
2452 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2453 char **name, void **value,
2456 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2457 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2458 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2461 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2463 tsec = current->security;
2464 dsec = dir->i_security;
2465 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2467 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2468 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2470 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2471 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2474 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2475 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2478 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2483 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2484 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2485 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2486 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2488 isec->initialized = 1;
2491 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2495 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2502 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2514 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2516 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2519 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2523 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2526 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2529 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2533 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2536 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2539 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2541 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2544 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2546 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2549 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2551 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2554 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2558 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2562 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2565 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2566 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2568 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2571 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2573 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2576 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2580 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2583 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2586 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2587 struct nameidata *nd)
2591 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2596 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2600 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2601 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2604 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2608 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2612 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2615 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2616 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2617 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2619 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2622 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2624 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2627 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2629 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2630 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2631 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2632 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2634 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2635 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2636 Restrict to administrator. */
2641 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2642 ordinary setattr permission. */
2643 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2646 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2647 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2649 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2650 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2651 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2652 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2653 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2657 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2658 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2660 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2661 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2664 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2667 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2668 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2670 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2671 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2675 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2676 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2677 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2679 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2684 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2685 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2689 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2694 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2696 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2697 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2701 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2702 const void *value, size_t size,
2705 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2706 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2710 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2711 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2715 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2717 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2718 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2719 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2727 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2729 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2732 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2734 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2737 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2739 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2740 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2742 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2743 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2748 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2749 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2750 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2752 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2754 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2758 char *context = NULL;
2759 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2761 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2764 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2777 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2778 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2780 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2784 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2787 if (!value || !size)
2790 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2798 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2800 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2801 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2802 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2806 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2808 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2811 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2813 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2816 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2818 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2822 /* file security operations */
2824 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2827 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2830 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2834 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2835 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2838 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2839 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2843 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2846 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2848 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2849 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2850 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2851 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2854 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2858 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2859 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2860 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2862 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2865 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2867 return file_alloc_security(file);
2870 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2872 file_free_security(file);
2875 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2887 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2889 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2890 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2893 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2895 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2896 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2899 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2903 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2908 error = task_has_capability(current, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2911 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2912 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2915 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2920 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2922 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2923 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2925 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2926 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2927 * This has an additional check.
2929 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2936 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2937 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2939 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2940 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2943 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2944 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2946 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2951 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2952 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2953 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2956 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2958 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2959 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2960 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2961 if (rc || addr_only)
2964 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2967 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2968 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2971 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2972 unsigned long reqprot,
2977 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2981 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2984 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2985 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2987 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2988 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2989 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2991 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2992 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2993 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2994 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2995 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2997 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2998 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2999 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3000 * modified content. This typically should only
3001 * occur for text relocations.
3003 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3011 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3014 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3016 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3019 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3026 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3031 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3032 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3041 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3042 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3047 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3052 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3056 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3063 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3065 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3066 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3068 tsec = current->security;
3069 fsec = file->f_security;
3070 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3075 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3076 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3080 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3081 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3083 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3084 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3086 tsec = tsk->security;
3087 fsec = file->f_security;
3090 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3092 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3094 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3095 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3098 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3100 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3103 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3105 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3106 struct inode *inode;
3107 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3108 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3109 fsec = file->f_security;
3110 isec = inode->i_security;
3112 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3113 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3114 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3115 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3116 * struct as its SID.
3118 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3119 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3121 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3122 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3123 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3124 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3125 * new inode label or new policy.
3126 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3128 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3131 /* task security operations */
3133 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3137 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3141 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3144 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3146 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3149 tsec1 = current->security;
3151 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3154 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3156 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3157 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3159 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3160 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3161 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3162 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3163 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3168 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3170 task_free_security(tsk);
3173 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3175 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3176 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3177 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3178 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3179 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3184 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3186 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3189 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3191 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3195 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3197 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3200 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3202 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3205 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3207 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3210 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3212 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3216 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3218 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3222 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3226 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3230 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3233 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3237 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3241 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3244 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3246 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3249 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3251 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3254 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3258 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3259 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3260 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3261 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3262 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3263 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3268 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3272 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3276 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3279 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3281 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3284 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3286 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3289 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3294 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3296 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3301 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3303 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3306 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3308 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3312 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3319 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3320 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3321 the state of the current process. */
3322 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3325 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3327 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3330 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3332 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3334 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3337 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3338 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3342 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3343 struct inode *inode)
3345 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3346 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3348 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3349 isec->initialized = 1;
3353 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3354 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3355 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3357 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3358 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3360 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3361 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3365 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3366 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3369 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3370 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3374 *proto = ih->protocol;
3376 switch (ih->protocol) {
3378 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3380 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3384 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3388 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3389 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3394 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3396 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3400 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3404 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3405 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3409 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3410 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3412 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3416 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3420 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3421 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3432 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3434 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3435 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3436 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3439 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3440 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3442 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3443 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3447 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3448 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3451 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3452 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3453 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3462 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3464 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3468 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3469 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3474 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3476 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3480 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3481 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3485 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3486 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3488 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3492 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3493 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3497 /* includes fragments */
3507 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3508 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3512 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3514 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3517 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3518 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3521 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3523 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3526 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3527 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3536 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3537 " unable to parse packet\n");
3543 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3545 * @family: protocol family
3546 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3549 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3550 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3551 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3552 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3553 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3557 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3564 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3565 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3567 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3568 if (unlikely(err)) {
3570 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3571 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3578 /* socket security operations */
3579 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3582 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3583 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3584 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3587 tsec = task->security;
3588 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3590 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3593 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3594 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3595 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3601 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3602 int protocol, int kern)
3605 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3611 tsec = current->security;
3612 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3613 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3614 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3615 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3621 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3622 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3625 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3626 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3627 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3630 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3632 tsec = current->security;
3633 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3634 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3635 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3636 isec->initialized = 1;
3639 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3640 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3641 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3642 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3648 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3649 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3650 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3652 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3657 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3662 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3663 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3664 * check the first address now.
3666 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3667 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3669 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3670 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3671 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3672 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3673 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3674 unsigned short snum;
3675 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3676 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3678 tsec = current->security;
3679 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3681 if (family == PF_INET) {
3682 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3683 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3684 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3685 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3687 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3688 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3689 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3690 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3696 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3698 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3699 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3703 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3704 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3705 ad.u.net.family = family;
3706 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3708 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3714 switch (isec->sclass) {
3715 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3716 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3719 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3720 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3723 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3724 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3728 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3732 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3736 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3737 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3738 ad.u.net.family = family;
3740 if (family == PF_INET)
3741 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3743 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3745 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3746 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3754 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3756 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3759 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3764 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3766 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3767 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3768 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3769 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3770 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3771 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3772 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3773 unsigned short snum;
3776 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3777 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3778 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3780 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3782 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3783 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3785 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3788 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3792 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3793 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3795 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3796 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3797 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3798 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3807 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3809 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3812 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3815 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3816 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3818 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3822 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3824 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3825 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3826 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3827 newisec->initialized = 1;
3832 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3837 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3841 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3844 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3845 int size, int flags)
3847 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3850 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3852 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3855 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3857 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3860 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3864 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3868 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3871 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3874 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3877 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3879 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3882 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3883 struct socket *other,
3886 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3887 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3888 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3889 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3892 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3896 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3897 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3899 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3900 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3902 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3904 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3908 /* connecting socket */
3909 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3910 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3912 /* server child socket */
3913 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3914 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3915 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3920 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3921 struct socket *other)
3923 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3924 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3925 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3928 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3929 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3931 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3932 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3934 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3935 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3942 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3944 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3950 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3953 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3954 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3958 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3961 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3962 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3965 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
3966 struct sk_buff *skb,
3967 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3972 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3974 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
3975 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
3977 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
3978 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
3981 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3982 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3983 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3984 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3986 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3987 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3988 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3989 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3991 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3992 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3993 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3994 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3997 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3998 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4003 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4006 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4010 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4013 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4019 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4020 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4021 if (unlikely(err)) {
4023 "SELinux: failure in"
4024 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4025 " network port label not found\n");
4028 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4031 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4032 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4033 u16 family, char *addrp)
4036 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4038 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4040 if (selinux_compat_net)
4041 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4044 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4049 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4050 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4053 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4054 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4056 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4059 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4065 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4068 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4069 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4070 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4071 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4074 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4077 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4078 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4081 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4082 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4083 ad.u.net.family = family;
4084 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4088 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4089 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4090 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4091 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4092 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4093 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4096 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4099 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4102 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4106 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4110 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4111 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4120 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4121 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4126 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4127 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4128 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4130 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4132 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4133 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4134 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4135 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4137 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4142 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4147 if (scontext_len > len) {
4152 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4156 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4164 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4166 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4170 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4171 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4172 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4176 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4177 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4179 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4182 *secid = peer_secid;
4183 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4188 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4190 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4193 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4195 sk_free_security(sk);
4198 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4200 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4201 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4203 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4204 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4205 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4207 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4210 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4213 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4215 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4217 *secid = sksec->sid;
4221 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4223 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4224 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4226 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4227 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4228 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4229 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4231 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4234 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4235 struct request_sock *req)
4237 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4242 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4245 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4246 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4247 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4251 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4255 req->secid = newsid;
4256 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4260 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4261 const struct request_sock *req)
4263 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4265 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4266 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4267 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4268 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4269 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4270 time it will have been created and available. */
4272 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4273 * thread with access to newsksec */
4274 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4277 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4278 struct sk_buff *skb)
4280 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4282 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4285 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4288 fl->secid = req->secid;
4291 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4295 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4296 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4297 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4299 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4303 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4305 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4307 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4308 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4309 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4310 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4311 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4312 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4322 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4327 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4329 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4334 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4338 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4341 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4342 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4343 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4346 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4347 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4348 ad.u.net.family = family;
4349 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4352 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4356 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4357 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4361 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4362 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4368 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4369 struct sk_buff *skb,
4370 const struct net_device *in,
4371 const struct net_device *out,
4372 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4374 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4377 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4378 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4379 struct sk_buff *skb,
4380 const struct net_device *in,
4381 const struct net_device *out,
4382 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4384 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4388 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4390 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4391 u16 family, char *addrp)
4394 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4396 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4397 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4399 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4400 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4403 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4404 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4405 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4406 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4408 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4409 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4410 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4411 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4413 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4414 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4415 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4416 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4419 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4420 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4425 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4428 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4431 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4434 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4441 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4442 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4443 if (unlikely(err)) {
4445 "SELinux: failure in"
4446 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4447 " network port label not found\n");
4450 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4453 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4455 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4460 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4461 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4465 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4467 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4468 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4472 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4473 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4477 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4478 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4484 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4490 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4496 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4497 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4498 ad.u.net.family = family;
4499 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4502 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4503 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4504 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4505 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4506 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4507 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4508 family, addrp, proto);
4510 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4511 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4512 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4513 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4514 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4515 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4516 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4519 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4520 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4521 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4524 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4525 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4526 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4527 * directly from the packet */
4530 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4531 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4532 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4534 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4536 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4540 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4541 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4544 if (peerlbl_active) {
4548 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4550 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4551 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4554 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4556 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4557 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4564 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4565 struct sk_buff *skb,
4566 const struct net_device *in,
4567 const struct net_device *out,
4568 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4570 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4573 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4574 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4575 struct sk_buff *skb,
4576 const struct net_device *in,
4577 const struct net_device *out,
4578 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4580 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4584 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4586 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4590 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4594 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4595 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4600 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4603 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4605 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4609 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4610 ad.u.cap = capability;
4612 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4613 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4616 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4617 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4620 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4621 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4623 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4627 isec->sclass = sclass;
4628 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4629 perm->security = isec;
4634 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4636 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4637 perm->security = NULL;
4641 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4643 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4645 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4649 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4650 msg->security = msec;
4655 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4657 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4659 msg->security = NULL;
4663 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4666 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4667 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4668 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4670 tsec = current->security;
4671 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4673 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4674 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4676 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4679 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4681 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4684 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4686 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4689 /* message queue security operations */
4690 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4692 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4693 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4694 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4697 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4701 tsec = current->security;
4702 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4704 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4705 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4707 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4710 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4716 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4718 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4721 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4723 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4724 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4725 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4727 tsec = current->security;
4728 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4730 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4731 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4733 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4734 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4737 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4745 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4746 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4749 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4752 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4755 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4761 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4765 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4767 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4768 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4769 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4770 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4773 tsec = current->security;
4774 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4775 msec = msg->security;
4778 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4780 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4782 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4783 * message queue this message will be stored in
4785 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4793 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4794 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4796 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4797 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4800 /* Can this process send the message */
4801 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4802 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4804 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4805 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4806 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4811 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4812 struct task_struct *target,
4813 long type, int mode)
4815 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4816 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4817 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4818 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4821 tsec = target->security;
4822 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4823 msec = msg->security;
4825 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4826 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4828 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4829 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4831 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4832 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4836 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4837 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4839 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4840 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4841 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4844 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4848 tsec = current->security;
4849 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4851 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4852 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4854 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4857 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4863 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4865 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4868 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4870 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4871 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4872 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4874 tsec = current->security;
4875 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4877 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4878 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4880 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4881 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4884 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4885 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4893 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4894 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4897 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4900 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4907 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4913 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4917 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4918 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4923 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4927 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4930 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4932 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4935 /* Semaphore security operations */
4936 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4938 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4939 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4940 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4943 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4947 tsec = current->security;
4948 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4950 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4951 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4953 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4956 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4962 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4964 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4967 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4969 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4970 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4971 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4973 tsec = current->security;
4974 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4976 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4977 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4979 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4980 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4983 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4984 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4992 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4993 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4997 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5008 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5011 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5015 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5021 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5025 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5026 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5031 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5035 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5038 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5044 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5046 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5051 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5054 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5056 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5060 /* module stacking operations */
5061 static int selinux_register_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
5063 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
5064 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
5065 "module registered.\n", __func__);
5069 secondary_ops = ops;
5071 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
5078 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5081 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5084 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5085 char *name, char **value)
5087 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5093 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5100 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5102 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5104 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5105 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5106 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5107 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5108 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5109 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5110 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5111 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5118 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5124 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5125 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5127 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5128 struct task_struct *tracer;
5134 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5135 security attributes. */
5140 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5141 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5142 * above restriction is ever removed.
5144 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5145 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5146 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5147 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5148 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5149 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5150 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5151 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5152 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5153 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5159 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5160 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5161 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5165 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5166 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5167 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5169 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5176 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5177 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5178 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5179 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5180 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5181 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5183 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5184 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5185 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5186 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5187 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5188 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5191 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5192 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5193 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5194 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5195 struct av_decision avd;
5200 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5201 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5202 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5203 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5204 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5205 do_each_thread(g, t)
5206 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5207 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5210 while_each_thread(g, t);
5211 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5214 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5215 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5216 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5220 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5221 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5224 tracer = task_tracer_task(p);
5225 if (tracer != NULL) {
5226 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5227 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5229 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5231 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5235 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5236 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5250 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5252 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5255 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5257 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5260 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5267 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5268 unsigned long flags)
5270 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5271 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5273 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5277 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5278 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5280 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5286 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5288 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5294 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5295 struct task_struct *ctx,
5299 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5300 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5302 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5304 tsec = ctx->security;
5305 ksec = key->security;
5307 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5308 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5309 appear to be created. */
5313 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5314 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5317 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5319 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5320 char *context = NULL;
5324 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5333 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5336 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5337 .capget = selinux_capget,
5338 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5339 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5340 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5341 .capable = selinux_capable,
5342 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5343 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5344 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5345 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5347 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5348 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5350 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5351 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5352 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5353 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5354 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5355 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5356 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5358 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5359 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5360 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5361 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5362 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5363 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5364 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5365 .sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts,
5366 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5367 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5368 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5371 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5372 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5373 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5374 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5375 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5376 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5377 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5378 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5379 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5380 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5381 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5382 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5383 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5384 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5385 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5386 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5387 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5388 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5389 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5390 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5391 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5392 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5393 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5394 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5395 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5396 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5397 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5399 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5400 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5401 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5402 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5403 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5404 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5405 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5406 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5407 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5408 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5409 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5411 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5413 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5414 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5415 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5416 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5417 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5418 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5419 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5420 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5421 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5422 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5423 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5424 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5425 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5426 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5427 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5428 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5429 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5430 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5431 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5432 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5433 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5434 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5435 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5437 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5438 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5440 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5441 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5443 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5444 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5445 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5446 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5447 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5448 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5450 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5451 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5452 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5453 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5454 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5456 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5457 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5458 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5459 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5460 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5462 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
5464 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5466 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5467 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5469 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5470 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5471 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5473 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5474 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5476 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5477 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5478 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5479 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5480 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5481 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5482 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5483 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5484 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5485 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5486 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5487 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5488 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5489 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5490 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5491 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5492 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5493 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5494 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5495 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5496 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5497 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5498 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5499 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5500 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5502 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5503 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5504 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5505 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5506 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5507 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5508 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5509 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5510 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5511 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5512 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5516 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5517 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5518 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5519 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5523 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5524 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5525 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5526 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5530 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5532 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5534 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5535 selinux_enabled = 0;
5539 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5540 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5544 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5546 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5547 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5548 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5549 tsec = current->security;
5550 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5552 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5553 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5554 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5557 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
5559 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5560 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5561 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5563 if (selinux_enforcing)
5564 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5566 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5571 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5573 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5575 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5576 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5577 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5578 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5580 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5581 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5582 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5583 struct superblock_security_struct,
5585 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5587 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5588 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5589 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5591 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5593 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5594 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5595 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5598 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5599 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5602 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5603 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5604 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5606 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5608 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5610 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5611 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5613 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5614 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5617 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5618 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5620 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5621 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5625 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5627 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5629 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5630 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5632 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5633 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5636 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5637 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5639 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5640 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5646 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5651 if (!selinux_enabled)
5654 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5656 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++) {
5657 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5659 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n",
5663 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5664 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++) {
5665 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5667 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n",
5676 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5678 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5679 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5683 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5685 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++)
5686 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5687 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5688 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++)
5689 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5694 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5696 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5697 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5700 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5702 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5703 static int selinux_disabled;
5705 int selinux_disable(void)
5707 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5709 if (ss_initialized) {
5710 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5714 if (selinux_disabled) {
5715 /* Only do this once. */
5719 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5721 selinux_disabled = 1;
5722 selinux_enabled = 0;
5724 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5725 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5727 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5728 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5730 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */