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1 | /* | |
2 | * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module | |
3 | * | |
4 | * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. | |
5 | * | |
6 | * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> | |
7 | * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> | |
8 | * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> | |
9 | * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> | |
10 | * | |
11 | * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. | |
12 | * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> | |
13 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. | |
14 | * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> | |
15 | * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | |
16 | * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com> | |
17 | * | |
18 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
19 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, | |
20 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation. | |
21 | */ | |
22 | ||
23 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
26 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
27 | #include <linux/errno.h> | |
28 | #include <linux/sched.h> | |
29 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
30 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
31 | #include <linux/capability.h> | |
32 | #include <linux/unistd.h> | |
33 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
34 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
35 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
36 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
37 | #include <linux/swap.h> | |
38 | #include <linux/smp_lock.h> | |
39 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> | |
40 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> | |
41 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
42 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
43 | #include <linux/mount.h> | |
44 | #include <linux/ext2_fs.h> | |
45 | #include <linux/proc_fs.h> | |
46 | #include <linux/kd.h> | |
47 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> | |
48 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> | |
49 | #include <linux/tty.h> | |
50 | #include <net/icmp.h> | |
51 | #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */ | |
52 | #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ | |
53 | #include <asm/uaccess.h> | |
54 | #include <asm/ioctls.h> | |
55 | #include <linux/bitops.h> | |
56 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> | |
57 | #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ | |
58 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
59 | #include <linux/tcp.h> | |
60 | #include <linux/udp.h> | |
61 | #include <linux/quota.h> | |
62 | #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ | |
63 | #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ | |
64 | #include <linux/parser.h> | |
65 | #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> | |
66 | #include <net/ipv6.h> | |
67 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
68 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
69 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> | |
70 | #include <linux/audit.h> | |
71 | #include <linux/string.h> | |
72 | #include <linux/selinux.h> | |
73 | #include <linux/mutex.h> | |
74 | ||
75 | #include "avc.h" | |
76 | #include "objsec.h" | |
77 | #include "netif.h" | |
78 | #include "xfrm.h" | |
79 | #include "selinux_netlabel.h" | |
80 | ||
81 | #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" | |
82 | #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX | |
83 | ||
84 | extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; | |
85 | extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); | |
86 | extern int selinux_compat_net; | |
87 | ||
88 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP | |
89 | int selinux_enforcing = 0; | |
90 | ||
91 | static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) | |
92 | { | |
93 | selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0); | |
94 | return 1; | |
95 | } | |
96 | __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); | |
97 | #endif | |
98 | ||
99 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM | |
100 | int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; | |
101 | ||
102 | static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) | |
103 | { | |
104 | selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); | |
105 | return 1; | |
106 | } | |
107 | __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); | |
108 | #else | |
109 | int selinux_enabled = 1; | |
110 | #endif | |
111 | ||
112 | /* Original (dummy) security module. */ | |
113 | static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL; | |
114 | ||
115 | /* Minimal support for a secondary security module, | |
116 | just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules. | |
117 | The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary | |
118 | module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */ | |
119 | static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL; | |
120 | ||
121 | /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized | |
122 | before the policy was loaded. */ | |
123 | static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head); | |
124 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock); | |
125 | ||
126 | static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache; | |
127 | ||
128 | /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context | |
129 | length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */ | |
130 | static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size) | |
131 | { | |
132 | char *context; | |
133 | unsigned len; | |
134 | int rc; | |
135 | ||
136 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len); | |
137 | if (rc) | |
138 | return rc; | |
139 | ||
140 | if (!buffer || !size) | |
141 | goto getsecurity_exit; | |
142 | ||
143 | if (size < len) { | |
144 | len = -ERANGE; | |
145 | goto getsecurity_exit; | |
146 | } | |
147 | memcpy(buffer, context, len); | |
148 | ||
149 | getsecurity_exit: | |
150 | kfree(context); | |
151 | return len; | |
152 | } | |
153 | ||
154 | /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ | |
155 | ||
156 | static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task) | |
157 | { | |
158 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
159 | ||
160 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
161 | if (!tsec) | |
162 | return -ENOMEM; | |
163 | ||
164 | tsec->task = task; | |
165 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
166 | task->security = tsec; | |
167 | ||
168 | return 0; | |
169 | } | |
170 | ||
171 | static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task) | |
172 | { | |
173 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security; | |
174 | task->security = NULL; | |
175 | kfree(tsec); | |
176 | } | |
177 | ||
178 | static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) | |
179 | { | |
180 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
181 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
182 | ||
183 | isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL); | |
184 | if (!isec) | |
185 | return -ENOMEM; | |
186 | ||
187 | memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec)); | |
188 | mutex_init(&isec->lock); | |
189 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); | |
190 | isec->inode = inode; | |
191 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
192 | isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; | |
193 | isec->task_sid = tsec->sid; | |
194 | inode->i_security = isec; | |
195 | ||
196 | return 0; | |
197 | } | |
198 | ||
199 | static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) | |
200 | { | |
201 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
202 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
203 | ||
204 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
205 | if (!list_empty(&isec->list)) | |
206 | list_del_init(&isec->list); | |
207 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
208 | ||
209 | inode->i_security = NULL; | |
210 | kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec); | |
211 | } | |
212 | ||
213 | static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) | |
214 | { | |
215 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
216 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
217 | ||
218 | fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
219 | if (!fsec) | |
220 | return -ENOMEM; | |
221 | ||
222 | fsec->file = file; | |
223 | fsec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
224 | fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid; | |
225 | file->f_security = fsec; | |
226 | ||
227 | return 0; | |
228 | } | |
229 | ||
230 | static void file_free_security(struct file *file) | |
231 | { | |
232 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; | |
233 | file->f_security = NULL; | |
234 | kfree(fsec); | |
235 | } | |
236 | ||
237 | static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
238 | { | |
239 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
240 | ||
241 | sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
242 | if (!sbsec) | |
243 | return -ENOMEM; | |
244 | ||
245 | mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); | |
246 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list); | |
247 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); | |
248 | spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
249 | sbsec->sb = sb; | |
250 | sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
251 | sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; | |
252 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
253 | sb->s_security = sbsec; | |
254 | ||
255 | return 0; | |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
258 | static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
259 | { | |
260 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
261 | ||
262 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
263 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list)) | |
264 | list_del_init(&sbsec->list); | |
265 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
266 | ||
267 | sb->s_security = NULL; | |
268 | kfree(sbsec); | |
269 | } | |
270 | ||
271 | static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) | |
272 | { | |
273 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
274 | ||
275 | ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority); | |
276 | if (!ssec) | |
277 | return -ENOMEM; | |
278 | ||
279 | ssec->sk = sk; | |
280 | ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
281 | ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
282 | sk->sk_security = ssec; | |
283 | ||
284 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family); | |
285 | ||
286 | return 0; | |
287 | } | |
288 | ||
289 | static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) | |
290 | { | |
291 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; | |
292 | ||
293 | sk->sk_security = NULL; | |
294 | kfree(ssec); | |
295 | } | |
296 | ||
297 | /* The security server must be initialized before | |
298 | any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */ | |
299 | extern int ss_initialized; | |
300 | ||
301 | /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */ | |
302 | ||
303 | static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = { | |
304 | "uses xattr", | |
305 | "uses transition SIDs", | |
306 | "uses task SIDs", | |
307 | "uses genfs_contexts", | |
308 | "not configured for labeling", | |
309 | "uses mountpoint labeling", | |
310 | }; | |
311 | ||
312 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); | |
313 | ||
314 | static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode) | |
315 | { | |
316 | return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | enum { | |
320 | Opt_context = 1, | |
321 | Opt_fscontext = 2, | |
322 | Opt_defcontext = 4, | |
323 | Opt_rootcontext = 8, | |
324 | }; | |
325 | ||
326 | static match_table_t tokens = { | |
327 | {Opt_context, "context=%s"}, | |
328 | {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"}, | |
329 | {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"}, | |
330 | {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"}, | |
331 | }; | |
332 | ||
333 | #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" | |
334 | ||
335 | static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, | |
336 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, | |
337 | struct task_security_struct *tsec) | |
338 | { | |
339 | int rc; | |
340 | ||
341 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
342 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); | |
343 | if (rc) | |
344 | return rc; | |
345 | ||
346 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
347 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); | |
348 | return rc; | |
349 | } | |
350 | ||
351 | static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, | |
352 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, | |
353 | struct task_security_struct *tsec) | |
354 | { | |
355 | int rc; | |
356 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
357 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); | |
358 | if (rc) | |
359 | return rc; | |
360 | ||
361 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
362 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); | |
363 | return rc; | |
364 | } | |
365 | ||
366 | static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
367 | { | |
368 | char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; | |
369 | char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL; | |
370 | const char *name; | |
371 | u32 sid; | |
372 | int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0; | |
373 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
374 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
375 | ||
376 | if (!data) | |
377 | goto out; | |
378 | ||
379 | name = sb->s_type->name; | |
380 | ||
381 | if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { | |
382 | ||
383 | /* NFS we understand. */ | |
384 | if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) { | |
385 | struct nfs_mount_data *d = data; | |
386 | ||
387 | if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION) | |
388 | goto out; | |
389 | ||
390 | if (d->context[0]) { | |
391 | context = d->context; | |
392 | seen |= Opt_context; | |
393 | } | |
394 | } else | |
395 | goto out; | |
396 | ||
397 | } else { | |
398 | /* Standard string-based options. */ | |
399 | char *p, *options = data; | |
400 | ||
401 | while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) { | |
402 | int token; | |
403 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; | |
404 | ||
405 | if (!*p) | |
406 | continue; | |
407 | ||
408 | token = match_token(p, tokens, args); | |
409 | ||
410 | switch (token) { | |
411 | case Opt_context: | |
412 | if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) { | |
413 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
414 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
415 | goto out_free; | |
416 | } | |
417 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
418 | if (!context) { | |
419 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
420 | goto out_free; | |
421 | } | |
422 | if (!alloc) | |
423 | alloc = 1; | |
424 | seen |= Opt_context; | |
425 | break; | |
426 | ||
427 | case Opt_fscontext: | |
428 | if (seen & Opt_fscontext) { | |
429 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
430 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
431 | goto out_free; | |
432 | } | |
433 | fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
434 | if (!fscontext) { | |
435 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
436 | goto out_free; | |
437 | } | |
438 | if (!alloc) | |
439 | alloc = 1; | |
440 | seen |= Opt_fscontext; | |
441 | break; | |
442 | ||
443 | case Opt_rootcontext: | |
444 | if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) { | |
445 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
446 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
447 | goto out_free; | |
448 | } | |
449 | rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
450 | if (!rootcontext) { | |
451 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
452 | goto out_free; | |
453 | } | |
454 | if (!alloc) | |
455 | alloc = 1; | |
456 | seen |= Opt_rootcontext; | |
457 | break; | |
458 | ||
459 | case Opt_defcontext: | |
460 | if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { | |
461 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
462 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: " | |
463 | "defcontext option is invalid " | |
464 | "for this filesystem type\n"); | |
465 | goto out_free; | |
466 | } | |
467 | if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) { | |
468 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
469 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
470 | goto out_free; | |
471 | } | |
472 | defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
473 | if (!defcontext) { | |
474 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
475 | goto out_free; | |
476 | } | |
477 | if (!alloc) | |
478 | alloc = 1; | |
479 | seen |= Opt_defcontext; | |
480 | break; | |
481 | ||
482 | default: | |
483 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
484 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount " | |
485 | "option\n"); | |
486 | goto out_free; | |
487 | ||
488 | } | |
489 | } | |
490 | } | |
491 | ||
492 | if (!seen) | |
493 | goto out; | |
494 | ||
495 | /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ | |
496 | if (fscontext) { | |
497 | rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid); | |
498 | if (rc) { | |
499 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
500 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
501 | fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
502 | goto out_free; | |
503 | } | |
504 | ||
505 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); | |
506 | if (rc) | |
507 | goto out_free; | |
508 | ||
509 | sbsec->sid = sid; | |
510 | } | |
511 | ||
512 | /* | |
513 | * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior. | |
514 | * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set | |
515 | * the superblock context if not already set. | |
516 | */ | |
517 | if (context) { | |
518 | rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid); | |
519 | if (rc) { | |
520 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
521 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
522 | context, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
523 | goto out_free; | |
524 | } | |
525 | ||
526 | if (!fscontext) { | |
527 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); | |
528 | if (rc) | |
529 | goto out_free; | |
530 | sbsec->sid = sid; | |
531 | } else { | |
532 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); | |
533 | if (rc) | |
534 | goto out_free; | |
535 | } | |
536 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; | |
537 | ||
538 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; | |
539 | } | |
540 | ||
541 | if (rootcontext) { | |
542 | struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode; | |
543 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
544 | rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid); | |
545 | if (rc) { | |
546 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
547 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
548 | rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
549 | goto out_free; | |
550 | } | |
551 | ||
552 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); | |
553 | if (rc) | |
554 | goto out_free; | |
555 | ||
556 | isec->sid = sid; | |
557 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
558 | } | |
559 | ||
560 | if (defcontext) { | |
561 | rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid); | |
562 | if (rc) { | |
563 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
564 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
565 | defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
566 | goto out_free; | |
567 | } | |
568 | ||
569 | if (sid == sbsec->def_sid) | |
570 | goto out_free; | |
571 | ||
572 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); | |
573 | if (rc) | |
574 | goto out_free; | |
575 | ||
576 | sbsec->def_sid = sid; | |
577 | } | |
578 | ||
579 | out_free: | |
580 | if (alloc) { | |
581 | kfree(context); | |
582 | kfree(defcontext); | |
583 | kfree(fscontext); | |
584 | kfree(rootcontext); | |
585 | } | |
586 | out: | |
587 | return rc; | |
588 | } | |
589 | ||
590 | static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
591 | { | |
592 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
593 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; | |
594 | struct inode *inode = root->d_inode; | |
595 | int rc = 0; | |
596 | ||
597 | mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); | |
598 | if (sbsec->initialized) | |
599 | goto out; | |
600 | ||
601 | if (!ss_initialized) { | |
602 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, | |
603 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security | |
604 | server is ready to handle calls. */ | |
605 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
606 | if (list_empty(&sbsec->list)) | |
607 | list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head); | |
608 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
609 | goto out; | |
610 | } | |
611 | ||
612 | /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ | |
613 | rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); | |
614 | if (rc) { | |
615 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", | |
616 | __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc); | |
617 | goto out; | |
618 | } | |
619 | ||
620 | rc = try_context_mount(sb, data); | |
621 | if (rc) | |
622 | goto out; | |
623 | ||
624 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { | |
625 | /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no | |
626 | error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on | |
627 | the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be | |
628 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have | |
629 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ | |
630 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { | |
631 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " | |
632 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
633 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
634 | goto out; | |
635 | } | |
636 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); | |
637 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { | |
638 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
639 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | |
640 | "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", | |
641 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
642 | else | |
643 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | |
644 | "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, | |
645 | sb->s_type->name, -rc); | |
646 | goto out; | |
647 | } | |
648 | } | |
649 | ||
650 | if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) | |
651 | sbsec->proc = 1; | |
652 | ||
653 | sbsec->initialized = 1; | |
654 | ||
655 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) { | |
656 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", | |
657 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
658 | } | |
659 | else { | |
660 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", | |
661 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, | |
662 | labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); | |
663 | } | |
664 | ||
665 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ | |
666 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root); | |
667 | ||
668 | /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. | |
669 | inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created | |
670 | during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly | |
671 | populates itself. */ | |
672 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
673 | next_inode: | |
674 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { | |
675 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = | |
676 | list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, | |
677 | struct inode_security_struct, list); | |
678 | struct inode *inode = isec->inode; | |
679 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
680 | inode = igrab(inode); | |
681 | if (inode) { | |
682 | if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode)) | |
683 | inode_doinit(inode); | |
684 | iput(inode); | |
685 | } | |
686 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
687 | list_del_init(&isec->list); | |
688 | goto next_inode; | |
689 | } | |
690 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
691 | out: | |
692 | mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); | |
693 | return rc; | |
694 | } | |
695 | ||
696 | static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) | |
697 | { | |
698 | switch (mode & S_IFMT) { | |
699 | case S_IFSOCK: | |
700 | return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; | |
701 | case S_IFLNK: | |
702 | return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; | |
703 | case S_IFREG: | |
704 | return SECCLASS_FILE; | |
705 | case S_IFBLK: | |
706 | return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; | |
707 | case S_IFDIR: | |
708 | return SECCLASS_DIR; | |
709 | case S_IFCHR: | |
710 | return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; | |
711 | case S_IFIFO: | |
712 | return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; | |
713 | ||
714 | } | |
715 | ||
716 | return SECCLASS_FILE; | |
717 | } | |
718 | ||
719 | static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) | |
720 | { | |
721 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); | |
722 | } | |
723 | ||
724 | static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) | |
725 | { | |
726 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); | |
727 | } | |
728 | ||
729 | static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) | |
730 | { | |
731 | switch (family) { | |
732 | case PF_UNIX: | |
733 | switch (type) { | |
734 | case SOCK_STREAM: | |
735 | case SOCK_SEQPACKET: | |
736 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; | |
737 | case SOCK_DGRAM: | |
738 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; | |
739 | } | |
740 | break; | |
741 | case PF_INET: | |
742 | case PF_INET6: | |
743 | switch (type) { | |
744 | case SOCK_STREAM: | |
745 | if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) | |
746 | return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; | |
747 | else | |
748 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
749 | case SOCK_DGRAM: | |
750 | if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) | |
751 | return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; | |
752 | else | |
753 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
754 | default: | |
755 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
756 | } | |
757 | break; | |
758 | case PF_NETLINK: | |
759 | switch (protocol) { | |
760 | case NETLINK_ROUTE: | |
761 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; | |
762 | case NETLINK_FIREWALL: | |
763 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET; | |
764 | case NETLINK_INET_DIAG: | |
765 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; | |
766 | case NETLINK_NFLOG: | |
767 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; | |
768 | case NETLINK_XFRM: | |
769 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; | |
770 | case NETLINK_SELINUX: | |
771 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; | |
772 | case NETLINK_AUDIT: | |
773 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; | |
774 | case NETLINK_IP6_FW: | |
775 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET; | |
776 | case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: | |
777 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; | |
778 | case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: | |
779 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; | |
780 | default: | |
781 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; | |
782 | } | |
783 | case PF_PACKET: | |
784 | return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; | |
785 | case PF_KEY: | |
786 | return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; | |
787 | case PF_APPLETALK: | |
788 | return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; | |
789 | } | |
790 | ||
791 | return SECCLASS_SOCKET; | |
792 | } | |
793 | ||
794 | #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS | |
795 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, | |
796 | u16 tclass, | |
797 | u32 *sid) | |
798 | { | |
799 | int buflen, rc; | |
800 | char *buffer, *path, *end; | |
801 | ||
802 | buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); | |
803 | if (!buffer) | |
804 | return -ENOMEM; | |
805 | ||
806 | buflen = PAGE_SIZE; | |
807 | end = buffer+buflen; | |
808 | *--end = '\0'; | |
809 | buflen--; | |
810 | path = end-1; | |
811 | *path = '/'; | |
812 | while (de && de != de->parent) { | |
813 | buflen -= de->namelen + 1; | |
814 | if (buflen < 0) | |
815 | break; | |
816 | end -= de->namelen; | |
817 | memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen); | |
818 | *--end = '/'; | |
819 | path = end; | |
820 | de = de->parent; | |
821 | } | |
822 | rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); | |
823 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); | |
824 | return rc; | |
825 | } | |
826 | #else | |
827 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, | |
828 | u16 tclass, | |
829 | u32 *sid) | |
830 | { | |
831 | return -EINVAL; | |
832 | } | |
833 | #endif | |
834 | ||
835 | /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ | |
836 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) | |
837 | { | |
838 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; | |
839 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
840 | u32 sid; | |
841 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
842 | #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 | |
843 | char *context = NULL; | |
844 | unsigned len = 0; | |
845 | int rc = 0; | |
846 | ||
847 | if (isec->initialized) | |
848 | goto out; | |
849 | ||
850 | mutex_lock(&isec->lock); | |
851 | if (isec->initialized) | |
852 | goto out_unlock; | |
853 | ||
854 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
855 | if (!sbsec->initialized) { | |
856 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, | |
857 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security | |
858 | server is ready to handle calls. */ | |
859 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
860 | if (list_empty(&isec->list)) | |
861 | list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); | |
862 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
863 | goto out_unlock; | |
864 | } | |
865 | ||
866 | switch (sbsec->behavior) { | |
867 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: | |
868 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { | |
869 | isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; | |
870 | break; | |
871 | } | |
872 | ||
873 | /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. | |
874 | Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ | |
875 | if (opt_dentry) { | |
876 | /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ | |
877 | dentry = dget(opt_dentry); | |
878 | } else { | |
879 | /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */ | |
880 | dentry = d_find_alias(inode); | |
881 | } | |
882 | if (!dentry) { | |
883 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s " | |
884 | "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id, | |
885 | inode->i_ino); | |
886 | goto out_unlock; | |
887 | } | |
888 | ||
889 | len = INITCONTEXTLEN; | |
890 | context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
891 | if (!context) { | |
892 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
893 | dput(dentry); | |
894 | goto out_unlock; | |
895 | } | |
896 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
897 | context, len); | |
898 | if (rc == -ERANGE) { | |
899 | /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ | |
900 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
901 | NULL, 0); | |
902 | if (rc < 0) { | |
903 | dput(dentry); | |
904 | goto out_unlock; | |
905 | } | |
906 | kfree(context); | |
907 | len = rc; | |
908 | context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
909 | if (!context) { | |
910 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
911 | dput(dentry); | |
912 | goto out_unlock; | |
913 | } | |
914 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, | |
915 | XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
916 | context, len); | |
917 | } | |
918 | dput(dentry); | |
919 | if (rc < 0) { | |
920 | if (rc != -ENODATA) { | |
921 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned " | |
922 | "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, | |
923 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
924 | kfree(context); | |
925 | goto out_unlock; | |
926 | } | |
927 | /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ | |
928 | sid = sbsec->def_sid; | |
929 | rc = 0; | |
930 | } else { | |
931 | rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, | |
932 | sbsec->def_sid); | |
933 | if (rc) { | |
934 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) " | |
935 | "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", | |
936 | __FUNCTION__, context, -rc, | |
937 | inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
938 | kfree(context); | |
939 | /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ | |
940 | rc = 0; | |
941 | break; | |
942 | } | |
943 | } | |
944 | kfree(context); | |
945 | isec->sid = sid; | |
946 | break; | |
947 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: | |
948 | isec->sid = isec->task_sid; | |
949 | break; | |
950 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: | |
951 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ | |
952 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; | |
953 | ||
954 | /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ | |
955 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
956 | rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, | |
957 | sbsec->sid, | |
958 | isec->sclass, | |
959 | &sid); | |
960 | if (rc) | |
961 | goto out_unlock; | |
962 | isec->sid = sid; | |
963 | break; | |
964 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: | |
965 | isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; | |
966 | break; | |
967 | default: | |
968 | /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ | |
969 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; | |
970 | ||
971 | if (sbsec->proc) { | |
972 | struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); | |
973 | if (proci->pde) { | |
974 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
975 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde, | |
976 | isec->sclass, | |
977 | &sid); | |
978 | if (rc) | |
979 | goto out_unlock; | |
980 | isec->sid = sid; | |
981 | } | |
982 | } | |
983 | break; | |
984 | } | |
985 | ||
986 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
987 | ||
988 | out_unlock: | |
989 | mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); | |
990 | out: | |
991 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) | |
992 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
993 | return rc; | |
994 | } | |
995 | ||
996 | /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ | |
997 | static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) | |
998 | { | |
999 | u32 perm = 0; | |
1000 | ||
1001 | switch (sig) { | |
1002 | case SIGCHLD: | |
1003 | /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ | |
1004 | perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; | |
1005 | break; | |
1006 | case SIGKILL: | |
1007 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ | |
1008 | perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; | |
1009 | break; | |
1010 | case SIGSTOP: | |
1011 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ | |
1012 | perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; | |
1013 | break; | |
1014 | default: | |
1015 | /* All other signals. */ | |
1016 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; | |
1017 | break; | |
1018 | } | |
1019 | ||
1020 | return perm; | |
1021 | } | |
1022 | ||
1023 | /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks, | |
1024 | fork check, ptrace check, etc. */ | |
1025 | static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1, | |
1026 | struct task_struct *tsk2, | |
1027 | u32 perms) | |
1028 | { | |
1029 | struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2; | |
1030 | ||
1031 | tsec1 = tsk1->security; | |
1032 | tsec2 = tsk2->security; | |
1033 | return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid, | |
1034 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); | |
1035 | } | |
1036 | ||
1037 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ | |
1038 | static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1039 | int cap) | |
1040 | { | |
1041 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1042 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1043 | ||
1044 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
1045 | ||
1046 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP); | |
1047 | ad.tsk = tsk; | |
1048 | ad.u.cap = cap; | |
1049 | ||
1050 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
1051 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad); | |
1052 | } | |
1053 | ||
1054 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */ | |
1055 | static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1056 | u32 perms) | |
1057 | { | |
1058 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1059 | ||
1060 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
1061 | ||
1062 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, | |
1063 | SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL); | |
1064 | } | |
1065 | ||
1066 | /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. | |
1067 | The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit | |
1068 | data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ | |
1069 | static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1070 | struct inode *inode, | |
1071 | u32 perms, | |
1072 | struct avc_audit_data *adp) | |
1073 | { | |
1074 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1075 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
1076 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1077 | ||
1078 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
1079 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
1080 | ||
1081 | if (!adp) { | |
1082 | adp = &ad; | |
1083 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1084 | ad.u.fs.inode = inode; | |
1085 | } | |
1086 | ||
1087 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); | |
1088 | } | |
1089 | ||
1090 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing | |
1091 | the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the | |
1092 | pathname if needed. */ | |
1093 | static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1094 | struct vfsmount *mnt, | |
1095 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1096 | u32 av) | |
1097 | { | |
1098 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1099 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1100 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1101 | ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt; | |
1102 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1103 | return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad); | |
1104 | } | |
1105 | ||
1106 | /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to | |
1107 | access an inode in a given way. Check access to the | |
1108 | descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to | |
1109 | check a particular permission to the file. | |
1110 | Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it | |
1111 | has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then | |
1112 | access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases | |
1113 | where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ | |
1114 | static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1115 | struct file *file, | |
1116 | u32 av) | |
1117 | { | |
1118 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; | |
1119 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; | |
1120 | struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; | |
1121 | struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; | |
1122 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1123 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1124 | int rc; | |
1125 | ||
1126 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1127 | ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt; | |
1128 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1129 | ||
1130 | if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) { | |
1131 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid, | |
1132 | SECCLASS_FD, | |
1133 | FD__USE, | |
1134 | &ad); | |
1135 | if (rc) | |
1136 | return rc; | |
1137 | } | |
1138 | ||
1139 | /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ | |
1140 | if (av) | |
1141 | return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad); | |
1142 | ||
1143 | return 0; | |
1144 | } | |
1145 | ||
1146 | /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ | |
1147 | static int may_create(struct inode *dir, | |
1148 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1149 | u16 tclass) | |
1150 | { | |
1151 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1152 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; | |
1153 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1154 | u32 newsid; | |
1155 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1156 | int rc; | |
1157 | ||
1158 | tsec = current->security; | |
1159 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1160 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
1161 | ||
1162 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1163 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1164 | ||
1165 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, | |
1166 | DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, | |
1167 | &ad); | |
1168 | if (rc) | |
1169 | return rc; | |
1170 | ||
1171 | if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { | |
1172 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; | |
1173 | } else { | |
1174 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, | |
1175 | &newsid); | |
1176 | if (rc) | |
1177 | return rc; | |
1178 | } | |
1179 | ||
1180 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); | |
1181 | if (rc) | |
1182 | return rc; | |
1183 | ||
1184 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, | |
1185 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
1186 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
1187 | } | |
1188 | ||
1189 | /* Check whether a task can create a key. */ | |
1190 | static int may_create_key(u32 ksid, | |
1191 | struct task_struct *ctx) | |
1192 | { | |
1193 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1194 | ||
1195 | tsec = ctx->security; | |
1196 | ||
1197 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); | |
1198 | } | |
1199 | ||
1200 | #define MAY_LINK 0 | |
1201 | #define MAY_UNLINK 1 | |
1202 | #define MAY_RMDIR 2 | |
1203 | ||
1204 | /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ | |
1205 | static int may_link(struct inode *dir, | |
1206 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1207 | int kind) | |
1208 | ||
1209 | { | |
1210 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1211 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; | |
1212 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1213 | u32 av; | |
1214 | int rc; | |
1215 | ||
1216 | tsec = current->security; | |
1217 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1218 | isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1219 | ||
1220 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1221 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1222 | ||
1223 | av = DIR__SEARCH; | |
1224 | av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); | |
1225 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); | |
1226 | if (rc) | |
1227 | return rc; | |
1228 | ||
1229 | switch (kind) { | |
1230 | case MAY_LINK: | |
1231 | av = FILE__LINK; | |
1232 | break; | |
1233 | case MAY_UNLINK: | |
1234 | av = FILE__UNLINK; | |
1235 | break; | |
1236 | case MAY_RMDIR: | |
1237 | av = DIR__RMDIR; | |
1238 | break; | |
1239 | default: | |
1240 | printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind); | |
1241 | return 0; | |
1242 | } | |
1243 | ||
1244 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); | |
1245 | return rc; | |
1246 | } | |
1247 | ||
1248 | static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, | |
1249 | struct dentry *old_dentry, | |
1250 | struct inode *new_dir, | |
1251 | struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
1252 | { | |
1253 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1254 | struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; | |
1255 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1256 | u32 av; | |
1257 | int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; | |
1258 | int rc; | |
1259 | ||
1260 | tsec = current->security; | |
1261 | old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; | |
1262 | old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1263 | old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); | |
1264 | new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; | |
1265 | ||
1266 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1267 | ||
1268 | ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry; | |
1269 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, | |
1270 | DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); | |
1271 | if (rc) | |
1272 | return rc; | |
1273 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid, | |
1274 | old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); | |
1275 | if (rc) | |
1276 | return rc; | |
1277 | if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { | |
1278 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid, | |
1279 | old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); | |
1280 | if (rc) | |
1281 | return rc; | |
1282 | } | |
1283 | ||
1284 | ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry; | |
1285 | av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; | |
1286 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) | |
1287 | av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; | |
1288 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); | |
1289 | if (rc) | |
1290 | return rc; | |
1291 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) { | |
1292 | new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1293 | new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); | |
1294 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid, | |
1295 | new_isec->sclass, | |
1296 | (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); | |
1297 | if (rc) | |
1298 | return rc; | |
1299 | } | |
1300 | ||
1301 | return 0; | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
1304 | /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ | |
1305 | static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1306 | struct super_block *sb, | |
1307 | u32 perms, | |
1308 | struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
1309 | { | |
1310 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1311 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1312 | ||
1313 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
1314 | sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
1315 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
1316 | perms, ad); | |
1317 | } | |
1318 | ||
1319 | /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ | |
1320 | static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) | |
1321 | { | |
1322 | u32 av = 0; | |
1323 | ||
1324 | if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) { | |
1325 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) | |
1326 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; | |
1327 | if (mask & MAY_READ) | |
1328 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1329 | ||
1330 | if (mask & MAY_APPEND) | |
1331 | av |= FILE__APPEND; | |
1332 | else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) | |
1333 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1334 | ||
1335 | } else { | |
1336 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) | |
1337 | av |= DIR__SEARCH; | |
1338 | if (mask & MAY_WRITE) | |
1339 | av |= DIR__WRITE; | |
1340 | if (mask & MAY_READ) | |
1341 | av |= DIR__READ; | |
1342 | } | |
1343 | ||
1344 | return av; | |
1345 | } | |
1346 | ||
1347 | /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ | |
1348 | static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) | |
1349 | { | |
1350 | u32 av = 0; | |
1351 | ||
1352 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) | |
1353 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1354 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { | |
1355 | if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) | |
1356 | av |= FILE__APPEND; | |
1357 | else | |
1358 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1359 | } | |
1360 | ||
1361 | return av; | |
1362 | } | |
1363 | ||
1364 | /* Hook functions begin here. */ | |
1365 | ||
1366 | static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) | |
1367 | { | |
1368 | struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security; | |
1369 | struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security; | |
1370 | int rc; | |
1371 | ||
1372 | rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child); | |
1373 | if (rc) | |
1374 | return rc; | |
1375 | ||
1376 | rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE); | |
1377 | /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */ | |
1378 | if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc) | |
1379 | csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid; | |
1380 | return rc; | |
1381 | } | |
1382 | ||
1383 | static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1384 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1385 | { | |
1386 | int error; | |
1387 | ||
1388 | error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP); | |
1389 | if (error) | |
1390 | return error; | |
1391 | ||
1392 | return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1393 | } | |
1394 | ||
1395 | static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1396 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1397 | { | |
1398 | int error; | |
1399 | ||
1400 | error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1401 | if (error) | |
1402 | return error; | |
1403 | ||
1404 | return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP); | |
1405 | } | |
1406 | ||
1407 | static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1408 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1409 | { | |
1410 | secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1411 | } | |
1412 | ||
1413 | static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) | |
1414 | { | |
1415 | int rc; | |
1416 | ||
1417 | rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap); | |
1418 | if (rc) | |
1419 | return rc; | |
1420 | ||
1421 | return task_has_capability(tsk,cap); | |
1422 | } | |
1423 | ||
1424 | static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) | |
1425 | { | |
1426 | int error = 0; | |
1427 | u32 av; | |
1428 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1429 | u32 tsid; | |
1430 | int rc; | |
1431 | ||
1432 | rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op); | |
1433 | if (rc) | |
1434 | return rc; | |
1435 | ||
1436 | tsec = current->security; | |
1437 | ||
1438 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ? | |
1439 | SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); | |
1440 | if (rc) { | |
1441 | /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */ | |
1442 | tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; | |
1443 | } | |
1444 | ||
1445 | /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating | |
1446 | * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */ | |
1447 | if(op == 001) { | |
1448 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid, | |
1449 | SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL); | |
1450 | } else { | |
1451 | av = 0; | |
1452 | if (op & 004) | |
1453 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1454 | if (op & 002) | |
1455 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1456 | if (av) | |
1457 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid, | |
1458 | SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL); | |
1459 | } | |
1460 | ||
1461 | return error; | |
1462 | } | |
1463 | ||
1464 | static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) | |
1465 | { | |
1466 | int rc = 0; | |
1467 | ||
1468 | if (!sb) | |
1469 | return 0; | |
1470 | ||
1471 | switch (cmds) { | |
1472 | case Q_SYNC: | |
1473 | case Q_QUOTAON: | |
1474 | case Q_QUOTAOFF: | |
1475 | case Q_SETINFO: | |
1476 | case Q_SETQUOTA: | |
1477 | rc = superblock_has_perm(current, | |
1478 | sb, | |
1479 | FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); | |
1480 | break; | |
1481 | case Q_GETFMT: | |
1482 | case Q_GETINFO: | |
1483 | case Q_GETQUOTA: | |
1484 | rc = superblock_has_perm(current, | |
1485 | sb, | |
1486 | FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); | |
1487 | break; | |
1488 | default: | |
1489 | rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ | |
1490 | break; | |
1491 | } | |
1492 | return rc; | |
1493 | } | |
1494 | ||
1495 | static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) | |
1496 | { | |
1497 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); | |
1498 | } | |
1499 | ||
1500 | static int selinux_syslog(int type) | |
1501 | { | |
1502 | int rc; | |
1503 | ||
1504 | rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type); | |
1505 | if (rc) | |
1506 | return rc; | |
1507 | ||
1508 | switch (type) { | |
1509 | case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */ | |
1510 | case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */ | |
1511 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ); | |
1512 | break; | |
1513 | case 6: /* Disable logging to console */ | |
1514 | case 7: /* Enable logging to console */ | |
1515 | case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */ | |
1516 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE); | |
1517 | break; | |
1518 | case 0: /* Close log */ | |
1519 | case 1: /* Open log */ | |
1520 | case 2: /* Read from log */ | |
1521 | case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */ | |
1522 | case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */ | |
1523 | default: | |
1524 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD); | |
1525 | break; | |
1526 | } | |
1527 | return rc; | |
1528 | } | |
1529 | ||
1530 | /* | |
1531 | * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual | |
1532 | * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to | |
1533 | * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. | |
1534 | * | |
1535 | * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0 | |
1536 | * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if | |
1537 | * the capability is granted. | |
1538 | * | |
1539 | * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all | |
1540 | * processes that allocate mappings. | |
1541 | */ | |
1542 | static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages) | |
1543 | { | |
1544 | int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
1545 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
1546 | ||
1547 | rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); | |
1548 | if (rc == 0) | |
1549 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
1550 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, | |
1551 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), | |
1552 | NULL); | |
1553 | ||
1554 | if (rc == 0) | |
1555 | cap_sys_admin = 1; | |
1556 | ||
1557 | return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin); | |
1558 | } | |
1559 | ||
1560 | /* binprm security operations */ | |
1561 | ||
1562 | static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1563 | { | |
1564 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1565 | ||
1566 | bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1567 | if (!bsec) | |
1568 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1569 | ||
1570 | bsec->bprm = bprm; | |
1571 | bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
1572 | bsec->set = 0; | |
1573 | ||
1574 | bprm->security = bsec; | |
1575 | return 0; | |
1576 | } | |
1577 | ||
1578 | static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1579 | { | |
1580 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1581 | struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
1582 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
1583 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1584 | u32 newsid; | |
1585 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1586 | int rc; | |
1587 | ||
1588 | rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm); | |
1589 | if (rc) | |
1590 | return rc; | |
1591 | ||
1592 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1593 | ||
1594 | if (bsec->set) | |
1595 | return 0; | |
1596 | ||
1597 | tsec = current->security; | |
1598 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
1599 | ||
1600 | /* Default to the current task SID. */ | |
1601 | bsec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
1602 | ||
1603 | /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ | |
1604 | tsec->create_sid = 0; | |
1605 | tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; | |
1606 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; | |
1607 | ||
1608 | if (tsec->exec_sid) { | |
1609 | newsid = tsec->exec_sid; | |
1610 | /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ | |
1611 | tsec->exec_sid = 0; | |
1612 | } else { | |
1613 | /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ | |
1614 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
1615 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid); | |
1616 | if (rc) | |
1617 | return rc; | |
1618 | } | |
1619 | ||
1620 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1621 | ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt; | |
1622 | ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry; | |
1623 | ||
1624 | if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) | |
1625 | newsid = tsec->sid; | |
1626 | ||
1627 | if (tsec->sid == newsid) { | |
1628 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
1629 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); | |
1630 | if (rc) | |
1631 | return rc; | |
1632 | } else { | |
1633 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ | |
1634 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, | |
1635 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); | |
1636 | if (rc) | |
1637 | return rc; | |
1638 | ||
1639 | rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid, | |
1640 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); | |
1641 | if (rc) | |
1642 | return rc; | |
1643 | ||
1644 | /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ | |
1645 | current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; | |
1646 | ||
1647 | /* Set the security field to the new SID. */ | |
1648 | bsec->sid = newsid; | |
1649 | } | |
1650 | ||
1651 | bsec->set = 1; | |
1652 | return 0; | |
1653 | } | |
1654 | ||
1655 | static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1656 | { | |
1657 | return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm); | |
1658 | } | |
1659 | ||
1660 | ||
1661 | static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1662 | { | |
1663 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
1664 | int atsecure = 0; | |
1665 | ||
1666 | if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) { | |
1667 | /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless | |
1668 | the noatsecure permission is granted between | |
1669 | the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ | |
1670 | atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, | |
1671 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1672 | PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); | |
1673 | } | |
1674 | ||
1675 | return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm)); | |
1676 | } | |
1677 | ||
1678 | static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1679 | { | |
1680 | kfree(bprm->security); | |
1681 | bprm->security = NULL; | |
1682 | } | |
1683 | ||
1684 | extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; | |
1685 | extern struct dentry *selinux_null; | |
1686 | ||
1687 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ | |
1688 | static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files) | |
1689 | { | |
1690 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1691 | struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; | |
1692 | struct tty_struct *tty; | |
1693 | struct fdtable *fdt; | |
1694 | long j = -1; | |
1695 | ||
1696 | mutex_lock(&tty_mutex); | |
1697 | tty = current->signal->tty; | |
1698 | if (tty) { | |
1699 | file_list_lock(); | |
1700 | file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list); | |
1701 | if (file) { | |
1702 | /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. | |
1703 | Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather | |
1704 | than using file_has_perm, as this particular open | |
1705 | file may belong to another process and we are only | |
1706 | interested in the inode-based check here. */ | |
1707 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
1708 | if (inode_has_perm(current, inode, | |
1709 | FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { | |
1710 | /* Reset controlling tty. */ | |
1711 | current->signal->tty = NULL; | |
1712 | current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0; | |
1713 | } | |
1714 | } | |
1715 | file_list_unlock(); | |
1716 | } | |
1717 | mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex); | |
1718 | ||
1719 | /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ | |
1720 | ||
1721 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1722 | ||
1723 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); | |
1724 | for (;;) { | |
1725 | unsigned long set, i; | |
1726 | int fd; | |
1727 | ||
1728 | j++; | |
1729 | i = j * __NFDBITS; | |
1730 | fdt = files_fdtable(files); | |
1731 | if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset) | |
1732 | break; | |
1733 | set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j]; | |
1734 | if (!set) | |
1735 | continue; | |
1736 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); | |
1737 | for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) { | |
1738 | if (set & 1) { | |
1739 | file = fget(i); | |
1740 | if (!file) | |
1741 | continue; | |
1742 | if (file_has_perm(current, | |
1743 | file, | |
1744 | file_to_av(file))) { | |
1745 | sys_close(i); | |
1746 | fd = get_unused_fd(); | |
1747 | if (fd != i) { | |
1748 | if (fd >= 0) | |
1749 | put_unused_fd(fd); | |
1750 | fput(file); | |
1751 | continue; | |
1752 | } | |
1753 | if (devnull) { | |
1754 | get_file(devnull); | |
1755 | } else { | |
1756 | devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR); | |
1757 | if (!devnull) { | |
1758 | put_unused_fd(fd); | |
1759 | fput(file); | |
1760 | continue; | |
1761 | } | |
1762 | } | |
1763 | fd_install(fd, devnull); | |
1764 | } | |
1765 | fput(file); | |
1766 | } | |
1767 | } | |
1768 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); | |
1769 | ||
1770 | } | |
1771 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); | |
1772 | } | |
1773 | ||
1774 | static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) | |
1775 | { | |
1776 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1777 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1778 | u32 sid; | |
1779 | int rc; | |
1780 | ||
1781 | secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe); | |
1782 | ||
1783 | tsec = current->security; | |
1784 | ||
1785 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1786 | sid = bsec->sid; | |
1787 | ||
1788 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid; | |
1789 | bsec->unsafe = 0; | |
1790 | if (tsec->sid != sid) { | |
1791 | /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID | |
1792 | unchanged and kill. */ | |
1793 | if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { | |
1794 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1795 | PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); | |
1796 | if (rc) { | |
1797 | bsec->unsafe = 1; | |
1798 | return; | |
1799 | } | |
1800 | } | |
1801 | ||
1802 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. | |
1803 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */ | |
1804 | if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { | |
1805 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, | |
1806 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, | |
1807 | NULL); | |
1808 | if (rc) { | |
1809 | bsec->unsafe = 1; | |
1810 | return; | |
1811 | } | |
1812 | } | |
1813 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
1814 | } | |
1815 | } | |
1816 | ||
1817 | /* | |
1818 | * called after apply_creds without the task lock held | |
1819 | */ | |
1820 | static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1821 | { | |
1822 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1823 | struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; | |
1824 | struct itimerval itimer; | |
1825 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1826 | int rc, i; | |
1827 | ||
1828 | tsec = current->security; | |
1829 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1830 | ||
1831 | if (bsec->unsafe) { | |
1832 | force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current); | |
1833 | return; | |
1834 | } | |
1835 | if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid) | |
1836 | return; | |
1837 | ||
1838 | /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ | |
1839 | flush_unauthorized_files(current->files); | |
1840 | ||
1841 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state | |
1842 | from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid | |
1843 | subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock | |
1844 | signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has | |
1845 | been updated so that any kill done after the flush | |
1846 | will be checked against the new SID. */ | |
1847 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1848 | PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); | |
1849 | if (rc) { | |
1850 | memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer); | |
1851 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) | |
1852 | do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); | |
1853 | flush_signals(current); | |
1854 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); | |
1855 | flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); | |
1856 | sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); | |
1857 | recalc_sigpending(); | |
1858 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); | |
1859 | } | |
1860 | ||
1861 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits | |
1862 | from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to | |
1863 | the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init | |
1864 | task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits | |
1865 | (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit | |
1866 | check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into | |
1867 | the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher | |
1868 | than the default soft limit for cases where the default | |
1869 | is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or | |
1870 | RLIMIT_STACK.*/ | |
1871 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1872 | PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); | |
1873 | if (rc) { | |
1874 | for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { | |
1875 | rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; | |
1876 | initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i; | |
1877 | rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur); | |
1878 | } | |
1879 | if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) { | |
1880 | /* | |
1881 | * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations | |
1882 | * to be refigured. | |
1883 | */ | |
1884 | current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1); | |
1885 | } | |
1886 | } | |
1887 | ||
1888 | /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can | |
1889 | recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */ | |
1890 | wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit); | |
1891 | } | |
1892 | ||
1893 | /* superblock security operations */ | |
1894 | ||
1895 | static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
1896 | { | |
1897 | return superblock_alloc_security(sb); | |
1898 | } | |
1899 | ||
1900 | static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
1901 | { | |
1902 | superblock_free_security(sb); | |
1903 | } | |
1904 | ||
1905 | static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen) | |
1906 | { | |
1907 | if (plen > olen) | |
1908 | return 0; | |
1909 | ||
1910 | return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen); | |
1911 | } | |
1912 | ||
1913 | static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) | |
1914 | { | |
1915 | return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) || | |
1916 | match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) || | |
1917 | match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) || | |
1918 | match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len)); | |
1919 | } | |
1920 | ||
1921 | static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) | |
1922 | { | |
1923 | if (!*first) { | |
1924 | **to = ','; | |
1925 | *to += 1; | |
1926 | } else | |
1927 | *first = 0; | |
1928 | memcpy(*to, from, len); | |
1929 | *to += len; | |
1930 | } | |
1931 | ||
1932 | static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, | |
1933 | int len) | |
1934 | { | |
1935 | int current_size = 0; | |
1936 | ||
1937 | if (!*first) { | |
1938 | **to = '|'; | |
1939 | *to += 1; | |
1940 | } | |
1941 | else | |
1942 | *first = 0; | |
1943 | ||
1944 | while (current_size < len) { | |
1945 | if (*from != '"') { | |
1946 | **to = *from; | |
1947 | *to += 1; | |
1948 | } | |
1949 | from += 1; | |
1950 | current_size += 1; | |
1951 | } | |
1952 | } | |
1953 | ||
1954 | static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy) | |
1955 | { | |
1956 | int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0; | |
1957 | char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end; | |
1958 | char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec; | |
1959 | int open_quote = 0; | |
1960 | ||
1961 | in_curr = orig; | |
1962 | sec_curr = copy; | |
1963 | ||
1964 | /* Binary mount data: just copy */ | |
1965 | if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { | |
1966 | copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr); | |
1967 | goto out; | |
1968 | } | |
1969 | ||
1970 | nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); | |
1971 | if (!nosec) { | |
1972 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
1973 | goto out; | |
1974 | } | |
1975 | ||
1976 | nosec_save = nosec; | |
1977 | fnosec = fsec = 1; | |
1978 | in_save = in_end = orig; | |
1979 | ||
1980 | do { | |
1981 | if (*in_end == '"') | |
1982 | open_quote = !open_quote; | |
1983 | if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) || | |
1984 | *in_end == '\0') { | |
1985 | int len = in_end - in_curr; | |
1986 | ||
1987 | if (selinux_option(in_curr, len)) | |
1988 | take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); | |
1989 | else | |
1990 | take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len); | |
1991 | ||
1992 | in_curr = in_end + 1; | |
1993 | } | |
1994 | } while (*in_end++); | |
1995 | ||
1996 | strcpy(in_save, nosec_save); | |
1997 | free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save); | |
1998 | out: | |
1999 | return rc; | |
2000 | } | |
2001 | ||
2002 | static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
2003 | { | |
2004 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
2005 | int rc; | |
2006 | ||
2007 | rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); | |
2008 | if (rc) | |
2009 | return rc; | |
2010 | ||
2011 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
2012 | ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root; | |
2013 | return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); | |
2014 | } | |
2015 | ||
2016 | static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) | |
2017 | { | |
2018 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
2019 | ||
2020 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
2021 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; | |
2022 | return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); | |
2023 | } | |
2024 | ||
2025 | static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name, | |
2026 | struct nameidata *nd, | |
2027 | char * type, | |
2028 | unsigned long flags, | |
2029 | void * data) | |
2030 | { | |
2031 | int rc; | |
2032 | ||
2033 | rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data); | |
2034 | if (rc) | |
2035 | return rc; | |
2036 | ||
2037 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) | |
2038 | return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb, | |
2039 | FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); | |
2040 | else | |
2041 | return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry, | |
2042 | FILE__MOUNTON); | |
2043 | } | |
2044 | ||
2045 | static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) | |
2046 | { | |
2047 | int rc; | |
2048 | ||
2049 | rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags); | |
2050 | if (rc) | |
2051 | return rc; | |
2052 | ||
2053 | return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb, | |
2054 | FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL); | |
2055 | } | |
2056 | ||
2057 | /* inode security operations */ | |
2058 | ||
2059 | static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) | |
2060 | { | |
2061 | return inode_alloc_security(inode); | |
2062 | } | |
2063 | ||
2064 | static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) | |
2065 | { | |
2066 | inode_free_security(inode); | |
2067 | } | |
2068 | ||
2069 | static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, | |
2070 | char **name, void **value, | |
2071 | size_t *len) | |
2072 | { | |
2073 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2074 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; | |
2075 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
2076 | u32 newsid, clen; | |
2077 | int rc; | |
2078 | char *namep = NULL, *context; | |
2079 | ||
2080 | tsec = current->security; | |
2081 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
2082 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
2083 | ||
2084 | if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { | |
2085 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; | |
2086 | } else { | |
2087 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, | |
2088 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), | |
2089 | &newsid); | |
2090 | if (rc) { | |
2091 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: " | |
2092 | "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s " | |
2093 | "ino=%ld)\n", | |
2094 | __FUNCTION__, | |
2095 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
2096 | return rc; | |
2097 | } | |
2098 | } | |
2099 | ||
2100 | /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ | |
2101 | if (sbsec->initialized) { | |
2102 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2103 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
2104 | isec->sid = newsid; | |
2105 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
2106 | } | |
2107 | ||
2108 | if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) | |
2109 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2110 | ||
2111 | if (name) { | |
2112 | namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL); | |
2113 | if (!namep) | |
2114 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2115 | *name = namep; | |
2116 | } | |
2117 | ||
2118 | if (value && len) { | |
2119 | rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen); | |
2120 | if (rc) { | |
2121 | kfree(namep); | |
2122 | return rc; | |
2123 | } | |
2124 | *value = context; | |
2125 | *len = clen; | |
2126 | } | |
2127 | ||
2128 | return 0; | |
2129 | } | |
2130 | ||
2131 | static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) | |
2132 | { | |
2133 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); | |
2134 | } | |
2135 | ||
2136 | static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
2137 | { | |
2138 | int rc; | |
2139 | ||
2140 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry); | |
2141 | if (rc) | |
2142 | return rc; | |
2143 | return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); | |
2144 | } | |
2145 | ||
2146 | static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2147 | { | |
2148 | int rc; | |
2149 | ||
2150 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry); | |
2151 | if (rc) | |
2152 | return rc; | |
2153 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); | |
2154 | } | |
2155 | ||
2156 | static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) | |
2157 | { | |
2158 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); | |
2159 | } | |
2160 | ||
2161 | static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) | |
2162 | { | |
2163 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); | |
2164 | } | |
2165 | ||
2166 | static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2167 | { | |
2168 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); | |
2169 | } | |
2170 | ||
2171 | static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) | |
2172 | { | |
2173 | int rc; | |
2174 | ||
2175 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); | |
2176 | if (rc) | |
2177 | return rc; | |
2178 | ||
2179 | return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); | |
2180 | } | |
2181 | ||
2182 | static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, | |
2183 | struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
2184 | { | |
2185 | return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); | |
2186 | } | |
2187 | ||
2188 | static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) | |
2189 | { | |
2190 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); | |
2191 | } | |
2192 | ||
2193 | static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) | |
2194 | { | |
2195 | int rc; | |
2196 | ||
2197 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata); | |
2198 | if (rc) | |
2199 | return rc; | |
2200 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); | |
2201 | } | |
2202 | ||
2203 | static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, | |
2204 | struct nameidata *nd) | |
2205 | { | |
2206 | int rc; | |
2207 | ||
2208 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd); | |
2209 | if (rc) | |
2210 | return rc; | |
2211 | ||
2212 | if (!mask) { | |
2213 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ | |
2214 | return 0; | |
2215 | } | |
2216 | ||
2217 | return inode_has_perm(current, inode, | |
2218 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL); | |
2219 | } | |
2220 | ||
2221 | static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) | |
2222 | { | |
2223 | int rc; | |
2224 | ||
2225 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr); | |
2226 | if (rc) | |
2227 | return rc; | |
2228 | ||
2229 | if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) | |
2230 | return 0; | |
2231 | ||
2232 | if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | | |
2233 | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET)) | |
2234 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2235 | ||
2236 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE); | |
2237 | } | |
2238 | ||
2239 | static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2240 | { | |
2241 | return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2242 | } | |
2243 | ||
2244 | static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2245 | { | |
2246 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
2247 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
2248 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2249 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
2250 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
2251 | u32 newsid; | |
2252 | int rc = 0; | |
2253 | ||
2254 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2255 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
2256 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) && | |
2257 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { | |
2258 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. | |
2259 | Restrict to administrator. */ | |
2260 | return -EPERM; | |
2261 | } | |
2262 | ||
2263 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the | |
2264 | ordinary setattr permission. */ | |
2265 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2266 | } | |
2267 | ||
2268 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
2269 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) | |
2270 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2271 | ||
2272 | if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) | |
2273 | return -EPERM; | |
2274 | ||
2275 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
2276 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
2277 | ||
2278 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, | |
2279 | FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); | |
2280 | if (rc) | |
2281 | return rc; | |
2282 | ||
2283 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); | |
2284 | if (rc) | |
2285 | return rc; | |
2286 | ||
2287 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass, | |
2288 | FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); | |
2289 | if (rc) | |
2290 | return rc; | |
2291 | ||
2292 | rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid, | |
2293 | isec->sclass); | |
2294 | if (rc) | |
2295 | return rc; | |
2296 | ||
2297 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, | |
2298 | sbsec->sid, | |
2299 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
2300 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, | |
2301 | &ad); | |
2302 | } | |
2303 | ||
2304 | static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, | |
2305 | void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2306 | { | |
2307 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
2308 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2309 | u32 newsid; | |
2310 | int rc; | |
2311 | ||
2312 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2313 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ | |
2314 | return; | |
2315 | } | |
2316 | ||
2317 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); | |
2318 | if (rc) { | |
2319 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context " | |
2320 | "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc); | |
2321 | return; | |
2322 | } | |
2323 | ||
2324 | isec->sid = newsid; | |
2325 | return; | |
2326 | } | |
2327 | ||
2328 | static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
2329 | { | |
2330 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2331 | } | |
2332 | ||
2333 | static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry) | |
2334 | { | |
2335 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2336 | } | |
2337 | ||
2338 | static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
2339 | { | |
2340 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2341 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
2342 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) && | |
2343 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { | |
2344 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. | |
2345 | Restrict to administrator. */ | |
2346 | return -EPERM; | |
2347 | } | |
2348 | ||
2349 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the | |
2350 | ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate | |
2351 | permission for removexattr. */ | |
2352 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2353 | } | |
2354 | ||
2355 | /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. | |
2356 | You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ | |
2357 | return -EACCES; | |
2358 | } | |
2359 | ||
2360 | static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) | |
2361 | { | |
2362 | return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; | |
2363 | } | |
2364 | ||
2365 | /* | |
2366 | * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the | |
2367 | * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to | |
2368 | * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user. | |
2369 | * | |
2370 | * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. | |
2371 | */ | |
2372 | static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) | |
2373 | { | |
2374 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2375 | ||
2376 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) | |
2377 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2378 | ||
2379 | return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size); | |
2380 | } | |
2381 | ||
2382 | static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, | |
2383 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2384 | { | |
2385 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2386 | u32 newsid; | |
2387 | int rc; | |
2388 | ||
2389 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) | |
2390 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2391 | ||
2392 | if (!value || !size) | |
2393 | return -EACCES; | |
2394 | ||
2395 | rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid); | |
2396 | if (rc) | |
2397 | return rc; | |
2398 | ||
2399 | isec->sid = newsid; | |
2400 | return 0; | |
2401 | } | |
2402 | ||
2403 | static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) | |
2404 | { | |
2405 | const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); | |
2406 | if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) | |
2407 | memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); | |
2408 | return len; | |
2409 | } | |
2410 | ||
2411 | /* file security operations */ | |
2412 | ||
2413 | static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) | |
2414 | { | |
2415 | int rc; | |
2416 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
2417 | ||
2418 | if (!mask) { | |
2419 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ | |
2420 | return 0; | |
2421 | } | |
2422 | ||
2423 | /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ | |
2424 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) | |
2425 | mask |= MAY_APPEND; | |
2426 | ||
2427 | rc = file_has_perm(current, file, | |
2428 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); | |
2429 | if (rc) | |
2430 | return rc; | |
2431 | ||
2432 | return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask); | |
2433 | } | |
2434 | ||
2435 | static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) | |
2436 | { | |
2437 | return file_alloc_security(file); | |
2438 | } | |
2439 | ||
2440 | static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) | |
2441 | { | |
2442 | file_free_security(file); | |
2443 | } | |
2444 | ||
2445 | static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, | |
2446 | unsigned long arg) | |
2447 | { | |
2448 | int error = 0; | |
2449 | ||
2450 | switch (cmd) { | |
2451 | case FIONREAD: | |
2452 | /* fall through */ | |
2453 | case FIBMAP: | |
2454 | /* fall through */ | |
2455 | case FIGETBSZ: | |
2456 | /* fall through */ | |
2457 | case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS: | |
2458 | /* fall through */ | |
2459 | case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION: | |
2460 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2461 | break; | |
2462 | ||
2463 | case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS: | |
2464 | /* fall through */ | |
2465 | case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION: | |
2466 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2467 | break; | |
2468 | ||
2469 | /* sys_ioctl() checks */ | |
2470 | case FIONBIO: | |
2471 | /* fall through */ | |
2472 | case FIOASYNC: | |
2473 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0); | |
2474 | break; | |
2475 | ||
2476 | case KDSKBENT: | |
2477 | case KDSKBSENT: | |
2478 | error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG); | |
2479 | break; | |
2480 | ||
2481 | /* default case assumes that the command will go | |
2482 | * to the file's ioctl() function. | |
2483 | */ | |
2484 | default: | |
2485 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL); | |
2486 | ||
2487 | } | |
2488 | return error; | |
2489 | } | |
2490 | ||
2491 | static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) | |
2492 | { | |
2493 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 | |
2494 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { | |
2495 | /* | |
2496 | * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a | |
2497 | * private file mapping that will also be writable. | |
2498 | * This has an additional check. | |
2499 | */ | |
2500 | int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM); | |
2501 | if (rc) | |
2502 | return rc; | |
2503 | } | |
2504 | #endif | |
2505 | ||
2506 | if (file) { | |
2507 | /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ | |
2508 | u32 av = FILE__READ; | |
2509 | ||
2510 | /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ | |
2511 | if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) | |
2512 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
2513 | ||
2514 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) | |
2515 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; | |
2516 | ||
2517 | return file_has_perm(current, file, av); | |
2518 | } | |
2519 | return 0; | |
2520 | } | |
2521 | ||
2522 | static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, | |
2523 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) | |
2524 | { | |
2525 | int rc; | |
2526 | ||
2527 | rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags); | |
2528 | if (rc) | |
2529 | return rc; | |
2530 | ||
2531 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) | |
2532 | prot = reqprot; | |
2533 | ||
2534 | return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, | |
2535 | (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); | |
2536 | } | |
2537 | ||
2538 | static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, | |
2539 | unsigned long reqprot, | |
2540 | unsigned long prot) | |
2541 | { | |
2542 | int rc; | |
2543 | ||
2544 | rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); | |
2545 | if (rc) | |
2546 | return rc; | |
2547 | ||
2548 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) | |
2549 | prot = reqprot; | |
2550 | ||
2551 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 | |
2552 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { | |
2553 | rc = 0; | |
2554 | if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && | |
2555 | vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { | |
2556 | rc = task_has_perm(current, current, | |
2557 | PROCESS__EXECHEAP); | |
2558 | } else if (!vma->vm_file && | |
2559 | vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && | |
2560 | vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) { | |
2561 | rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK); | |
2562 | } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { | |
2563 | /* | |
2564 | * We are making executable a file mapping that has | |
2565 | * had some COW done. Since pages might have been | |
2566 | * written, check ability to execute the possibly | |
2567 | * modified content. This typically should only | |
2568 | * occur for text relocations. | |
2569 | */ | |
2570 | rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, | |
2571 | FILE__EXECMOD); | |
2572 | } | |
2573 | if (rc) | |
2574 | return rc; | |
2575 | } | |
2576 | #endif | |
2577 | ||
2578 | return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); | |
2579 | } | |
2580 | ||
2581 | static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) | |
2582 | { | |
2583 | return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK); | |
2584 | } | |
2585 | ||
2586 | static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, | |
2587 | unsigned long arg) | |
2588 | { | |
2589 | int err = 0; | |
2590 | ||
2591 | switch (cmd) { | |
2592 | case F_SETFL: | |
2593 | if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) { | |
2594 | err = -EINVAL; | |
2595 | break; | |
2596 | } | |
2597 | ||
2598 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { | |
2599 | err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE); | |
2600 | break; | |
2601 | } | |
2602 | /* fall through */ | |
2603 | case F_SETOWN: | |
2604 | case F_SETSIG: | |
2605 | case F_GETFL: | |
2606 | case F_GETOWN: | |
2607 | case F_GETSIG: | |
2608 | /* Just check FD__USE permission */ | |
2609 | err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0); | |
2610 | break; | |
2611 | case F_GETLK: | |
2612 | case F_SETLK: | |
2613 | case F_SETLKW: | |
2614 | #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 | |
2615 | case F_GETLK64: | |
2616 | case F_SETLK64: | |
2617 | case F_SETLKW64: | |
2618 | #endif | |
2619 | if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) { | |
2620 | err = -EINVAL; | |
2621 | break; | |
2622 | } | |
2623 | err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK); | |
2624 | break; | |
2625 | } | |
2626 | ||
2627 | return err; | |
2628 | } | |
2629 | ||
2630 | static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) | |
2631 | { | |
2632 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2633 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
2634 | ||
2635 | tsec = current->security; | |
2636 | fsec = file->f_security; | |
2637 | fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid; | |
2638 | ||
2639 | return 0; | |
2640 | } | |
2641 | ||
2642 | static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
2643 | struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) | |
2644 | { | |
2645 | struct file *file; | |
2646 | u32 perm; | |
2647 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2648 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
2649 | ||
2650 | /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ | |
2651 | file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner)); | |
2652 | ||
2653 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
2654 | fsec = file->f_security; | |
2655 | ||
2656 | if (!signum) | |
2657 | perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ | |
2658 | else | |
2659 | perm = signal_to_av(signum); | |
2660 | ||
2661 | return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid, | |
2662 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); | |
2663 | } | |
2664 | ||
2665 | static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) | |
2666 | { | |
2667 | return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file)); | |
2668 | } | |
2669 | ||
2670 | /* task security operations */ | |
2671 | ||
2672 | static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) | |
2673 | { | |
2674 | int rc; | |
2675 | ||
2676 | rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags); | |
2677 | if (rc) | |
2678 | return rc; | |
2679 | ||
2680 | return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK); | |
2681 | } | |
2682 | ||
2683 | static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
2684 | { | |
2685 | struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2; | |
2686 | int rc; | |
2687 | ||
2688 | tsec1 = current->security; | |
2689 | ||
2690 | rc = task_alloc_security(tsk); | |
2691 | if (rc) | |
2692 | return rc; | |
2693 | tsec2 = tsk->security; | |
2694 | ||
2695 | tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid; | |
2696 | tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid; | |
2697 | ||
2698 | /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */ | |
2699 | tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid; | |
2700 | tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid; | |
2701 | tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid; | |
2702 | tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid; | |
2703 | ||
2704 | /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any. | |
2705 | This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any | |
2706 | subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */ | |
2707 | tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid; | |
2708 | ||
2709 | return 0; | |
2710 | } | |
2711 | ||
2712 | static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
2713 | { | |
2714 | task_free_security(tsk); | |
2715 | } | |
2716 | ||
2717 | static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) | |
2718 | { | |
2719 | /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and | |
2720 | since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux | |
2721 | identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control | |
2722 | this operation. However, SELinux does control the use | |
2723 | of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the | |
2724 | capable hook. */ | |
2725 | return 0; | |
2726 | } | |
2727 | ||
2728 | static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) | |
2729 | { | |
2730 | return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags); | |
2731 | } | |
2732 | ||
2733 | static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags) | |
2734 | { | |
2735 | /* See the comment for setuid above. */ | |
2736 | return 0; | |
2737 | } | |
2738 | ||
2739 | static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) | |
2740 | { | |
2741 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID); | |
2742 | } | |
2743 | ||
2744 | static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) | |
2745 | { | |
2746 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID); | |
2747 | } | |
2748 | ||
2749 | static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) | |
2750 | { | |
2751 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION); | |
2752 | } | |
2753 | ||
2754 | static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) | |
2755 | { | |
2756 | selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid); | |
2757 | } | |
2758 | ||
2759 | static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info) | |
2760 | { | |
2761 | /* See the comment for setuid above. */ | |
2762 | return 0; | |
2763 | } | |
2764 | ||
2765 | static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
2766 | { | |
2767 | int rc; | |
2768 | ||
2769 | rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice); | |
2770 | if (rc) | |
2771 | return rc; | |
2772 | ||
2773 | return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); | |
2774 | } | |
2775 | ||
2776 | static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
2777 | { | |
2778 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); | |
2779 | } | |
2780 | ||
2781 | static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) | |
2782 | { | |
2783 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); | |
2784 | } | |
2785 | ||
2786 | static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) | |
2787 | { | |
2788 | struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource; | |
2789 | int rc; | |
2790 | ||
2791 | rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim); | |
2792 | if (rc) | |
2793 | return rc; | |
2794 | ||
2795 | /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether | |
2796 | lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can | |
2797 | later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit | |
2798 | upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */ | |
2799 | if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) | |
2800 | return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); | |
2801 | ||
2802 | return 0; | |
2803 | } | |
2804 | ||
2805 | static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp) | |
2806 | { | |
2807 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); | |
2808 | } | |
2809 | ||
2810 | static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) | |
2811 | { | |
2812 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); | |
2813 | } | |
2814 | ||
2815 | static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) | |
2816 | { | |
2817 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); | |
2818 | } | |
2819 | ||
2820 | static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, | |
2821 | int sig, u32 secid) | |
2822 | { | |
2823 | u32 perm; | |
2824 | int rc; | |
2825 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2826 | ||
2827 | rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); | |
2828 | if (rc) | |
2829 | return rc; | |
2830 | ||
2831 | if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) | |
2832 | return 0; | |
2833 | ||
2834 | if (!sig) | |
2835 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ | |
2836 | else | |
2837 | perm = signal_to_av(sig); | |
2838 | tsec = p->security; | |
2839 | if (secid) | |
2840 | rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); | |
2841 | else | |
2842 | rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm); | |
2843 | return rc; | |
2844 | } | |
2845 | ||
2846 | static int selinux_task_prctl(int option, | |
2847 | unsigned long arg2, | |
2848 | unsigned long arg3, | |
2849 | unsigned long arg4, | |
2850 | unsigned long arg5) | |
2851 | { | |
2852 | /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require | |
2853 | any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify | |
2854 | the state of the current process. */ | |
2855 | return 0; | |
2856 | } | |
2857 | ||
2858 | static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) | |
2859 | { | |
2860 | u32 perm; | |
2861 | ||
2862 | perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal); | |
2863 | ||
2864 | return task_has_perm(p, current, perm); | |
2865 | } | |
2866 | ||
2867 | static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p) | |
2868 | { | |
2869 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2870 | ||
2871 | secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p); | |
2872 | ||
2873 | tsec = p->security; | |
2874 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid; | |
2875 | tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; | |
2876 | return; | |
2877 | } | |
2878 | ||
2879 | static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, | |
2880 | struct inode *inode) | |
2881 | { | |
2882 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security; | |
2883 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2884 | ||
2885 | isec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
2886 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
2887 | return; | |
2888 | } | |
2889 | ||
2890 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ | |
2891 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
2892 | { | |
2893 | int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; | |
2894 | struct iphdr _iph, *ih; | |
2895 | ||
2896 | offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data; | |
2897 | ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); | |
2898 | if (ih == NULL) | |
2899 | goto out; | |
2900 | ||
2901 | ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; | |
2902 | if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) | |
2903 | goto out; | |
2904 | ||
2905 | ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; | |
2906 | ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; | |
2907 | ret = 0; | |
2908 | ||
2909 | switch (ih->protocol) { | |
2910 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { | |
2911 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; | |
2912 | ||
2913 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) | |
2914 | break; | |
2915 | ||
2916 | offset += ihlen; | |
2917 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); | |
2918 | if (th == NULL) | |
2919 | break; | |
2920 | ||
2921 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; | |
2922 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; | |
2923 | break; | |
2924 | } | |
2925 | ||
2926 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { | |
2927 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; | |
2928 | ||
2929 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) | |
2930 | break; | |
2931 | ||
2932 | offset += ihlen; | |
2933 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); | |
2934 | if (uh == NULL) | |
2935 | break; | |
2936 | ||
2937 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; | |
2938 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; | |
2939 | break; | |
2940 | } | |
2941 | ||
2942 | default: | |
2943 | break; | |
2944 | } | |
2945 | out: | |
2946 | return ret; | |
2947 | } | |
2948 | ||
2949 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
2950 | ||
2951 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ | |
2952 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
2953 | { | |
2954 | u8 nexthdr; | |
2955 | int ret = -EINVAL, offset; | |
2956 | struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; | |
2957 | ||
2958 | offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data; | |
2959 | ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); | |
2960 | if (ip6 == NULL) | |
2961 | goto out; | |
2962 | ||
2963 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr); | |
2964 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr); | |
2965 | ret = 0; | |
2966 | ||
2967 | nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; | |
2968 | offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); | |
2969 | offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr); | |
2970 | if (offset < 0) | |
2971 | goto out; | |
2972 | ||
2973 | switch (nexthdr) { | |
2974 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { | |
2975 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; | |
2976 | ||
2977 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); | |
2978 | if (th == NULL) | |
2979 | break; | |
2980 | ||
2981 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; | |
2982 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; | |
2983 | break; | |
2984 | } | |
2985 | ||
2986 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { | |
2987 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; | |
2988 | ||
2989 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); | |
2990 | if (uh == NULL) | |
2991 | break; | |
2992 | ||
2993 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; | |
2994 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; | |
2995 | break; | |
2996 | } | |
2997 | ||
2998 | /* includes fragments */ | |
2999 | default: | |
3000 | break; | |
3001 | } | |
3002 | out: | |
3003 | return ret; | |
3004 | } | |
3005 | ||
3006 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
3007 | ||
3008 | static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, | |
3009 | char **addrp, int *len, int src) | |
3010 | { | |
3011 | int ret = 0; | |
3012 | ||
3013 | switch (ad->u.net.family) { | |
3014 | case PF_INET: | |
3015 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad); | |
3016 | if (ret || !addrp) | |
3017 | break; | |
3018 | *len = 4; | |
3019 | *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr : | |
3020 | &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr); | |
3021 | break; | |
3022 | ||
3023 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
3024 | case PF_INET6: | |
3025 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad); | |
3026 | if (ret || !addrp) | |
3027 | break; | |
3028 | *len = 16; | |
3029 | *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr : | |
3030 | &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr); | |
3031 | break; | |
3032 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
3033 | default: | |
3034 | break; | |
3035 | } | |
3036 | ||
3037 | return ret; | |
3038 | } | |
3039 | ||
3040 | /* socket security operations */ | |
3041 | static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock, | |
3042 | u32 perms) | |
3043 | { | |
3044 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3045 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3046 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3047 | int err = 0; | |
3048 | ||
3049 | tsec = task->security; | |
3050 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3051 | ||
3052 | if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) | |
3053 | goto out; | |
3054 | ||
3055 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3056 | ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk; | |
3057 | err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); | |
3058 | ||
3059 | out: | |
3060 | return err; | |
3061 | } | |
3062 | ||
3063 | static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, | |
3064 | int protocol, int kern) | |
3065 | { | |
3066 | int err = 0; | |
3067 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3068 | u32 newsid; | |
3069 | ||
3070 | if (kern) | |
3071 | goto out; | |
3072 | ||
3073 | tsec = current->security; | |
3074 | newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid; | |
3075 | err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, | |
3076 | socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, | |
3077 | protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); | |
3078 | ||
3079 | out: | |
3080 | return err; | |
3081 | } | |
3082 | ||
3083 | static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, | |
3084 | int type, int protocol, int kern) | |
3085 | { | |
3086 | int err = 0; | |
3087 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3088 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3089 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; | |
3090 | u32 newsid; | |
3091 | ||
3092 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3093 | ||
3094 | tsec = current->security; | |
3095 | newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid; | |
3096 | isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); | |
3097 | isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid; | |
3098 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
3099 | ||
3100 | if (sock->sk) { | |
3101 | sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; | |
3102 | sksec->sid = isec->sid; | |
3103 | err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock, | |
3104 | family, | |
3105 | isec->sid); | |
3106 | } | |
3107 | ||
3108 | return err; | |
3109 | } | |
3110 | ||
3111 | /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. | |
3112 | Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind | |
3113 | permission check between the socket and the port number. */ | |
3114 | #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0] | |
3115 | #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1] | |
3116 | ||
3117 | static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
3118 | { | |
3119 | u16 family; | |
3120 | int err; | |
3121 | ||
3122 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND); | |
3123 | if (err) | |
3124 | goto out; | |
3125 | ||
3126 | /* | |
3127 | * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. | |
3128 | * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just | |
3129 | * check the first address now. | |
3130 | */ | |
3131 | family = sock->sk->sk_family; | |
3132 | if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { | |
3133 | char *addrp; | |
3134 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3135 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3136 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3137 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; | |
3138 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; | |
3139 | unsigned short snum; | |
3140 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
3141 | u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen; | |
3142 | ||
3143 | tsec = current->security; | |
3144 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3145 | ||
3146 | if (family == PF_INET) { | |
3147 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; | |
3148 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); | |
3149 | addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr); | |
3150 | addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; | |
3151 | } else { | |
3152 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; | |
3153 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); | |
3154 | addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); | |
3155 | addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; | |
3156 | } | |
3157 | ||
3158 | if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) || | |
3159 | snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) { | |
3160 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
3161 | sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); | |
3162 | if (err) | |
3163 | goto out; | |
3164 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3165 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); | |
3166 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3167 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, | |
3168 | isec->sclass, | |
3169 | SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); | |
3170 | if (err) | |
3171 | goto out; | |
3172 | } | |
3173 | ||
3174 | switch(isec->sclass) { | |
3175 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: | |
3176 | node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; | |
3177 | break; | |
3178 | ||
3179 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: | |
3180 | node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; | |
3181 | break; | |
3182 | ||
3183 | default: | |
3184 | node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; | |
3185 | break; | |
3186 | } | |
3187 | ||
3188 | err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid); | |
3189 | if (err) | |
3190 | goto out; | |
3191 | ||
3192 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3193 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); | |
3194 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3195 | ||
3196 | if (family == PF_INET) | |
3197 | ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; | |
3198 | else | |
3199 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr); | |
3200 | ||
3201 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, | |
3202 | isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); | |
3203 | if (err) | |
3204 | goto out; | |
3205 | } | |
3206 | out: | |
3207 | return err; | |
3208 | } | |
3209 | ||
3210 | static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
3211 | { | |
3212 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3213 | int err; | |
3214 | ||
3215 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT); | |
3216 | if (err) | |
3217 | return err; | |
3218 | ||
3219 | /* | |
3220 | * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. | |
3221 | */ | |
3222 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3223 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { | |
3224 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
3225 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3226 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; | |
3227 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; | |
3228 | unsigned short snum; | |
3229 | u32 sid; | |
3230 | ||
3231 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { | |
3232 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; | |
3233 | if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) | |
3234 | return -EINVAL; | |
3235 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); | |
3236 | } else { | |
3237 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; | |
3238 | if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) | |
3239 | return -EINVAL; | |
3240 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); | |
3241 | } | |
3242 | ||
3243 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
3244 | sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); | |
3245 | if (err) | |
3246 | goto out; | |
3247 | ||
3248 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3249 | ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); | |
3250 | ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; | |
3251 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, | |
3252 | TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad); | |
3253 | if (err) | |
3254 | goto out; | |
3255 | } | |
3256 | ||
3257 | out: | |
3258 | return err; | |
3259 | } | |
3260 | ||
3261 | static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) | |
3262 | { | |
3263 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN); | |
3264 | } | |
3265 | ||
3266 | static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) | |
3267 | { | |
3268 | int err; | |
3269 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3270 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec; | |
3271 | ||
3272 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT); | |
3273 | if (err) | |
3274 | return err; | |
3275 | ||
3276 | newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security; | |
3277 | ||
3278 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3279 | newisec->sclass = isec->sclass; | |
3280 | newisec->sid = isec->sid; | |
3281 | newisec->initialized = 1; | |
3282 | ||
3283 | return 0; | |
3284 | } | |
3285 | ||
3286 | static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
3287 | int size) | |
3288 | { | |
3289 | int rc; | |
3290 | ||
3291 | rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE); | |
3292 | if (rc) | |
3293 | return rc; | |
3294 | ||
3295 | return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE); | |
3296 | } | |
3297 | ||
3298 | static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
3299 | int size, int flags) | |
3300 | { | |
3301 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ); | |
3302 | } | |
3303 | ||
3304 | static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) | |
3305 | { | |
3306 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); | |
3307 | } | |
3308 | ||
3309 | static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) | |
3310 | { | |
3311 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); | |
3312 | } | |
3313 | ||
3314 | static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname) | |
3315 | { | |
3316 | int err; | |
3317 | ||
3318 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT); | |
3319 | if (err) | |
3320 | return err; | |
3321 | ||
3322 | return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); | |
3323 | } | |
3324 | ||
3325 | static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, | |
3326 | int optname) | |
3327 | { | |
3328 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT); | |
3329 | } | |
3330 | ||
3331 | static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) | |
3332 | { | |
3333 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); | |
3334 | } | |
3335 | ||
3336 | static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, | |
3337 | struct socket *other, | |
3338 | struct sock *newsk) | |
3339 | { | |
3340 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
3341 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3342 | struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; | |
3343 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3344 | int err; | |
3345 | ||
3346 | err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk); | |
3347 | if (err) | |
3348 | return err; | |
3349 | ||
3350 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3351 | other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; | |
3352 | ||
3353 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3354 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; | |
3355 | ||
3356 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, | |
3357 | isec->sclass, | |
3358 | UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); | |
3359 | if (err) | |
3360 | return err; | |
3361 | ||
3362 | /* connecting socket */ | |
3363 | ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; | |
3364 | ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid; | |
3365 | ||
3366 | /* server child socket */ | |
3367 | ssec = newsk->sk_security; | |
3368 | ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid; | |
3369 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid); | |
3370 | ||
3371 | return err; | |
3372 | } | |
3373 | ||
3374 | static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, | |
3375 | struct socket *other) | |
3376 | { | |
3377 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3378 | struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; | |
3379 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3380 | int err; | |
3381 | ||
3382 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3383 | other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; | |
3384 | ||
3385 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3386 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; | |
3387 | ||
3388 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, | |
3389 | isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); | |
3390 | if (err) | |
3391 | return err; | |
3392 | ||
3393 | return 0; | |
3394 | } | |
3395 | ||
3396 | static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, | |
3397 | struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len) | |
3398 | { | |
3399 | int err = 0; | |
3400 | u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0; | |
3401 | struct socket *sock; | |
3402 | u16 sock_class = 0; | |
3403 | u32 sock_sid = 0; | |
3404 | ||
3405 | read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); | |
3406 | sock = sk->sk_socket; | |
3407 | if (sock) { | |
3408 | struct inode *inode; | |
3409 | inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); | |
3410 | if (inode) { | |
3411 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3412 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
3413 | sock_sid = isec->sid; | |
3414 | sock_class = isec->sclass; | |
3415 | } | |
3416 | } | |
3417 | read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); | |
3418 | if (!sock_sid) | |
3419 | goto out; | |
3420 | ||
3421 | if (!skb->dev) | |
3422 | goto out; | |
3423 | ||
3424 | err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL); | |
3425 | if (err) | |
3426 | goto out; | |
3427 | ||
3428 | switch (sock_class) { | |
3429 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: | |
3430 | netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV; | |
3431 | node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV; | |
3432 | recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; | |
3433 | break; | |
3434 | ||
3435 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: | |
3436 | netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV; | |
3437 | node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV; | |
3438 | recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; | |
3439 | break; | |
3440 | ||
3441 | default: | |
3442 | netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV; | |
3443 | node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV; | |
3444 | break; | |
3445 | } | |
3446 | ||
3447 | err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad); | |
3448 | if (err) | |
3449 | goto out; | |
3450 | ||
3451 | err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid); | |
3452 | if (err) | |
3453 | goto out; | |
3454 | ||
3455 | err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad); | |
3456 | if (err) | |
3457 | goto out; | |
3458 | ||
3459 | if (recv_perm) { | |
3460 | u32 port_sid; | |
3461 | ||
3462 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
3463 | sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), | |
3464 | &port_sid); | |
3465 | if (err) | |
3466 | goto out; | |
3467 | ||
3468 | err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid, | |
3469 | sock_class, recv_perm, ad); | |
3470 | } | |
3471 | ||
3472 | out: | |
3473 | return err; | |
3474 | } | |
3475 | ||
3476 | static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3477 | { | |
3478 | u16 family; | |
3479 | char *addrp; | |
3480 | int len, err = 0; | |
3481 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3482 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; | |
3483 | ||
3484 | family = sk->sk_family; | |
3485 | if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) | |
3486 | goto out; | |
3487 | ||
3488 | /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ | |
3489 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP)) | |
3490 | family = PF_INET; | |
3491 | ||
3492 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); | |
3493 | ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]"; | |
3494 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3495 | ||
3496 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1); | |
3497 | if (err) | |
3498 | goto out; | |
3499 | ||
3500 | if (selinux_compat_net) | |
3501 | err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family, | |
3502 | addrp, len); | |
3503 | else | |
3504 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, | |
3505 | PACKET__RECV, &ad); | |
3506 | if (err) | |
3507 | goto out; | |
3508 | ||
3509 | err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad); | |
3510 | if (err) | |
3511 | goto out; | |
3512 | ||
3513 | err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); | |
3514 | out: | |
3515 | return err; | |
3516 | } | |
3517 | ||
3518 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, | |
3519 | int __user *optlen, unsigned len) | |
3520 | { | |
3521 | int err = 0; | |
3522 | char *scontext; | |
3523 | u32 scontext_len; | |
3524 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
3525 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3526 | u32 peer_sid = 0; | |
3527 | ||
3528 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3529 | ||
3530 | /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */ | |
3531 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) { | |
3532 | ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; | |
3533 | peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; | |
3534 | } | |
3535 | else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { | |
3536 | peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock); | |
3537 | if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) | |
3538 | peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk); | |
3539 | if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) { | |
3540 | err = -ENOPROTOOPT; | |
3541 | goto out; | |
3542 | } | |
3543 | } | |
3544 | else { | |
3545 | err = -ENOPROTOOPT; | |
3546 | goto out; | |
3547 | } | |
3548 | ||
3549 | err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); | |
3550 | ||
3551 | if (err) | |
3552 | goto out; | |
3553 | ||
3554 | if (scontext_len > len) { | |
3555 | err = -ERANGE; | |
3556 | goto out_len; | |
3557 | } | |
3558 | ||
3559 | if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) | |
3560 | err = -EFAULT; | |
3561 | ||
3562 | out_len: | |
3563 | if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) | |
3564 | err = -EFAULT; | |
3565 | ||
3566 | kfree(scontext); | |
3567 | out: | |
3568 | return err; | |
3569 | } | |
3570 | ||
3571 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) | |
3572 | { | |
3573 | u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; | |
3574 | int err = 0; | |
3575 | ||
3576 | if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)) | |
3577 | selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); | |
3578 | else if (skb) { | |
3579 | peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb); | |
3580 | if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) | |
3581 | peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb); | |
3582 | } | |
3583 | ||
3584 | if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) | |
3585 | err = -EINVAL; | |
3586 | *secid = peer_secid; | |
3587 | ||
3588 | return err; | |
3589 | } | |
3590 | ||
3591 | static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) | |
3592 | { | |
3593 | return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority); | |
3594 | } | |
3595 | ||
3596 | static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) | |
3597 | { | |
3598 | sk_free_security(sk); | |
3599 | } | |
3600 | ||
3601 | static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) | |
3602 | { | |
3603 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; | |
3604 | struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security; | |
3605 | ||
3606 | newssec->sid = ssec->sid; | |
3607 | newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; | |
3608 | ||
3609 | selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(ssec, newssec); | |
3610 | } | |
3611 | ||
3612 | static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) | |
3613 | { | |
3614 | if (!sk) | |
3615 | *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; | |
3616 | else { | |
3617 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; | |
3618 | ||
3619 | *secid = sksec->sid; | |
3620 | } | |
3621 | } | |
3622 | ||
3623 | static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent) | |
3624 | { | |
3625 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security; | |
3626 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; | |
3627 | ||
3628 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || | |
3629 | sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) | |
3630 | isec->sid = sksec->sid; | |
3631 | ||
3632 | selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent); | |
3633 | } | |
3634 | ||
3635 | static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, | |
3636 | struct request_sock *req) | |
3637 | { | |
3638 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; | |
3639 | int err; | |
3640 | u32 newsid; | |
3641 | u32 peersid; | |
3642 | ||
3643 | newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid); | |
3644 | if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) { | |
3645 | req->secid = newsid; | |
3646 | return 0; | |
3647 | } | |
3648 | ||
3649 | err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0); | |
3650 | BUG_ON(err); | |
3651 | ||
3652 | if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { | |
3653 | req->secid = sksec->sid; | |
3654 | return 0; | |
3655 | } | |
3656 | ||
3657 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid); | |
3658 | if (err) | |
3659 | return err; | |
3660 | ||
3661 | req->secid = newsid; | |
3662 | return 0; | |
3663 | } | |
3664 | ||
3665 | static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, | |
3666 | const struct request_sock *req) | |
3667 | { | |
3668 | struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; | |
3669 | ||
3670 | newsksec->sid = req->secid; | |
3671 | /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the | |
3672 | new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. | |
3673 | So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which | |
3674 | time it will have been created and available. */ | |
3675 | ||
3676 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family); | |
3677 | } | |
3678 | ||
3679 | static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, | |
3680 | struct flowi *fl) | |
3681 | { | |
3682 | fl->secid = req->secid; | |
3683 | } | |
3684 | ||
3685 | static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3686 | { | |
3687 | int err = 0; | |
3688 | u32 perm; | |
3689 | struct nlmsghdr *nlh; | |
3690 | struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket; | |
3691 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3692 | ||
3693 | if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) { | |
3694 | err = -EINVAL; | |
3695 | goto out; | |
3696 | } | |
3697 | nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data; | |
3698 | ||
3699 | err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); | |
3700 | if (err) { | |
3701 | if (err == -EINVAL) { | |
3702 | audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, | |
3703 | "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message" | |
3704 | " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n", | |
3705 | nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass); | |
3706 | if (!selinux_enforcing) | |
3707 | err = 0; | |
3708 | } | |
3709 | ||
3710 | /* Ignore */ | |
3711 | if (err == -ENOENT) | |
3712 | err = 0; | |
3713 | goto out; | |
3714 | } | |
3715 | ||
3716 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm); | |
3717 | out: | |
3718 | return err; | |
3719 | } | |
3720 | ||
3721 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER | |
3722 | ||
3723 | static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev, | |
3724 | struct avc_audit_data *ad, | |
3725 | u16 family, char *addrp, int len) | |
3726 | { | |
3727 | int err = 0; | |
3728 | u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0; | |
3729 | struct socket *sock; | |
3730 | struct inode *inode; | |
3731 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3732 | ||
3733 | sock = sk->sk_socket; | |
3734 | if (!sock) | |
3735 | goto out; | |
3736 | ||
3737 | inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); | |
3738 | if (!inode) | |
3739 | goto out; | |
3740 | ||
3741 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
3742 | ||
3743 | err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL); | |
3744 | if (err) | |
3745 | goto out; | |
3746 | ||
3747 | switch (isec->sclass) { | |
3748 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: | |
3749 | netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND; | |
3750 | node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND; | |
3751 | send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; | |
3752 | break; | |
3753 | ||
3754 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: | |
3755 | netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND; | |
3756 | node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND; | |
3757 | send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; | |
3758 | break; | |
3759 | ||
3760 | default: | |
3761 | netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND; | |
3762 | node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND; | |
3763 | break; | |
3764 | } | |
3765 | ||
3766 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad); | |
3767 | if (err) | |
3768 | goto out; | |
3769 | ||
3770 | err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid); | |
3771 | if (err) | |
3772 | goto out; | |
3773 | ||
3774 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad); | |
3775 | if (err) | |
3776 | goto out; | |
3777 | ||
3778 | if (send_perm) { | |
3779 | u32 port_sid; | |
3780 | ||
3781 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, | |
3782 | sk->sk_type, | |
3783 | sk->sk_protocol, | |
3784 | ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), | |
3785 | &port_sid); | |
3786 | if (err) | |
3787 | goto out; | |
3788 | ||
3789 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass, | |
3790 | send_perm, ad); | |
3791 | } | |
3792 | out: | |
3793 | return err; | |
3794 | } | |
3795 | ||
3796 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, | |
3797 | struct sk_buff **pskb, | |
3798 | const struct net_device *in, | |
3799 | const struct net_device *out, | |
3800 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *), | |
3801 | u16 family) | |
3802 | { | |
3803 | char *addrp; | |
3804 | int len, err = 0; | |
3805 | struct sock *sk; | |
3806 | struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb; | |
3807 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3808 | struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out; | |
3809 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; | |
3810 | ||
3811 | sk = skb->sk; | |
3812 | if (!sk) | |
3813 | goto out; | |
3814 | ||
3815 | sksec = sk->sk_security; | |
3816 | ||
3817 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); | |
3818 | ad.u.net.netif = dev->name; | |
3819 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3820 | ||
3821 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0); | |
3822 | if (err) | |
3823 | goto out; | |
3824 | ||
3825 | if (selinux_compat_net) | |
3826 | err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad, | |
3827 | family, addrp, len); | |
3828 | else | |
3829 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, | |
3830 | PACKET__SEND, &ad); | |
3831 | ||
3832 | if (err) | |
3833 | goto out; | |
3834 | ||
3835 | err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); | |
3836 | out: | |
3837 | return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3838 | } | |
3839 | ||
3840 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, | |
3841 | struct sk_buff **pskb, | |
3842 | const struct net_device *in, | |
3843 | const struct net_device *out, | |
3844 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) | |
3845 | { | |
3846 | return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET); | |
3847 | } | |
3848 | ||
3849 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
3850 | ||
3851 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, | |
3852 | struct sk_buff **pskb, | |
3853 | const struct net_device *in, | |
3854 | const struct net_device *out, | |
3855 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) | |
3856 | { | |
3857 | return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6); | |
3858 | } | |
3859 | ||
3860 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
3861 | ||
3862 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ | |
3863 | ||
3864 | static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3865 | { | |
3866 | int err; | |
3867 | ||
3868 | err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); | |
3869 | if (err) | |
3870 | return err; | |
3871 | ||
3872 | if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS) | |
3873 | err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); | |
3874 | ||
3875 | return err; | |
3876 | } | |
3877 | ||
3878 | static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability) | |
3879 | { | |
3880 | int err; | |
3881 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3882 | ||
3883 | err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability); | |
3884 | if (err) | |
3885 | return err; | |
3886 | ||
3887 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); | |
3888 | ad.u.cap = capability; | |
3889 | ||
3890 | return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, | |
3891 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad); | |
3892 | } | |
3893 | ||
3894 | static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, | |
3895 | struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, | |
3896 | u16 sclass) | |
3897 | { | |
3898 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security; | |
3899 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3900 | ||
3901 | isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
3902 | if (!isec) | |
3903 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3904 | ||
3905 | isec->sclass = sclass; | |
3906 | isec->ipc_perm = perm; | |
3907 | isec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
3908 | perm->security = isec; | |
3909 | ||
3910 | return 0; | |
3911 | } | |
3912 | ||
3913 | static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) | |
3914 | { | |
3915 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security; | |
3916 | perm->security = NULL; | |
3917 | kfree(isec); | |
3918 | } | |
3919 | ||
3920 | static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3921 | { | |
3922 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; | |
3923 | ||
3924 | msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
3925 | if (!msec) | |
3926 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3927 | ||
3928 | msec->msg = msg; | |
3929 | msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
3930 | msg->security = msec; | |
3931 | ||
3932 | return 0; | |
3933 | } | |
3934 | ||
3935 | static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3936 | { | |
3937 | struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security; | |
3938 | ||
3939 | msg->security = NULL; | |
3940 | kfree(msec); | |
3941 | } | |
3942 | ||
3943 | static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, | |
3944 | u32 perms) | |
3945 | { | |
3946 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3947 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3948 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3949 | ||
3950 | tsec = current->security; | |
3951 | isec = ipc_perms->security; | |
3952 | ||
3953 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3954 | ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; | |
3955 | ||
3956 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); | |
3957 | } | |
3958 | ||
3959 | static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3960 | { | |
3961 | return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); | |
3962 | } | |
3963 | ||
3964 | static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3965 | { | |
3966 | msg_msg_free_security(msg); | |
3967 | } | |
3968 | ||
3969 | /* message queue security operations */ | |
3970 | static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) | |
3971 | { | |
3972 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3973 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3974 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3975 | int rc; | |
3976 | ||
3977 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ); | |
3978 | if (rc) | |
3979 | return rc; | |
3980 | ||
3981 | tsec = current->security; | |
3982 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
3983 | ||
3984 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3985 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
3986 | ||
3987 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, | |
3988 | MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); | |
3989 | if (rc) { | |
3990 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); | |
3991 | return rc; | |
3992 | } | |
3993 | return 0; | |
3994 | } | |
3995 | ||
3996 | static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq) | |
3997 | { | |
3998 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); | |
3999 | } | |
4000 | ||
4001 | static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) | |
4002 | { | |
4003 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4004 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
4005 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
4006 | ||
4007 | tsec = current->security; | |
4008 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
4009 | ||
4010 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
4011 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
4012 | ||
4013 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, | |
4014 | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
4015 | } | |
4016 | ||
4017 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) | |
4018 | { | |
4019 | int err; | |
4020 | int perms; | |
4021 | ||
4022 | switch(cmd) { | |
4023 | case IPC_INFO: | |
4024 | case MSG_INFO: | |
4025 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ | |
4026 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); | |
4027 | case IPC_STAT: | |
4028 | case MSG_STAT: | |
4029 | perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; | |
4030 | break; | |
4031 | case IPC_SET: | |
4032 | perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; | |
4033 | break; | |
4034 | case IPC_RMID: | |
4035 | perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; | |
4036 | break; | |
4037 | default: | |
4038 | return 0; | |
4039 | } | |
4040 | ||
4041 | err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms); | |
4042 | return err; | |
4043 | } | |
4044 | ||
4045 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) | |
4046 | { | |
4047 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4048 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
4049 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; | |
4050 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
4051 | int rc; | |
4052 | ||
4053 | tsec = current->security; | |
4054 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
4055 | msec = msg->security; | |
4056 | ||
4057 | /* | |
4058 | * First time through, need to assign label to the message | |
4059 | */ | |
4060 | if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { | |
4061 | /* | |
4062 | * Compute new sid based on current process and | |
4063 | * message queue this message will be stored in | |
4064 | */ | |
4065 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, | |
4066 | isec->sid, | |
4067 | SECCLASS_MSG, | |
4068 | &msec->sid); | |
4069 | if (rc) | |
4070 | return rc; | |
4071 | } | |
4072 | ||
4073 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
4074 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
4075 | ||
4076 | /* Can this process write to the queue? */ | |
4077 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, | |
4078 | MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); | |
4079 | if (!rc) | |
4080 | /* Can this process send the message */ | |
4081 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid, | |
4082 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad); | |
4083 | if (!rc) | |
4084 | /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ | |
4085 | rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, | |
4086 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); | |
4087 | ||
4088 | return rc; | |
4089 | } | |
4090 | ||
4091 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, | |
4092 | struct task_struct *target, | |
4093 | long type, int mode) | |
4094 | { | |
4095 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4096 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
4097 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; | |
4098 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
4099 | int rc; | |
4100 | ||
4101 | tsec = target->security; | |
4102 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
4103 | msec = msg->security; | |
4104 | ||
4105 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
4106 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
4107 | ||
4108 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
4109 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); | |
4110 | if (!rc) | |
4111 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid, | |
4112 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); | |
4113 | return rc; | |
4114 | } | |
4115 | ||
4116 | /* Shared Memory security operations */ | |
4117 | static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) | |
4118 | { | |
4119 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4120 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
4121 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
4122 | int rc; | |
4123 | ||
4124 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM); | |
4125 | if (rc) | |
4126 | return rc; | |
4127 | ||
4128 | tsec = current->security; | |
4129 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; | |
4130 | ||
4131 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
4132 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; | |
4133 | ||
4134 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, | |
4135 | SHM__CREATE, &ad); | |
4136 | if (rc) { | |
4137 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); | |
4138 | return rc; | |
4139 | } | |
4140 | return 0; | |
4141 | } | |
4142 | ||
4143 | static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) | |
4144 | { | |
4145 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); | |
4146 | } | |
4147 | ||
4148 | static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) | |
4149 | { | |
4150 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4151 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
4152 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
4153 | ||
4154 | tsec = current->security; | |
4155 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; | |
4156 | ||
4157 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
4158 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; | |
4159 | ||
4160 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, | |
4161 | SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
4162 | } | |
4163 | ||
4164 | /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ | |
4165 | static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) | |
4166 | { | |
4167 | int perms; | |
4168 | int err; | |
4169 | ||
4170 | switch(cmd) { | |
4171 | case IPC_INFO: | |
4172 | case SHM_INFO: | |
4173 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ | |
4174 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); | |
4175 | case IPC_STAT: | |
4176 | case SHM_STAT: | |
4177 | perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; | |
4178 | break; | |
4179 | case IPC_SET: | |
4180 | perms = SHM__SETATTR; | |
4181 | break; | |
4182 | case SHM_LOCK: | |
4183 | case SHM_UNLOCK: | |
4184 | perms = SHM__LOCK; | |
4185 | break; | |
4186 | case IPC_RMID: | |
4187 | perms = SHM__DESTROY; | |
4188 | break; | |
4189 | default: | |
4190 | return 0; | |
4191 | } | |
4192 | ||
4193 | err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); | |
4194 | return err; | |
4195 | } | |
4196 | ||
4197 | static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, | |
4198 | char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) | |
4199 | { | |
4200 | u32 perms; | |
4201 | int rc; | |
4202 | ||
4203 | rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg); | |
4204 | if (rc) | |
4205 | return rc; | |
4206 | ||
4207 | if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) | |
4208 | perms = SHM__READ; | |
4209 | else | |
4210 | perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; | |
4211 | ||
4212 | return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); | |
4213 | } | |
4214 | ||
4215 | /* Semaphore security operations */ | |
4216 | static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) | |
4217 | { | |
4218 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4219 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
4220 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
4221 | int rc; | |
4222 | ||
4223 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM); | |
4224 | if (rc) | |
4225 | return rc; | |
4226 | ||
4227 | tsec = current->security; | |
4228 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; | |
4229 | ||
4230 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
4231 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; | |
4232 | ||
4233 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, | |
4234 | SEM__CREATE, &ad); | |
4235 | if (rc) { | |
4236 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); | |
4237 | return rc; | |
4238 | } | |
4239 | return 0; | |
4240 | } | |
4241 | ||
4242 | static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) | |
4243 | { | |
4244 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); | |
4245 | } | |
4246 | ||
4247 | static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) | |
4248 | { | |
4249 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4250 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
4251 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
4252 | ||
4253 | tsec = current->security; | |
4254 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; | |
4255 | ||
4256 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
4257 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; | |
4258 | ||
4259 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, | |
4260 | SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
4261 | } | |
4262 | ||
4263 | /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ | |
4264 | static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) | |
4265 | { | |
4266 | int err; | |
4267 | u32 perms; | |
4268 | ||
4269 | switch(cmd) { | |
4270 | case IPC_INFO: | |
4271 | case SEM_INFO: | |
4272 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ | |
4273 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); | |
4274 | case GETPID: | |
4275 | case GETNCNT: | |
4276 | case GETZCNT: | |
4277 | perms = SEM__GETATTR; | |
4278 | break; | |
4279 | case GETVAL: | |
4280 | case GETALL: | |
4281 | perms = SEM__READ; | |
4282 | break; | |
4283 | case SETVAL: | |
4284 | case SETALL: | |
4285 | perms = SEM__WRITE; | |
4286 | break; | |
4287 | case IPC_RMID: | |
4288 | perms = SEM__DESTROY; | |
4289 | break; | |
4290 | case IPC_SET: | |
4291 | perms = SEM__SETATTR; | |
4292 | break; | |
4293 | case IPC_STAT: | |
4294 | case SEM_STAT: | |
4295 | perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; | |
4296 | break; | |
4297 | default: | |
4298 | return 0; | |
4299 | } | |
4300 | ||
4301 | err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); | |
4302 | return err; | |
4303 | } | |
4304 | ||
4305 | static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, | |
4306 | struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) | |
4307 | { | |
4308 | u32 perms; | |
4309 | ||
4310 | if (alter) | |
4311 | perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; | |
4312 | else | |
4313 | perms = SEM__READ; | |
4314 | ||
4315 | return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); | |
4316 | } | |
4317 | ||
4318 | static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) | |
4319 | { | |
4320 | u32 av = 0; | |
4321 | ||
4322 | av = 0; | |
4323 | if (flag & S_IRUGO) | |
4324 | av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; | |
4325 | if (flag & S_IWUGO) | |
4326 | av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; | |
4327 | ||
4328 | if (av == 0) | |
4329 | return 0; | |
4330 | ||
4331 | return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); | |
4332 | } | |
4333 | ||
4334 | /* module stacking operations */ | |
4335 | static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) | |
4336 | { | |
4337 | if (secondary_ops != original_ops) { | |
4338 | printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security " | |
4339 | "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__); | |
4340 | return -EINVAL; | |
4341 | } | |
4342 | ||
4343 | secondary_ops = ops; | |
4344 | ||
4345 | printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n", | |
4346 | __FUNCTION__, | |
4347 | name); | |
4348 | ||
4349 | return 0; | |
4350 | } | |
4351 | ||
4352 | static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) | |
4353 | { | |
4354 | if (ops != secondary_ops) { | |
4355 | printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module " | |
4356 | "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__); | |
4357 | return -EINVAL; | |
4358 | } | |
4359 | ||
4360 | secondary_ops = original_ops; | |
4361 | ||
4362 | return 0; | |
4363 | } | |
4364 | ||
4365 | static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) | |
4366 | { | |
4367 | if (inode) | |
4368 | inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); | |
4369 | } | |
4370 | ||
4371 | static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, | |
4372 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) | |
4373 | { | |
4374 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4375 | u32 sid; | |
4376 | int error; | |
4377 | ||
4378 | if (current != p) { | |
4379 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR); | |
4380 | if (error) | |
4381 | return error; | |
4382 | } | |
4383 | ||
4384 | tsec = p->security; | |
4385 | ||
4386 | if (!strcmp(name, "current")) | |
4387 | sid = tsec->sid; | |
4388 | else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) | |
4389 | sid = tsec->osid; | |
4390 | else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) | |
4391 | sid = tsec->exec_sid; | |
4392 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) | |
4393 | sid = tsec->create_sid; | |
4394 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) | |
4395 | sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; | |
4396 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) | |
4397 | sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; | |
4398 | else | |
4399 | return -EINVAL; | |
4400 | ||
4401 | if (!sid) | |
4402 | return 0; | |
4403 | ||
4404 | return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size); | |
4405 | } | |
4406 | ||
4407 | static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, | |
4408 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) | |
4409 | { | |
4410 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4411 | u32 sid = 0; | |
4412 | int error; | |
4413 | char *str = value; | |
4414 | ||
4415 | if (current != p) { | |
4416 | /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own | |
4417 | security attributes. */ | |
4418 | return -EACCES; | |
4419 | } | |
4420 | ||
4421 | /* | |
4422 | * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. | |
4423 | * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the | |
4424 | * above restriction is ever removed. | |
4425 | */ | |
4426 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) | |
4427 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC); | |
4428 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) | |
4429 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE); | |
4430 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) | |
4431 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE); | |
4432 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) | |
4433 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE); | |
4434 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) | |
4435 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); | |
4436 | else | |
4437 | error = -EINVAL; | |
4438 | if (error) | |
4439 | return error; | |
4440 | ||
4441 | /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ | |
4442 | if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') { | |
4443 | if (str[size-1] == '\n') { | |
4444 | str[size-1] = 0; | |
4445 | size--; | |
4446 | } | |
4447 | error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); | |
4448 | if (error) | |
4449 | return error; | |
4450 | } | |
4451 | ||
4452 | /* Permission checking based on the specified context is | |
4453 | performed during the actual operation (execve, | |
4454 | open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the | |
4455 | operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve | |
4456 | checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The | |
4457 | operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ | |
4458 | tsec = p->security; | |
4459 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) | |
4460 | tsec->exec_sid = sid; | |
4461 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) | |
4462 | tsec->create_sid = sid; | |
4463 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { | |
4464 | error = may_create_key(sid, p); | |
4465 | if (error) | |
4466 | return error; | |
4467 | tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; | |
4468 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) | |
4469 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; | |
4470 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { | |
4471 | struct av_decision avd; | |
4472 | ||
4473 | if (sid == 0) | |
4474 | return -EINVAL; | |
4475 | ||
4476 | /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ | |
4477 | if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) { | |
4478 | struct task_struct *g, *t; | |
4479 | struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm; | |
4480 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); | |
4481 | do_each_thread(g, t) | |
4482 | if (t->mm == mm && t != p) { | |
4483 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
4484 | return -EPERM; | |
4485 | } | |
4486 | while_each_thread(g, t); | |
4487 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
4488 | } | |
4489 | ||
4490 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ | |
4491 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
4492 | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); | |
4493 | if (error) | |
4494 | return error; | |
4495 | ||
4496 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. | |
4497 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ | |
4498 | task_lock(p); | |
4499 | if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) { | |
4500 | error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, | |
4501 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
4502 | PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd); | |
4503 | if (!error) | |
4504 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
4505 | task_unlock(p); | |
4506 | avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
4507 | PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL); | |
4508 | if (error) | |
4509 | return error; | |
4510 | } else { | |
4511 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
4512 | task_unlock(p); | |
4513 | } | |
4514 | } | |
4515 | else | |
4516 | return -EINVAL; | |
4517 | ||
4518 | return size; | |
4519 | } | |
4520 | ||
4521 | static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) | |
4522 | { | |
4523 | return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); | |
4524 | } | |
4525 | ||
4526 | static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) | |
4527 | { | |
4528 | if (secdata) | |
4529 | kfree(secdata); | |
4530 | } | |
4531 | ||
4532 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS | |
4533 | ||
4534 | static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk, | |
4535 | unsigned long flags) | |
4536 | { | |
4537 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; | |
4538 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; | |
4539 | ||
4540 | ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
4541 | if (!ksec) | |
4542 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4543 | ||
4544 | ksec->obj = k; | |
4545 | if (tsec->keycreate_sid) | |
4546 | ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; | |
4547 | else | |
4548 | ksec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
4549 | k->security = ksec; | |
4550 | ||
4551 | return 0; | |
4552 | } | |
4553 | ||
4554 | static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) | |
4555 | { | |
4556 | struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; | |
4557 | ||
4558 | k->security = NULL; | |
4559 | kfree(ksec); | |
4560 | } | |
4561 | ||
4562 | static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, | |
4563 | struct task_struct *ctx, | |
4564 | key_perm_t perm) | |
4565 | { | |
4566 | struct key *key; | |
4567 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4568 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; | |
4569 | ||
4570 | key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); | |
4571 | ||
4572 | tsec = ctx->security; | |
4573 | ksec = key->security; | |
4574 | ||
4575 | /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the | |
4576 | permission check. No serious, additional covert channels | |
4577 | appear to be created. */ | |
4578 | if (perm == 0) | |
4579 | return 0; | |
4580 | ||
4581 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid, | |
4582 | SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); | |
4583 | } | |
4584 | ||
4585 | #endif | |
4586 | ||
4587 | static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { | |
4588 | .ptrace = selinux_ptrace, | |
4589 | .capget = selinux_capget, | |
4590 | .capset_check = selinux_capset_check, | |
4591 | .capset_set = selinux_capset_set, | |
4592 | .sysctl = selinux_sysctl, | |
4593 | .capable = selinux_capable, | |
4594 | .quotactl = selinux_quotactl, | |
4595 | .quota_on = selinux_quota_on, | |
4596 | .syslog = selinux_syslog, | |
4597 | .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory, | |
4598 | ||
4599 | .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send, | |
4600 | .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv, | |
4601 | ||
4602 | .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security, | |
4603 | .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security, | |
4604 | .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds, | |
4605 | .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds, | |
4606 | .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security, | |
4607 | .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security, | |
4608 | .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, | |
4609 | ||
4610 | .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security, | |
4611 | .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security, | |
4612 | .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data, | |
4613 | .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount, | |
4614 | .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, | |
4615 | .sb_mount = selinux_mount, | |
4616 | .sb_umount = selinux_umount, | |
4617 | ||
4618 | .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security, | |
4619 | .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security, | |
4620 | .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security, | |
4621 | .inode_create = selinux_inode_create, | |
4622 | .inode_link = selinux_inode_link, | |
4623 | .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink, | |
4624 | .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink, | |
4625 | .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir, | |
4626 | .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir, | |
4627 | .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod, | |
4628 | .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename, | |
4629 | .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink, | |
4630 | .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link, | |
4631 | .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission, | |
4632 | .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr, | |
4633 | .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr, | |
4634 | .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr, | |
4635 | .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr, | |
4636 | .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr, | |
4637 | .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr, | |
4638 | .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr, | |
4639 | .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix, | |
4640 | .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, | |
4641 | .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, | |
4642 | .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, | |
4643 | ||
4644 | .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, | |
4645 | .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, | |
4646 | .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security, | |
4647 | .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl, | |
4648 | .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap, | |
4649 | .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect, | |
4650 | .file_lock = selinux_file_lock, | |
4651 | .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl, | |
4652 | .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner, | |
4653 | .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask, | |
4654 | .file_receive = selinux_file_receive, | |
4655 | ||
4656 | .task_create = selinux_task_create, | |
4657 | .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security, | |
4658 | .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security, | |
4659 | .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid, | |
4660 | .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid, | |
4661 | .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid, | |
4662 | .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid, | |
4663 | .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid, | |
4664 | .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid, | |
4665 | .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid, | |
4666 | .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups, | |
4667 | .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice, | |
4668 | .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio, | |
4669 | .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio, | |
4670 | .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit, | |
4671 | .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler, | |
4672 | .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler, | |
4673 | .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory, | |
4674 | .task_kill = selinux_task_kill, | |
4675 | .task_wait = selinux_task_wait, | |
4676 | .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl, | |
4677 | .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init, | |
4678 | .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, | |
4679 | ||
4680 | .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, | |
4681 | ||
4682 | .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, | |
4683 | .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, | |
4684 | ||
4685 | .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security, | |
4686 | .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security, | |
4687 | .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate, | |
4688 | .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl, | |
4689 | .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd, | |
4690 | .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv, | |
4691 | ||
4692 | .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security, | |
4693 | .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security, | |
4694 | .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate, | |
4695 | .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl, | |
4696 | .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat, | |
4697 | ||
4698 | .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security, | |
4699 | .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security, | |
4700 | .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate, | |
4701 | .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl, | |
4702 | .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop, | |
4703 | ||
4704 | .register_security = selinux_register_security, | |
4705 | .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security, | |
4706 | ||
4707 | .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate, | |
4708 | ||
4709 | .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, | |
4710 | .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, | |
4711 | ||
4712 | .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, | |
4713 | .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, | |
4714 | ||
4715 | .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect, | |
4716 | .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send, | |
4717 | ||
4718 | .socket_create = selinux_socket_create, | |
4719 | .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create, | |
4720 | .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind, | |
4721 | .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect, | |
4722 | .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen, | |
4723 | .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept, | |
4724 | .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg, | |
4725 | .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg, | |
4726 | .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname, | |
4727 | .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername, | |
4728 | .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt, | |
4729 | .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt, | |
4730 | .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown, | |
4731 | .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb, | |
4732 | .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream, | |
4733 | .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram, | |
4734 | .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security, | |
4735 | .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security, | |
4736 | .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security, | |
4737 | .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid, | |
4738 | .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft, | |
4739 | .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request, | |
4740 | .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone, | |
4741 | .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow, | |
4742 | ||
4743 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM | |
4744 | .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, | |
4745 | .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, | |
4746 | .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, | |
4747 | .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete, | |
4748 | .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, | |
4749 | .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, | |
4750 | .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, | |
4751 | .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, | |
4752 | .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, | |
4753 | .xfrm_flow_state_match = selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match, | |
4754 | .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session, | |
4755 | #endif | |
4756 | ||
4757 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS | |
4758 | .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc, | |
4759 | .key_free = selinux_key_free, | |
4760 | .key_permission = selinux_key_permission, | |
4761 | #endif | |
4762 | }; | |
4763 | ||
4764 | static __init int selinux_init(void) | |
4765 | { | |
4766 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4767 | ||
4768 | if (!selinux_enabled) { | |
4769 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); | |
4770 | return 0; | |
4771 | } | |
4772 | ||
4773 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n"); | |
4774 | ||
4775 | /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ | |
4776 | if (task_alloc_security(current)) | |
4777 | panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n"); | |
4778 | tsec = current->security; | |
4779 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; | |
4780 | ||
4781 | sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security", | |
4782 | sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), | |
4783 | 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL); | |
4784 | avc_init(); | |
4785 | ||
4786 | original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops; | |
4787 | if (!secondary_ops) | |
4788 | panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n"); | |
4789 | if (register_security (&selinux_ops)) | |
4790 | panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n"); | |
4791 | ||
4792 | if (selinux_enforcing) { | |
4793 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); | |
4794 | } else { | |
4795 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); | |
4796 | } | |
4797 | ||
4798 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS | |
4799 | /* Add security information to initial keyrings */ | |
4800 | selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current, | |
4801 | KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); | |
4802 | selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current, | |
4803 | KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); | |
4804 | #endif | |
4805 | ||
4806 | return 0; | |
4807 | } | |
4808 | ||
4809 | void selinux_complete_init(void) | |
4810 | { | |
4811 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); | |
4812 | ||
4813 | /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ | |
4814 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); | |
4815 | spin_lock(&sb_lock); | |
4816 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4817 | next_sb: | |
4818 | if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) { | |
4819 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = | |
4820 | list_entry(superblock_security_head.next, | |
4821 | struct superblock_security_struct, | |
4822 | list); | |
4823 | struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb; | |
4824 | sb->s_count++; | |
4825 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4826 | spin_unlock(&sb_lock); | |
4827 | down_read(&sb->s_umount); | |
4828 | if (sb->s_root) | |
4829 | superblock_doinit(sb, NULL); | |
4830 | drop_super(sb); | |
4831 | spin_lock(&sb_lock); | |
4832 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4833 | list_del_init(&sbsec->list); | |
4834 | goto next_sb; | |
4835 | } | |
4836 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4837 | spin_unlock(&sb_lock); | |
4838 | } | |
4839 | ||
4840 | /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label | |
4841 | all processes and objects when they are created. */ | |
4842 | security_initcall(selinux_init); | |
4843 | ||
4844 | #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) | |
4845 | ||
4846 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = { | |
4847 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last, | |
4848 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, | |
4849 | .pf = PF_INET, | |
4850 | .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING, | |
4851 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, | |
4852 | }; | |
4853 | ||
4854 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
4855 | ||
4856 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = { | |
4857 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last, | |
4858 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, | |
4859 | .pf = PF_INET6, | |
4860 | .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING, | |
4861 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, | |
4862 | }; | |
4863 | ||
4864 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
4865 | ||
4866 | static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) | |
4867 | { | |
4868 | int err = 0; | |
4869 | ||
4870 | if (!selinux_enabled) | |
4871 | goto out; | |
4872 | ||
4873 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); | |
4874 | ||
4875 | err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op); | |
4876 | if (err) | |
4877 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err); | |
4878 | ||
4879 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
4880 | ||
4881 | err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op); | |
4882 | if (err) | |
4883 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err); | |
4884 | ||
4885 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
4886 | ||
4887 | out: | |
4888 | return err; | |
4889 | } | |
4890 | ||
4891 | __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); | |
4892 | ||
4893 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE | |
4894 | static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) | |
4895 | { | |
4896 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); | |
4897 | ||
4898 | nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op); | |
4899 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
4900 | nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op); | |
4901 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
4902 | } | |
4903 | #endif | |
4904 | ||
4905 | #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ | |
4906 | ||
4907 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE | |
4908 | #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() | |
4909 | #endif | |
4910 | ||
4911 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ | |
4912 | ||
4913 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE | |
4914 | int selinux_disable(void) | |
4915 | { | |
4916 | extern void exit_sel_fs(void); | |
4917 | static int selinux_disabled = 0; | |
4918 | ||
4919 | if (ss_initialized) { | |
4920 | /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ | |
4921 | return -EINVAL; | |
4922 | } | |
4923 | ||
4924 | if (selinux_disabled) { | |
4925 | /* Only do this once. */ | |
4926 | return -EINVAL; | |
4927 | } | |
4928 | ||
4929 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); | |
4930 | ||
4931 | selinux_disabled = 1; | |
4932 | selinux_enabled = 0; | |
4933 | ||
4934 | /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */ | |
4935 | security_ops = secondary_ops; | |
4936 | ||
4937 | /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */ | |
4938 | selinux_nf_ip_exit(); | |
4939 | ||
4940 | /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ | |
4941 | exit_sel_fs(); | |
4942 | ||
4943 | return 0; | |
4944 | } | |
4945 | #endif | |
4946 | ||
4947 |