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1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support | |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. | |
5 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | |
6 | * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation | |
7 | * All Rights Reserved. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
10 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
11 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
12 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
13 | * | |
14 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
15 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
16 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
17 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
18 | * | |
19 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
20 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | |
21 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> | |
24 | * | |
25 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, | |
26 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. | |
27 | * | |
28 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in | |
29 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by | |
30 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. | |
31 | * | |
32 | * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, | |
33 | * 2006. | |
34 | * | |
35 | * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was | |
36 | * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. | |
37 | * | |
38 | * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional | |
39 | * filesystem information. | |
40 | * | |
41 | * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> | |
42 | * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. | |
43 | */ | |
44 | ||
45 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
46 | #include <asm/types.h> | |
47 | #include <asm/atomic.h> | |
48 | #include <linux/fs.h> | |
49 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
50 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
51 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
52 | #include <linux/mount.h> | |
53 | #include <linux/socket.h> | |
54 | #include <linux/mqueue.h> | |
55 | #include <linux/audit.h> | |
56 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
57 | #include <linux/time.h> | |
58 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
59 | #include <linux/compiler.h> | |
60 | #include <asm/unistd.h> | |
61 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
62 | #include <linux/list.h> | |
63 | #include <linux/tty.h> | |
64 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> | |
65 | #include <linux/highmem.h> | |
66 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> | |
67 | #include <linux/inotify.h> | |
68 | #include <linux/capability.h> | |
69 | ||
70 | #include "audit.h" | |
71 | ||
72 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | |
73 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | |
74 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | |
75 | ||
76 | /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */ | |
77 | #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1 | |
78 | ||
79 | /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */ | |
80 | #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 | |
81 | ||
82 | /* number of audit rules */ | |
83 | int audit_n_rules; | |
84 | ||
85 | /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ | |
86 | int audit_signals; | |
87 | ||
88 | struct audit_cap_data { | |
89 | kernel_cap_t permitted; | |
90 | kernel_cap_t inheritable; | |
91 | union { | |
92 | unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */ | |
93 | kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */ | |
94 | }; | |
95 | }; | |
96 | ||
97 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and | |
98 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved | |
99 | * pointers at syscall exit time). | |
100 | * | |
101 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ | |
102 | struct audit_names { | |
103 | const char *name; | |
104 | int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */ | |
105 | unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */ | |
106 | unsigned long ino; | |
107 | dev_t dev; | |
108 | umode_t mode; | |
109 | uid_t uid; | |
110 | gid_t gid; | |
111 | dev_t rdev; | |
112 | u32 osid; | |
113 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; | |
114 | unsigned int fcap_ver; | |
115 | }; | |
116 | ||
117 | struct audit_aux_data { | |
118 | struct audit_aux_data *next; | |
119 | int type; | |
120 | }; | |
121 | ||
122 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 | |
123 | ||
124 | /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ | |
125 | #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 | |
126 | ||
127 | struct audit_aux_data_execve { | |
128 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
129 | int argc; | |
130 | int envc; | |
131 | struct mm_struct *mm; | |
132 | }; | |
133 | ||
134 | struct audit_aux_data_pids { | |
135 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
136 | pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
137 | uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
138 | uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
139 | unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
140 | u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
141 | char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; | |
142 | int pid_count; | |
143 | }; | |
144 | ||
145 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { | |
146 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
147 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; | |
148 | unsigned int fcap_ver; | |
149 | struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; | |
150 | struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; | |
151 | }; | |
152 | ||
153 | struct audit_aux_data_capset { | |
154 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
155 | pid_t pid; | |
156 | struct audit_cap_data cap; | |
157 | }; | |
158 | ||
159 | struct audit_tree_refs { | |
160 | struct audit_tree_refs *next; | |
161 | struct audit_chunk *c[31]; | |
162 | }; | |
163 | ||
164 | /* The per-task audit context. */ | |
165 | struct audit_context { | |
166 | int dummy; /* must be the first element */ | |
167 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ | |
168 | enum audit_state state; | |
169 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ | |
170 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ | |
171 | int major; /* syscall number */ | |
172 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ | |
173 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ | |
174 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ | |
175 | int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ | |
176 | int name_count; | |
177 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; | |
178 | char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */ | |
179 | struct path pwd; | |
180 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ | |
181 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
182 | struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids; | |
183 | struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr; | |
184 | size_t sockaddr_len; | |
185 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ | |
186 | pid_t pid, ppid; | |
187 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; | |
188 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; | |
189 | unsigned long personality; | |
190 | int arch; | |
191 | ||
192 | pid_t target_pid; | |
193 | uid_t target_auid; | |
194 | uid_t target_uid; | |
195 | unsigned int target_sessionid; | |
196 | u32 target_sid; | |
197 | char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; | |
198 | ||
199 | struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; | |
200 | int tree_count; | |
201 | ||
202 | int type; | |
203 | union { | |
204 | struct { | |
205 | int nargs; | |
206 | long args[6]; | |
207 | } socketcall; | |
208 | struct { | |
209 | uid_t uid; | |
210 | gid_t gid; | |
211 | mode_t mode; | |
212 | u32 osid; | |
213 | int has_perm; | |
214 | uid_t perm_uid; | |
215 | gid_t perm_gid; | |
216 | mode_t perm_mode; | |
217 | unsigned long qbytes; | |
218 | } ipc; | |
219 | struct { | |
220 | mqd_t mqdes; | |
221 | struct mq_attr mqstat; | |
222 | } mq_getsetattr; | |
223 | struct { | |
224 | mqd_t mqdes; | |
225 | int sigev_signo; | |
226 | } mq_notify; | |
227 | struct { | |
228 | mqd_t mqdes; | |
229 | size_t msg_len; | |
230 | unsigned int msg_prio; | |
231 | struct timespec abs_timeout; | |
232 | } mq_sendrecv; | |
233 | struct { | |
234 | int oflag; | |
235 | mode_t mode; | |
236 | struct mq_attr attr; | |
237 | } mq_open; | |
238 | struct { | |
239 | pid_t pid; | |
240 | struct audit_cap_data cap; | |
241 | } capset; | |
242 | }; | |
243 | int fds[2]; | |
244 | ||
245 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
246 | int put_count; | |
247 | int ino_count; | |
248 | #endif | |
249 | }; | |
250 | ||
251 | #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | |
252 | static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask) | |
253 | { | |
254 | int n = ACC_MODE(flags); | |
255 | if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT)) | |
256 | n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE; | |
257 | return n & mask; | |
258 | } | |
259 | ||
260 | static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) | |
261 | { | |
262 | unsigned n; | |
263 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) | |
264 | return 0; | |
265 | n = ctx->major; | |
266 | ||
267 | switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { | |
268 | case 0: /* native */ | |
269 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && | |
270 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) | |
271 | return 1; | |
272 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && | |
273 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) | |
274 | return 1; | |
275 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && | |
276 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) | |
277 | return 1; | |
278 | return 0; | |
279 | case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ | |
280 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && | |
281 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) | |
282 | return 1; | |
283 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && | |
284 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) | |
285 | return 1; | |
286 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && | |
287 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) | |
288 | return 1; | |
289 | return 0; | |
290 | case 2: /* open */ | |
291 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); | |
292 | case 3: /* openat */ | |
293 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); | |
294 | case 4: /* socketcall */ | |
295 | return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); | |
296 | case 5: /* execve */ | |
297 | return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; | |
298 | default: | |
299 | return 0; | |
300 | } | |
301 | } | |
302 | ||
303 | static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which) | |
304 | { | |
305 | unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT; | |
306 | mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT; | |
307 | ||
308 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) | |
309 | return 0; | |
310 | ||
311 | if (index >= ctx->name_count) | |
312 | return 0; | |
313 | if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1) | |
314 | return 0; | |
315 | if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT) | |
316 | return 0; | |
317 | return 1; | |
318 | } | |
319 | ||
320 | /* | |
321 | * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; | |
322 | * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. | |
323 | * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. | |
324 | * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, | |
325 | * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, | |
326 | * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. | |
327 | * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. | |
328 | */ | |
329 | ||
330 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
331 | static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) | |
332 | { | |
333 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; | |
334 | int left = ctx->tree_count; | |
335 | if (likely(left)) { | |
336 | p->c[--left] = chunk; | |
337 | ctx->tree_count = left; | |
338 | return 1; | |
339 | } | |
340 | if (!p) | |
341 | return 0; | |
342 | p = p->next; | |
343 | if (p) { | |
344 | p->c[30] = chunk; | |
345 | ctx->trees = p; | |
346 | ctx->tree_count = 30; | |
347 | return 1; | |
348 | } | |
349 | return 0; | |
350 | } | |
351 | ||
352 | static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) | |
353 | { | |
354 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; | |
355 | ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); | |
356 | if (!ctx->trees) { | |
357 | ctx->trees = p; | |
358 | return 0; | |
359 | } | |
360 | if (p) | |
361 | p->next = ctx->trees; | |
362 | else | |
363 | ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; | |
364 | ctx->tree_count = 31; | |
365 | return 1; | |
366 | } | |
367 | #endif | |
368 | ||
369 | static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, | |
370 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) | |
371 | { | |
372 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
373 | struct audit_tree_refs *q; | |
374 | int n; | |
375 | if (!p) { | |
376 | /* we started with empty chain */ | |
377 | p = ctx->first_trees; | |
378 | count = 31; | |
379 | /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ | |
380 | if (!p) | |
381 | return; | |
382 | } | |
383 | n = count; | |
384 | for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { | |
385 | while (n--) { | |
386 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); | |
387 | q->c[n] = NULL; | |
388 | } | |
389 | } | |
390 | while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { | |
391 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); | |
392 | q->c[n] = NULL; | |
393 | } | |
394 | ctx->trees = p; | |
395 | ctx->tree_count = count; | |
396 | #endif | |
397 | } | |
398 | ||
399 | static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) | |
400 | { | |
401 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; | |
402 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { | |
403 | q = p->next; | |
404 | kfree(p); | |
405 | } | |
406 | } | |
407 | ||
408 | static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) | |
409 | { | |
410 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
411 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; | |
412 | int n; | |
413 | if (!tree) | |
414 | return 0; | |
415 | /* full ones */ | |
416 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { | |
417 | for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) | |
418 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) | |
419 | return 1; | |
420 | } | |
421 | /* partial */ | |
422 | if (p) { | |
423 | for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) | |
424 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) | |
425 | return 1; | |
426 | } | |
427 | #endif | |
428 | return 0; | |
429 | } | |
430 | ||
431 | /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ | |
432 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 | |
433 | * otherwise. */ | |
434 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
435 | struct audit_krule *rule, | |
436 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
437 | struct audit_names *name, | |
438 | enum audit_state *state) | |
439 | { | |
440 | const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk); | |
441 | int i, j, need_sid = 1; | |
442 | u32 sid; | |
443 | ||
444 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
445 | struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; | |
446 | int result = 0; | |
447 | ||
448 | switch (f->type) { | |
449 | case AUDIT_PID: | |
450 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); | |
451 | break; | |
452 | case AUDIT_PPID: | |
453 | if (ctx) { | |
454 | if (!ctx->ppid) | |
455 | ctx->ppid = sys_getppid(); | |
456 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); | |
457 | } | |
458 | break; | |
459 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
460 | result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val); | |
461 | break; | |
462 | case AUDIT_EUID: | |
463 | result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val); | |
464 | break; | |
465 | case AUDIT_SUID: | |
466 | result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val); | |
467 | break; | |
468 | case AUDIT_FSUID: | |
469 | result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val); | |
470 | break; | |
471 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
472 | result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val); | |
473 | break; | |
474 | case AUDIT_EGID: | |
475 | result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val); | |
476 | break; | |
477 | case AUDIT_SGID: | |
478 | result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val); | |
479 | break; | |
480 | case AUDIT_FSGID: | |
481 | result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val); | |
482 | break; | |
483 | case AUDIT_PERS: | |
484 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); | |
485 | break; | |
486 | case AUDIT_ARCH: | |
487 | if (ctx) | |
488 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); | |
489 | break; | |
490 | ||
491 | case AUDIT_EXIT: | |
492 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
493 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); | |
494 | break; | |
495 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: | |
496 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { | |
497 | if (f->val) | |
498 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); | |
499 | else | |
500 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); | |
501 | } | |
502 | break; | |
503 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: | |
504 | if (name) | |
505 | result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), | |
506 | f->op, f->val); | |
507 | else if (ctx) { | |
508 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
509 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { | |
510 | ++result; | |
511 | break; | |
512 | } | |
513 | } | |
514 | } | |
515 | break; | |
516 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: | |
517 | if (name) | |
518 | result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), | |
519 | f->op, f->val); | |
520 | else if (ctx) { | |
521 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
522 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { | |
523 | ++result; | |
524 | break; | |
525 | } | |
526 | } | |
527 | } | |
528 | break; | |
529 | case AUDIT_INODE: | |
530 | if (name) | |
531 | result = (name->ino == f->val); | |
532 | else if (ctx) { | |
533 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
534 | if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) { | |
535 | ++result; | |
536 | break; | |
537 | } | |
538 | } | |
539 | } | |
540 | break; | |
541 | case AUDIT_WATCH: | |
542 | if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1) | |
543 | result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev && | |
544 | name->ino == rule->watch->ino); | |
545 | break; | |
546 | case AUDIT_DIR: | |
547 | if (ctx) | |
548 | result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); | |
549 | break; | |
550 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
551 | result = 0; | |
552 | if (ctx) | |
553 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val); | |
554 | break; | |
555 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: | |
556 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: | |
557 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: | |
558 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: | |
559 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: | |
560 | /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating | |
561 | a temporary error. We simply treat this as a | |
562 | match for now to avoid losing information that | |
563 | may be wanted. An error message will also be | |
564 | logged upon error */ | |
565 | if (f->lsm_rule) { | |
566 | if (need_sid) { | |
567 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); | |
568 | need_sid = 0; | |
569 | } | |
570 | result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, | |
571 | f->op, | |
572 | f->lsm_rule, | |
573 | ctx); | |
574 | } | |
575 | break; | |
576 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: | |
577 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: | |
578 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: | |
579 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: | |
580 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: | |
581 | /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR | |
582 | also applies here */ | |
583 | if (f->lsm_rule) { | |
584 | /* Find files that match */ | |
585 | if (name) { | |
586 | result = security_audit_rule_match( | |
587 | name->osid, f->type, f->op, | |
588 | f->lsm_rule, ctx); | |
589 | } else if (ctx) { | |
590 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
591 | if (security_audit_rule_match( | |
592 | ctx->names[j].osid, | |
593 | f->type, f->op, | |
594 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { | |
595 | ++result; | |
596 | break; | |
597 | } | |
598 | } | |
599 | } | |
600 | /* Find ipc objects that match */ | |
601 | if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) | |
602 | break; | |
603 | if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, | |
604 | f->type, f->op, | |
605 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) | |
606 | ++result; | |
607 | } | |
608 | break; | |
609 | case AUDIT_ARG0: | |
610 | case AUDIT_ARG1: | |
611 | case AUDIT_ARG2: | |
612 | case AUDIT_ARG3: | |
613 | if (ctx) | |
614 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); | |
615 | break; | |
616 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: | |
617 | /* ignore this field for filtering */ | |
618 | result = 1; | |
619 | break; | |
620 | case AUDIT_PERM: | |
621 | result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); | |
622 | break; | |
623 | case AUDIT_FILETYPE: | |
624 | result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); | |
625 | break; | |
626 | } | |
627 | ||
628 | if (!result) { | |
629 | put_cred(cred); | |
630 | return 0; | |
631 | } | |
632 | } | |
633 | if (rule->filterkey && ctx) | |
634 | ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
635 | switch (rule->action) { | |
636 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
637 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
638 | } | |
639 | put_cred(cred); | |
640 | return 1; | |
641 | } | |
642 | ||
643 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is | |
644 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task | |
645 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. | |
646 | */ | |
647 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
648 | { | |
649 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
650 | enum audit_state state; | |
651 | ||
652 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
653 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { | |
654 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) { | |
655 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
656 | return state; | |
657 | } | |
658 | } | |
659 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
660 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
661 | } | |
662 | ||
663 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the | |
664 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is | |
665 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit | |
666 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). | |
667 | */ | |
668 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
669 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
670 | struct list_head *list) | |
671 | { | |
672 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
673 | enum audit_state state; | |
674 | ||
675 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) | |
676 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; | |
677 | ||
678 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
679 | if (!list_empty(list)) { | |
680 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); | |
681 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
682 | ||
683 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
684 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && | |
685 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, | |
686 | &state)) { | |
687 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
688 | return state; | |
689 | } | |
690 | } | |
691 | } | |
692 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
693 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
694 | } | |
695 | ||
696 | /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been | |
697 | * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash | |
698 | * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[]. | |
699 | * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). | |
700 | */ | |
701 | enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
702 | struct audit_context *ctx) | |
703 | { | |
704 | int i; | |
705 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
706 | enum audit_state state; | |
707 | ||
708 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) | |
709 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; | |
710 | ||
711 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
712 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) { | |
713 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); | |
714 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
715 | struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i]; | |
716 | int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); | |
717 | struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; | |
718 | ||
719 | if (list_empty(list)) | |
720 | continue; | |
721 | ||
722 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
723 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && | |
724 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) { | |
725 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
726 | return state; | |
727 | } | |
728 | } | |
729 | } | |
730 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
731 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
732 | } | |
733 | ||
734 | void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) | |
735 | { | |
736 | ctx->auditable = 1; | |
737 | } | |
738 | ||
739 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
740 | int return_valid, | |
741 | int return_code) | |
742 | { | |
743 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
744 | ||
745 | if (likely(!context)) | |
746 | return NULL; | |
747 | context->return_valid = return_valid; | |
748 | ||
749 | /* | |
750 | * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual | |
751 | * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific | |
752 | * signal handlers | |
753 | * | |
754 | * This is actually a test for: | |
755 | * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || | |
756 | * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) | |
757 | * | |
758 | * but is faster than a bunch of || | |
759 | */ | |
760 | if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && | |
761 | (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && | |
762 | (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) | |
763 | context->return_code = -EINTR; | |
764 | else | |
765 | context->return_code = return_code; | |
766 | ||
767 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) { | |
768 | enum audit_state state; | |
769 | ||
770 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); | |
771 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { | |
772 | context->auditable = 1; | |
773 | goto get_context; | |
774 | } | |
775 | ||
776 | state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); | |
777 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) | |
778 | context->auditable = 1; | |
779 | ||
780 | } | |
781 | ||
782 | get_context: | |
783 | ||
784 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; | |
785 | return context; | |
786 | } | |
787 | ||
788 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) | |
789 | { | |
790 | int i; | |
791 | ||
792 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
793 | if (context->auditable | |
794 | ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { | |
795 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" | |
796 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" | |
797 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", | |
798 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
799 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, | |
800 | context->name_count, context->put_count, | |
801 | context->ino_count); | |
802 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { | |
803 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
804 | context->names[i].name, | |
805 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); | |
806 | } | |
807 | dump_stack(); | |
808 | return; | |
809 | } | |
810 | #endif | |
811 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
812 | context->put_count = 0; | |
813 | context->ino_count = 0; | |
814 | #endif | |
815 | ||
816 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { | |
817 | if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put) | |
818 | __putname(context->names[i].name); | |
819 | } | |
820 | context->name_count = 0; | |
821 | path_put(&context->pwd); | |
822 | context->pwd.dentry = NULL; | |
823 | context->pwd.mnt = NULL; | |
824 | } | |
825 | ||
826 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) | |
827 | { | |
828 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
829 | ||
830 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { | |
831 | context->aux = aux->next; | |
832 | kfree(aux); | |
833 | } | |
834 | while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { | |
835 | context->aux_pids = aux->next; | |
836 | kfree(aux); | |
837 | } | |
838 | } | |
839 | ||
840 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, | |
841 | enum audit_state state) | |
842 | { | |
843 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); | |
844 | context->state = state; | |
845 | } | |
846 | ||
847 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) | |
848 | { | |
849 | struct audit_context *context; | |
850 | ||
851 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
852 | return NULL; | |
853 | audit_zero_context(context, state); | |
854 | return context; | |
855 | } | |
856 | ||
857 | /** | |
858 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task | |
859 | * @tsk: task | |
860 | * | |
861 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context | |
862 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the | |
863 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is | |
864 | * needed. | |
865 | */ | |
866 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
867 | { | |
868 | struct audit_context *context; | |
869 | enum audit_state state; | |
870 | ||
871 | if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) | |
872 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ | |
873 | ||
874 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk); | |
875 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
876 | return 0; | |
877 | ||
878 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { | |
879 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); | |
880 | return -ENOMEM; | |
881 | } | |
882 | ||
883 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
884 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); | |
885 | return 0; | |
886 | } | |
887 | ||
888 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) | |
889 | { | |
890 | struct audit_context *previous; | |
891 | int count = 0; | |
892 | ||
893 | do { | |
894 | previous = context->previous; | |
895 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { | |
896 | ++count; | |
897 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" | |
898 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", | |
899 | context->serial, context->major, | |
900 | context->name_count, count); | |
901 | } | |
902 | audit_free_names(context); | |
903 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); | |
904 | free_tree_refs(context); | |
905 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
906 | kfree(context->filterkey); | |
907 | kfree(context->sockaddr); | |
908 | kfree(context); | |
909 | context = previous; | |
910 | } while (context); | |
911 | if (count >= 10) | |
912 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); | |
913 | } | |
914 | ||
915 | void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) | |
916 | { | |
917 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
918 | unsigned len; | |
919 | int error; | |
920 | u32 sid; | |
921 | ||
922 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); | |
923 | if (!sid) | |
924 | return; | |
925 | ||
926 | error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); | |
927 | if (error) { | |
928 | if (error != -EINVAL) | |
929 | goto error_path; | |
930 | return; | |
931 | } | |
932 | ||
933 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); | |
934 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
935 | return; | |
936 | ||
937 | error_path: | |
938 | audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context"); | |
939 | return; | |
940 | } | |
941 | ||
942 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context); | |
943 | ||
944 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk) | |
945 | { | |
946 | char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)]; | |
947 | struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm; | |
948 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
949 | ||
950 | /* tsk == current */ | |
951 | ||
952 | get_task_comm(name, tsk); | |
953 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); | |
954 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); | |
955 | ||
956 | if (mm) { | |
957 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
958 | vma = mm->mmap; | |
959 | while (vma) { | |
960 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
961 | vma->vm_file) { | |
962 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", | |
963 | &vma->vm_file->f_path); | |
964 | break; | |
965 | } | |
966 | vma = vma->vm_next; | |
967 | } | |
968 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
969 | } | |
970 | audit_log_task_context(ab); | |
971 | } | |
972 | ||
973 | static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, | |
974 | uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, | |
975 | u32 sid, char *comm) | |
976 | { | |
977 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
978 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
979 | u32 len; | |
980 | int rc = 0; | |
981 | ||
982 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); | |
983 | if (!ab) | |
984 | return rc; | |
985 | ||
986 | audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid, | |
987 | uid, sessionid); | |
988 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { | |
989 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); | |
990 | rc = 1; | |
991 | } else { | |
992 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); | |
993 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
994 | } | |
995 | audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); | |
996 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); | |
997 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
998 | ||
999 | return rc; | |
1000 | } | |
1001 | ||
1002 | /* | |
1003 | * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't | |
1004 | * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being | |
1005 | * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry) | |
1006 | * | |
1007 | * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when | |
1008 | * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting | |
1009 | * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to | |
1010 | * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space | |
1011 | * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was. | |
1012 | */ | |
1013 | static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context, | |
1014 | struct audit_buffer **ab, | |
1015 | int arg_num, | |
1016 | size_t *len_sent, | |
1017 | const char __user *p, | |
1018 | char *buf) | |
1019 | { | |
1020 | char arg_num_len_buf[12]; | |
1021 | const char __user *tmp_p = p; | |
1022 | /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */ | |
1023 | size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3; | |
1024 | size_t len, len_left, to_send; | |
1025 | size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; | |
1026 | unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0; | |
1027 | int ret; | |
1028 | ||
1029 | /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */ | |
1030 | len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; | |
1031 | ||
1032 | /* | |
1033 | * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings | |
1034 | * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar | |
1035 | * for strings that are too long, we should not have created | |
1036 | * any. | |
1037 | */ | |
1038 | if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) { | |
1039 | WARN_ON(1); | |
1040 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); | |
1041 | return -1; | |
1042 | } | |
1043 | ||
1044 | /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */ | |
1045 | do { | |
1046 | if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN) | |
1047 | to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; | |
1048 | else | |
1049 | to_send = len_left; | |
1050 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send); | |
1051 | /* | |
1052 | * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just | |
1053 | * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- | |
1054 | * space yet. | |
1055 | */ | |
1056 | if (ret) { | |
1057 | WARN_ON(1); | |
1058 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); | |
1059 | return -1; | |
1060 | } | |
1061 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; | |
1062 | has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send); | |
1063 | if (has_cntl) { | |
1064 | /* | |
1065 | * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only | |
1066 | * send half as much in each message | |
1067 | */ | |
1068 | max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2; | |
1069 | break; | |
1070 | } | |
1071 | len_left -= to_send; | |
1072 | tmp_p += to_send; | |
1073 | } while (len_left > 0); | |
1074 | ||
1075 | len_left = len; | |
1076 | ||
1077 | if (len > max_execve_audit_len) | |
1078 | too_long = 1; | |
1079 | ||
1080 | /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */ | |
1081 | for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) { | |
1082 | int room_left; | |
1083 | ||
1084 | if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len) | |
1085 | to_send = max_execve_audit_len; | |
1086 | else | |
1087 | to_send = len_left; | |
1088 | ||
1089 | /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */ | |
1090 | room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent; | |
1091 | if (has_cntl) | |
1092 | room_left -= (to_send * 2); | |
1093 | else | |
1094 | room_left -= to_send; | |
1095 | if (room_left < 0) { | |
1096 | *len_sent = 0; | |
1097 | audit_log_end(*ab); | |
1098 | *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); | |
1099 | if (!*ab) | |
1100 | return 0; | |
1101 | } | |
1102 | ||
1103 | /* | |
1104 | * first record needs to say how long the original string was | |
1105 | * so we can be sure nothing was lost. | |
1106 | */ | |
1107 | if ((i == 0) && (too_long)) | |
1108 | audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num, | |
1109 | has_cntl ? 2*len : len); | |
1110 | ||
1111 | /* | |
1112 | * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already | |
1113 | * filled buf above when we checked for control characters | |
1114 | * so don't bother with another copy_from_user | |
1115 | */ | |
1116 | if (len >= max_execve_audit_len) | |
1117 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send); | |
1118 | else | |
1119 | ret = 0; | |
1120 | if (ret) { | |
1121 | WARN_ON(1); | |
1122 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); | |
1123 | return -1; | |
1124 | } | |
1125 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; | |
1126 | ||
1127 | /* actually log it */ | |
1128 | audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num); | |
1129 | if (too_long) | |
1130 | audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i); | |
1131 | audit_log_format(*ab, "="); | |
1132 | if (has_cntl) | |
1133 | audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send); | |
1134 | else | |
1135 | audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf); | |
1136 | audit_log_format(*ab, "\n"); | |
1137 | ||
1138 | p += to_send; | |
1139 | len_left -= to_send; | |
1140 | *len_sent += arg_num_len; | |
1141 | if (has_cntl) | |
1142 | *len_sent += to_send * 2; | |
1143 | else | |
1144 | *len_sent += to_send; | |
1145 | } | |
1146 | /* include the null we didn't log */ | |
1147 | return len + 1; | |
1148 | } | |
1149 | ||
1150 | static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, | |
1151 | struct audit_buffer **ab, | |
1152 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) | |
1153 | { | |
1154 | int i; | |
1155 | size_t len, len_sent = 0; | |
1156 | const char __user *p; | |
1157 | char *buf; | |
1158 | ||
1159 | if (axi->mm != current->mm) | |
1160 | return; /* execve failed, no additional info */ | |
1161 | ||
1162 | p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start; | |
1163 | ||
1164 | audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc); | |
1165 | ||
1166 | /* | |
1167 | * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just | |
1168 | * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size | |
1169 | * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg() | |
1170 | * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe. | |
1171 | */ | |
1172 | buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1173 | if (!buf) { | |
1174 | audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n"); | |
1175 | return; | |
1176 | } | |
1177 | ||
1178 | for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) { | |
1179 | len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i, | |
1180 | &len_sent, p, buf); | |
1181 | if (len <= 0) | |
1182 | break; | |
1183 | p += len; | |
1184 | } | |
1185 | kfree(buf); | |
1186 | } | |
1187 | ||
1188 | static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) | |
1189 | { | |
1190 | int i; | |
1191 | ||
1192 | audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); | |
1193 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { | |
1194 | audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]); | |
1195 | } | |
1196 | } | |
1197 | ||
1198 | static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) | |
1199 | { | |
1200 | kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted; | |
1201 | kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable; | |
1202 | int log = 0; | |
1203 | ||
1204 | if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { | |
1205 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); | |
1206 | log = 1; | |
1207 | } | |
1208 | if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { | |
1209 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); | |
1210 | log = 1; | |
1211 | } | |
1212 | ||
1213 | if (log) | |
1214 | audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver); | |
1215 | } | |
1216 | ||
1217 | static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) | |
1218 | { | |
1219 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
1220 | int i; | |
1221 | ||
1222 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); | |
1223 | if (!ab) | |
1224 | return; | |
1225 | ||
1226 | switch (context->type) { | |
1227 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { | |
1228 | int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; | |
1229 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); | |
1230 | for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) | |
1231 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, | |
1232 | context->socketcall.args[i]); | |
1233 | break; } | |
1234 | case AUDIT_IPC: { | |
1235 | u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; | |
1236 | ||
1237 | audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", | |
1238 | context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode); | |
1239 | if (osid) { | |
1240 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
1241 | u32 len; | |
1242 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { | |
1243 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); | |
1244 | *call_panic = 1; | |
1245 | } else { | |
1246 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); | |
1247 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
1248 | } | |
1249 | } | |
1250 | if (context->ipc.has_perm) { | |
1251 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1252 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, | |
1253 | AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); | |
1254 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1255 | "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", | |
1256 | context->ipc.qbytes, | |
1257 | context->ipc.perm_uid, | |
1258 | context->ipc.perm_gid, | |
1259 | context->ipc.perm_mode); | |
1260 | if (!ab) | |
1261 | return; | |
1262 | } | |
1263 | break; } | |
1264 | case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: { | |
1265 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1266 | "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " | |
1267 | "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", | |
1268 | context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, | |
1269 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, | |
1270 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, | |
1271 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, | |
1272 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); | |
1273 | break; } | |
1274 | case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: { | |
1275 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1276 | "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " | |
1277 | "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", | |
1278 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, | |
1279 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, | |
1280 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, | |
1281 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, | |
1282 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); | |
1283 | break; } | |
1284 | case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: { | |
1285 | audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", | |
1286 | context->mq_notify.mqdes, | |
1287 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); | |
1288 | break; } | |
1289 | case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { | |
1290 | struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; | |
1291 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1292 | "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " | |
1293 | "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", | |
1294 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, | |
1295 | attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, | |
1296 | attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); | |
1297 | break; } | |
1298 | case AUDIT_CAPSET: { | |
1299 | audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); | |
1300 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); | |
1301 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); | |
1302 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); | |
1303 | break; } | |
1304 | } | |
1305 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1306 | } | |
1307 | ||
1308 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) | |
1309 | { | |
1310 | const struct cred *cred; | |
1311 | int i, call_panic = 0; | |
1312 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
1313 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
1314 | const char *tty; | |
1315 | ||
1316 | /* tsk == current */ | |
1317 | context->pid = tsk->pid; | |
1318 | if (!context->ppid) | |
1319 | context->ppid = sys_getppid(); | |
1320 | cred = current_cred(); | |
1321 | context->uid = cred->uid; | |
1322 | context->gid = cred->gid; | |
1323 | context->euid = cred->euid; | |
1324 | context->suid = cred->suid; | |
1325 | context->fsuid = cred->fsuid; | |
1326 | context->egid = cred->egid; | |
1327 | context->sgid = cred->sgid; | |
1328 | context->fsgid = cred->fsgid; | |
1329 | context->personality = tsk->personality; | |
1330 | ||
1331 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); | |
1332 | if (!ab) | |
1333 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
1334 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", | |
1335 | context->arch, context->major); | |
1336 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) | |
1337 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); | |
1338 | if (context->return_valid) | |
1339 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", | |
1340 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", | |
1341 | context->return_code); | |
1342 | ||
1343 | spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); | |
1344 | if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name) | |
1345 | tty = tsk->signal->tty->name; | |
1346 | else | |
1347 | tty = "(none)"; | |
1348 | spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); | |
1349 | ||
1350 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1351 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" | |
1352 | " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" | |
1353 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" | |
1354 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", | |
1355 | context->argv[0], | |
1356 | context->argv[1], | |
1357 | context->argv[2], | |
1358 | context->argv[3], | |
1359 | context->name_count, | |
1360 | context->ppid, | |
1361 | context->pid, | |
1362 | tsk->loginuid, | |
1363 | context->uid, | |
1364 | context->gid, | |
1365 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, | |
1366 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty, | |
1367 | tsk->sessionid); | |
1368 | ||
1369 | ||
1370 | audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); | |
1371 | if (context->filterkey) { | |
1372 | audit_log_format(ab, " key="); | |
1373 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey); | |
1374 | } else | |
1375 | audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)"); | |
1376 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1377 | ||
1378 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { | |
1379 | ||
1380 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); | |
1381 | if (!ab) | |
1382 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
1383 | ||
1384 | switch (aux->type) { | |
1385 | ||
1386 | case AUDIT_EXECVE: { | |
1387 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux; | |
1388 | audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi); | |
1389 | break; } | |
1390 | ||
1391 | case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { | |
1392 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; | |
1393 | audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); | |
1394 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); | |
1395 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); | |
1396 | audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); | |
1397 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); | |
1398 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); | |
1399 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); | |
1400 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); | |
1401 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); | |
1402 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); | |
1403 | break; } | |
1404 | ||
1405 | } | |
1406 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1407 | } | |
1408 | ||
1409 | if (context->type) | |
1410 | show_special(context, &call_panic); | |
1411 | ||
1412 | if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { | |
1413 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); | |
1414 | if (ab) { | |
1415 | audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", | |
1416 | context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); | |
1417 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1418 | } | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | ||
1421 | if (context->sockaddr_len) { | |
1422 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); | |
1423 | if (ab) { | |
1424 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); | |
1425 | audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, | |
1426 | context->sockaddr_len); | |
1427 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1428 | } | |
1429 | } | |
1430 | ||
1431 | for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { | |
1432 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; | |
1433 | ||
1434 | for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) | |
1435 | if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], | |
1436 | axs->target_auid[i], | |
1437 | axs->target_uid[i], | |
1438 | axs->target_sessionid[i], | |
1439 | axs->target_sid[i], | |
1440 | axs->target_comm[i])) | |
1441 | call_panic = 1; | |
1442 | } | |
1443 | ||
1444 | if (context->target_pid && | |
1445 | audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, | |
1446 | context->target_auid, context->target_uid, | |
1447 | context->target_sessionid, | |
1448 | context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) | |
1449 | call_panic = 1; | |
1450 | ||
1451 | if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { | |
1452 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); | |
1453 | if (ab) { | |
1454 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); | |
1455 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1456 | } | |
1457 | } | |
1458 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { | |
1459 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i]; | |
1460 | ||
1461 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); | |
1462 | if (!ab) | |
1463 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
1464 | ||
1465 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); | |
1466 | ||
1467 | if (n->name) { | |
1468 | switch(n->name_len) { | |
1469 | case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: | |
1470 | /* log the full path */ | |
1471 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
1472 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name); | |
1473 | break; | |
1474 | case 0: | |
1475 | /* name was specified as a relative path and the | |
1476 | * directory component is the cwd */ | |
1477 | audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd); | |
1478 | break; | |
1479 | default: | |
1480 | /* log the name's directory component */ | |
1481 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
1482 | audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name, | |
1483 | n->name_len); | |
1484 | } | |
1485 | } else | |
1486 | audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); | |
1487 | ||
1488 | if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) { | |
1489 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu" | |
1490 | " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" | |
1491 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", | |
1492 | n->ino, | |
1493 | MAJOR(n->dev), | |
1494 | MINOR(n->dev), | |
1495 | n->mode, | |
1496 | n->uid, | |
1497 | n->gid, | |
1498 | MAJOR(n->rdev), | |
1499 | MINOR(n->rdev)); | |
1500 | } | |
1501 | if (n->osid != 0) { | |
1502 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
1503 | u32 len; | |
1504 | if (security_secid_to_secctx( | |
1505 | n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { | |
1506 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); | |
1507 | call_panic = 2; | |
1508 | } else { | |
1509 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); | |
1510 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
1511 | } | |
1512 | } | |
1513 | ||
1514 | audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); | |
1515 | ||
1516 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1517 | } | |
1518 | ||
1519 | /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ | |
1520 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); | |
1521 | if (ab) | |
1522 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1523 | if (call_panic) | |
1524 | audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); | |
1525 | } | |
1526 | ||
1527 | /** | |
1528 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context | |
1529 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free | |
1530 | * | |
1531 | * Called from copy_process and do_exit | |
1532 | */ | |
1533 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
1534 | { | |
1535 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1536 | ||
1537 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); | |
1538 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1539 | return; | |
1540 | ||
1541 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit | |
1542 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. | |
1543 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this | |
1544 | * in the context of the idle thread */ | |
1545 | /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ | |
1546 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) | |
1547 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); | |
1548 | ||
1549 | audit_free_context(context); | |
1550 | } | |
1551 | ||
1552 | /** | |
1553 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry | |
1554 | * @arch: architecture type | |
1555 | * @major: major syscall type (function) | |
1556 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 | |
1557 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 | |
1558 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 | |
1559 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 | |
1560 | * | |
1561 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the | |
1562 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or | |
1563 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the | |
1564 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, | |
1565 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it | |
1566 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it | |
1567 | * be written). | |
1568 | */ | |
1569 | void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, | |
1570 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, | |
1571 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) | |
1572 | { | |
1573 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; | |
1574 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
1575 | enum audit_state state; | |
1576 | ||
1577 | if (unlikely(!context)) | |
1578 | return; | |
1579 | ||
1580 | /* | |
1581 | * This happens only on certain architectures that make system | |
1582 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of | |
1583 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new | |
1584 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you | |
1585 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) | |
1586 | * | |
1587 | * i386 no | |
1588 | * x86_64 no | |
1589 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S) | |
1590 | * | |
1591 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner | |
1592 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. | |
1593 | */ | |
1594 | if (context->in_syscall) { | |
1595 | struct audit_context *newctx; | |
1596 | ||
1597 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1598 | printk(KERN_ERR | |
1599 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" | |
1600 | " entering syscall=%d\n", | |
1601 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); | |
1602 | #endif | |
1603 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); | |
1604 | if (newctx) { | |
1605 | newctx->previous = context; | |
1606 | context = newctx; | |
1607 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; | |
1608 | } else { | |
1609 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we | |
1610 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname | |
1611 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is | |
1612 | * to abandon auditing. */ | |
1613 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
1614 | } | |
1615 | } | |
1616 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); | |
1617 | ||
1618 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
1619 | return; | |
1620 | ||
1621 | context->arch = arch; | |
1622 | context->major = major; | |
1623 | context->argv[0] = a1; | |
1624 | context->argv[1] = a2; | |
1625 | context->argv[2] = a3; | |
1626 | context->argv[3] = a4; | |
1627 | ||
1628 | state = context->state; | |
1629 | context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; | |
1630 | if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)) | |
1631 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); | |
1632 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
1633 | return; | |
1634 | ||
1635 | context->serial = 0; | |
1636 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; | |
1637 | context->in_syscall = 1; | |
1638 | context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT); | |
1639 | context->ppid = 0; | |
1640 | } | |
1641 | ||
1642 | void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child) | |
1643 | { | |
1644 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
1645 | struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context; | |
1646 | if (!p || !ctx || !ctx->auditable) | |
1647 | return; | |
1648 | p->arch = ctx->arch; | |
1649 | p->major = ctx->major; | |
1650 | memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv)); | |
1651 | p->ctime = ctx->ctime; | |
1652 | p->dummy = ctx->dummy; | |
1653 | p->auditable = ctx->auditable; | |
1654 | p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall; | |
1655 | p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1656 | p->ppid = current->pid; | |
1657 | } | |
1658 | ||
1659 | /** | |
1660 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call | |
1661 | * @valid: success/failure flag | |
1662 | * @return_code: syscall return value | |
1663 | * | |
1664 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as | |
1665 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from | |
1666 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit | |
1667 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, | |
1668 | * free the names stored from getname(). | |
1669 | */ | |
1670 | void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code) | |
1671 | { | |
1672 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; | |
1673 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1674 | ||
1675 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); | |
1676 | ||
1677 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1678 | return; | |
1679 | ||
1680 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) | |
1681 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); | |
1682 | ||
1683 | context->in_syscall = 0; | |
1684 | context->auditable = 0; | |
1685 | ||
1686 | if (context->previous) { | |
1687 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; | |
1688 | context->previous = NULL; | |
1689 | audit_free_context(context); | |
1690 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; | |
1691 | } else { | |
1692 | audit_free_names(context); | |
1693 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); | |
1694 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
1695 | context->aux = NULL; | |
1696 | context->aux_pids = NULL; | |
1697 | context->target_pid = 0; | |
1698 | context->target_sid = 0; | |
1699 | context->sockaddr_len = 0; | |
1700 | context->type = 0; | |
1701 | context->fds[0] = -1; | |
1702 | kfree(context->filterkey); | |
1703 | context->filterkey = NULL; | |
1704 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
1705 | } | |
1706 | } | |
1707 | ||
1708 | static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) | |
1709 | { | |
1710 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
1711 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1712 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; | |
1713 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; | |
1714 | int count; | |
1715 | if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) | |
1716 | return; | |
1717 | context = current->audit_context; | |
1718 | p = context->trees; | |
1719 | count = context->tree_count; | |
1720 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
1721 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); | |
1722 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1723 | if (!chunk) | |
1724 | return; | |
1725 | if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) | |
1726 | return; | |
1727 | if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { | |
1728 | printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); | |
1729 | audit_set_auditable(context); | |
1730 | audit_put_chunk(chunk); | |
1731 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); | |
1732 | return; | |
1733 | } | |
1734 | put_tree_ref(context, chunk); | |
1735 | #endif | |
1736 | } | |
1737 | ||
1738 | static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) | |
1739 | { | |
1740 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
1741 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1742 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; | |
1743 | const struct dentry *d, *parent; | |
1744 | struct audit_chunk *drop; | |
1745 | unsigned long seq; | |
1746 | int count; | |
1747 | ||
1748 | context = current->audit_context; | |
1749 | p = context->trees; | |
1750 | count = context->tree_count; | |
1751 | retry: | |
1752 | drop = NULL; | |
1753 | d = dentry; | |
1754 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
1755 | seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); | |
1756 | for(;;) { | |
1757 | struct inode *inode = d->d_inode; | |
1758 | if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) { | |
1759 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; | |
1760 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); | |
1761 | if (chunk) { | |
1762 | if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { | |
1763 | drop = chunk; | |
1764 | break; | |
1765 | } | |
1766 | } | |
1767 | } | |
1768 | parent = d->d_parent; | |
1769 | if (parent == d) | |
1770 | break; | |
1771 | d = parent; | |
1772 | } | |
1773 | if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ | |
1774 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1775 | if (!drop) { | |
1776 | /* just a race with rename */ | |
1777 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); | |
1778 | goto retry; | |
1779 | } | |
1780 | audit_put_chunk(drop); | |
1781 | if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { | |
1782 | /* OK, got more space */ | |
1783 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); | |
1784 | goto retry; | |
1785 | } | |
1786 | /* too bad */ | |
1787 | printk(KERN_WARNING | |
1788 | "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); | |
1789 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); | |
1790 | audit_set_auditable(context); | |
1791 | return; | |
1792 | } | |
1793 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1794 | #endif | |
1795 | } | |
1796 | ||
1797 | /** | |
1798 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list | |
1799 | * @name: name to add | |
1800 | * | |
1801 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. | |
1802 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). | |
1803 | */ | |
1804 | void __audit_getname(const char *name) | |
1805 | { | |
1806 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1807 | ||
1808 | if (IS_ERR(name) || !name) | |
1809 | return; | |
1810 | ||
1811 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
1812 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
1813 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", | |
1814 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
1815 | dump_stack(); | |
1816 | #endif | |
1817 | return; | |
1818 | } | |
1819 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); | |
1820 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; | |
1821 | context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; | |
1822 | context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1; | |
1823 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1824 | context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0; | |
1825 | ++context->name_count; | |
1826 | if (!context->pwd.dentry) { | |
1827 | read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
1828 | context->pwd = current->fs->pwd; | |
1829 | path_get(¤t->fs->pwd); | |
1830 | read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
1831 | } | |
1832 | ||
1833 | } | |
1834 | ||
1835 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request | |
1836 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname | |
1837 | * | |
1838 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, | |
1839 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. | |
1840 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). | |
1841 | */ | |
1842 | void audit_putname(const char *name) | |
1843 | { | |
1844 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1845 | ||
1846 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
1847 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
1848 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
1849 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", | |
1850 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
1851 | if (context->name_count) { | |
1852 | int i; | |
1853 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
1854 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
1855 | context->names[i].name, | |
1856 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); | |
1857 | } | |
1858 | #endif | |
1859 | __putname(name); | |
1860 | } | |
1861 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1862 | else { | |
1863 | ++context->put_count; | |
1864 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { | |
1865 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" | |
1866 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" | |
1867 | " put_count=%d\n", | |
1868 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
1869 | context->serial, context->major, | |
1870 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, | |
1871 | context->put_count); | |
1872 | dump_stack(); | |
1873 | } | |
1874 | } | |
1875 | #endif | |
1876 | } | |
1877 | ||
1878 | static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context, | |
1879 | const struct inode *inode) | |
1880 | { | |
1881 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) { | |
1882 | if (inode) | |
1883 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: " | |
1884 | "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n", | |
1885 | MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), | |
1886 | MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), | |
1887 | inode->i_ino); | |
1888 | ||
1889 | else | |
1890 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n"); | |
1891 | return 1; | |
1892 | } | |
1893 | context->name_count++; | |
1894 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1895 | context->ino_count++; | |
1896 | #endif | |
1897 | return 0; | |
1898 | } | |
1899 | ||
1900 | ||
1901 | static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry) | |
1902 | { | |
1903 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; | |
1904 | int rc; | |
1905 | ||
1906 | memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); | |
1907 | memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); | |
1908 | name->fcap.fE = 0; | |
1909 | name->fcap_ver = 0; | |
1910 | ||
1911 | if (!dentry) | |
1912 | return 0; | |
1913 | ||
1914 | rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps); | |
1915 | if (rc) | |
1916 | return rc; | |
1917 | ||
1918 | name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; | |
1919 | name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; | |
1920 | name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); | |
1921 | name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; | |
1922 | ||
1923 | return 0; | |
1924 | } | |
1925 | ||
1926 | ||
1927 | /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ | |
1928 | static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, | |
1929 | const struct inode *inode) | |
1930 | { | |
1931 | name->ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1932 | name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | |
1933 | name->mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1934 | name->uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1935 | name->gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1936 | name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
1937 | security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); | |
1938 | audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); | |
1939 | } | |
1940 | ||
1941 | /** | |
1942 | * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup | |
1943 | * @name: name being audited | |
1944 | * @dentry: dentry being audited | |
1945 | * | |
1946 | * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). | |
1947 | */ | |
1948 | void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry) | |
1949 | { | |
1950 | int idx; | |
1951 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1952 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1953 | ||
1954 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1955 | return; | |
1956 | if (context->name_count | |
1957 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name | |
1958 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) | |
1959 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
1960 | else if (context->name_count > 1 | |
1961 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name | |
1962 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) | |
1963 | idx = context->name_count - 2; | |
1964 | else { | |
1965 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no | |
1966 | * associated name? */ | |
1967 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) | |
1968 | return; | |
1969 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
1970 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1971 | } | |
1972 | handle_path(dentry); | |
1973 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode); | |
1974 | } | |
1975 | ||
1976 | /** | |
1977 | * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects | |
1978 | * @dname: inode's dentry name | |
1979 | * @dentry: dentry being audited | |
1980 | * @parent: inode of dentry parent | |
1981 | * | |
1982 | * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode | |
1983 | * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. | |
1984 | * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. | |
1985 | * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after | |
1986 | * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object | |
1987 | * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during | |
1988 | * unsuccessful attempts. | |
1989 | */ | |
1990 | void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry, | |
1991 | const struct inode *parent) | |
1992 | { | |
1993 | int idx; | |
1994 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1995 | const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; | |
1996 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1997 | int dirlen = 0; | |
1998 | ||
1999 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
2000 | return; | |
2001 | ||
2002 | if (inode) | |
2003 | handle_one(inode); | |
2004 | /* determine matching parent */ | |
2005 | if (!dname) | |
2006 | goto add_names; | |
2007 | ||
2008 | /* parent is more likely, look for it first */ | |
2009 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { | |
2010 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; | |
2011 | ||
2012 | if (!n->name) | |
2013 | continue; | |
2014 | ||
2015 | if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && | |
2016 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { | |
2017 | n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */ | |
2018 | found_parent = n->name; | |
2019 | goto add_names; | |
2020 | } | |
2021 | } | |
2022 | ||
2023 | /* no matching parent, look for matching child */ | |
2024 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { | |
2025 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; | |
2026 | ||
2027 | if (!n->name) | |
2028 | continue; | |
2029 | ||
2030 | /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */ | |
2031 | if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) || | |
2032 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { | |
2033 | if (inode) | |
2034 | audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode); | |
2035 | else | |
2036 | n->ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
2037 | found_child = n->name; | |
2038 | goto add_names; | |
2039 | } | |
2040 | } | |
2041 | ||
2042 | add_names: | |
2043 | if (!found_parent) { | |
2044 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent)) | |
2045 | return; | |
2046 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
2047 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
2048 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent); | |
2049 | } | |
2050 | ||
2051 | if (!found_child) { | |
2052 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) | |
2053 | return; | |
2054 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
2055 | ||
2056 | /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent | |
2057 | * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in | |
2058 | * audit_free_names() */ | |
2059 | if (found_parent) { | |
2060 | context->names[idx].name = found_parent; | |
2061 | context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; | |
2062 | /* don't call __putname() */ | |
2063 | context->names[idx].name_put = 0; | |
2064 | } else { | |
2065 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
2066 | } | |
2067 | ||
2068 | if (inode) | |
2069 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode); | |
2070 | else | |
2071 | context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
2072 | } | |
2073 | } | |
2074 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); | |
2075 | ||
2076 | /** | |
2077 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values | |
2078 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task | |
2079 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context | |
2080 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context | |
2081 | * | |
2082 | * Also sets the context as auditable. | |
2083 | */ | |
2084 | int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, | |
2085 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) | |
2086 | { | |
2087 | if (!ctx->in_syscall) | |
2088 | return 0; | |
2089 | if (!ctx->serial) | |
2090 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); | |
2091 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; | |
2092 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; | |
2093 | *serial = ctx->serial; | |
2094 | ctx->auditable = 1; | |
2095 | return 1; | |
2096 | } | |
2097 | ||
2098 | /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ | |
2099 | static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); | |
2100 | ||
2101 | /** | |
2102 | * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid | |
2103 | * @task: task whose audit context is being modified | |
2104 | * @loginuid: loginuid value | |
2105 | * | |
2106 | * Returns 0. | |
2107 | * | |
2108 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). | |
2109 | */ | |
2110 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) | |
2111 | { | |
2112 | unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); | |
2113 | struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context; | |
2114 | ||
2115 | if (context && context->in_syscall) { | |
2116 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
2117 | ||
2118 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); | |
2119 | if (ab) { | |
2120 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " | |
2121 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u" | |
2122 | " old ses=%u new ses=%u", | |
2123 | task->pid, task_uid(task), | |
2124 | task->loginuid, loginuid, | |
2125 | task->sessionid, sessionid); | |
2126 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
2127 | } | |
2128 | } | |
2129 | task->sessionid = sessionid; | |
2130 | task->loginuid = loginuid; | |
2131 | return 0; | |
2132 | } | |
2133 | ||
2134 | /** | |
2135 | * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open | |
2136 | * @oflag: open flag | |
2137 | * @mode: mode bits | |
2138 | * @u_attr: queue attributes | |
2139 | * | |
2140 | */ | |
2141 | void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) | |
2142 | { | |
2143 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2144 | ||
2145 | if (attr) | |
2146 | memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); | |
2147 | else | |
2148 | memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); | |
2149 | ||
2150 | context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; | |
2151 | context->mq_open.mode = mode; | |
2152 | ||
2153 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; | |
2154 | } | |
2155 | ||
2156 | /** | |
2157 | * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive | |
2158 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor | |
2159 | * @msg_len: Message length | |
2160 | * @msg_prio: Message priority | |
2161 | * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time | |
2162 | * | |
2163 | */ | |
2164 | void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, | |
2165 | const struct timespec *abs_timeout) | |
2166 | { | |
2167 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2168 | struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; | |
2169 | ||
2170 | if (abs_timeout) | |
2171 | memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)); | |
2172 | else | |
2173 | memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec)); | |
2174 | ||
2175 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; | |
2176 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; | |
2177 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; | |
2178 | ||
2179 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; | |
2180 | } | |
2181 | ||
2182 | /** | |
2183 | * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify | |
2184 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor | |
2185 | * @u_notification: Notification event | |
2186 | * | |
2187 | */ | |
2188 | ||
2189 | void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) | |
2190 | { | |
2191 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2192 | ||
2193 | if (notification) | |
2194 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; | |
2195 | else | |
2196 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; | |
2197 | ||
2198 | context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; | |
2199 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; | |
2200 | } | |
2201 | ||
2202 | /** | |
2203 | * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute | |
2204 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor | |
2205 | * @mqstat: MQ flags | |
2206 | * | |
2207 | */ | |
2208 | void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) | |
2209 | { | |
2210 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2211 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; | |
2212 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; | |
2213 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; | |
2214 | } | |
2215 | ||
2216 | /** | |
2217 | * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object | |
2218 | * @ipcp: ipc permissions | |
2219 | * | |
2220 | */ | |
2221 | void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) | |
2222 | { | |
2223 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2224 | context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; | |
2225 | context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; | |
2226 | context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; | |
2227 | context->ipc.has_perm = 0; | |
2228 | security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); | |
2229 | context->type = AUDIT_IPC; | |
2230 | } | |
2231 | ||
2232 | /** | |
2233 | * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions | |
2234 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes | |
2235 | * @uid: msgq user id | |
2236 | * @gid: msgq group id | |
2237 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) | |
2238 | * | |
2239 | * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). | |
2240 | */ | |
2241 | void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) | |
2242 | { | |
2243 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2244 | ||
2245 | context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; | |
2246 | context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; | |
2247 | context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; | |
2248 | context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; | |
2249 | context->ipc.has_perm = 1; | |
2250 | } | |
2251 | ||
2252 | int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
2253 | { | |
2254 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; | |
2255 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2256 | ||
2257 | if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy)) | |
2258 | return 0; | |
2259 | ||
2260 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); | |
2261 | if (!ax) | |
2262 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2263 | ||
2264 | ax->argc = bprm->argc; | |
2265 | ax->envc = bprm->envc; | |
2266 | ax->mm = bprm->mm; | |
2267 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE; | |
2268 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
2269 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
2270 | return 0; | |
2271 | } | |
2272 | ||
2273 | ||
2274 | /** | |
2275 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall | |
2276 | * @nargs: number of args | |
2277 | * @args: args array | |
2278 | * | |
2279 | */ | |
2280 | void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) | |
2281 | { | |
2282 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2283 | ||
2284 | if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) | |
2285 | return; | |
2286 | ||
2287 | context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; | |
2288 | context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; | |
2289 | memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
2290 | } | |
2291 | ||
2292 | /** | |
2293 | * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair | |
2294 | * @fd1: the first file descriptor | |
2295 | * @fd2: the second file descriptor | |
2296 | * | |
2297 | */ | |
2298 | void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) | |
2299 | { | |
2300 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2301 | context->fds[0] = fd1; | |
2302 | context->fds[1] = fd2; | |
2303 | } | |
2304 | ||
2305 | /** | |
2306 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto | |
2307 | * @len: data length in user space | |
2308 | * @a: data address in kernel space | |
2309 | * | |
2310 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
2311 | */ | |
2312 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) | |
2313 | { | |
2314 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2315 | ||
2316 | if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) | |
2317 | return 0; | |
2318 | ||
2319 | if (!context->sockaddr) { | |
2320 | void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); | |
2321 | if (!p) | |
2322 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2323 | context->sockaddr = p; | |
2324 | } | |
2325 | ||
2326 | context->sockaddr_len = len; | |
2327 | memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); | |
2328 | return 0; | |
2329 | } | |
2330 | ||
2331 | void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) | |
2332 | { | |
2333 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2334 | ||
2335 | context->target_pid = t->pid; | |
2336 | context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); | |
2337 | context->target_uid = task_uid(t); | |
2338 | context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); | |
2339 | security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); | |
2340 | memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); | |
2341 | } | |
2342 | ||
2343 | /** | |
2344 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem | |
2345 | * @sig: signal value | |
2346 | * @t: task being signaled | |
2347 | * | |
2348 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) | |
2349 | * and uid that is doing that. | |
2350 | */ | |
2351 | int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) | |
2352 | { | |
2353 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; | |
2354 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; | |
2355 | struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; | |
2356 | uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); | |
2357 | ||
2358 | if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { | |
2359 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { | |
2360 | audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid; | |
2361 | if (tsk->loginuid != -1) | |
2362 | audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; | |
2363 | else | |
2364 | audit_sig_uid = uid; | |
2365 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); | |
2366 | } | |
2367 | if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) | |
2368 | return 0; | |
2369 | } | |
2370 | ||
2371 | /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly | |
2372 | * in audit_context */ | |
2373 | if (!ctx->target_pid) { | |
2374 | ctx->target_pid = t->tgid; | |
2375 | ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); | |
2376 | ctx->target_uid = t_uid; | |
2377 | ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); | |
2378 | security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); | |
2379 | memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); | |
2380 | return 0; | |
2381 | } | |
2382 | ||
2383 | axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; | |
2384 | if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { | |
2385 | axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
2386 | if (!axp) | |
2387 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2388 | ||
2389 | axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; | |
2390 | axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; | |
2391 | ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; | |
2392 | } | |
2393 | BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); | |
2394 | ||
2395 | axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; | |
2396 | axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); | |
2397 | axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; | |
2398 | axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); | |
2399 | security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); | |
2400 | memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); | |
2401 | axp->pid_count++; | |
2402 | ||
2403 | return 0; | |
2404 | } | |
2405 | ||
2406 | /** | |
2407 | * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps | |
2408 | * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed | |
2409 | * @new: the proposed new credentials | |
2410 | * @old: the old credentials | |
2411 | * | |
2412 | * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not | |
2413 | * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall | |
2414 | * | |
2415 | * -Eric | |
2416 | */ | |
2417 | int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, | |
2418 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) | |
2419 | { | |
2420 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; | |
2421 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2422 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; | |
2423 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
2424 | ||
2425 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); | |
2426 | if (!ax) | |
2427 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2428 | ||
2429 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; | |
2430 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
2431 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
2432 | ||
2433 | dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); | |
2434 | get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); | |
2435 | dput(dentry); | |
2436 | ||
2437 | ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; | |
2438 | ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; | |
2439 | ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); | |
2440 | ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; | |
2441 | ||
2442 | ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; | |
2443 | ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; | |
2444 | ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; | |
2445 | ||
2446 | ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; | |
2447 | ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; | |
2448 | ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; | |
2449 | return 0; | |
2450 | } | |
2451 | ||
2452 | /** | |
2453 | * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall | |
2454 | * @pid: target pid of the capset call | |
2455 | * @new: the new credentials | |
2456 | * @old: the old (current) credentials | |
2457 | * | |
2458 | * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the | |
2459 | * audit system if applicable | |
2460 | */ | |
2461 | void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, | |
2462 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) | |
2463 | { | |
2464 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2465 | context->capset.pid = pid; | |
2466 | context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; | |
2467 | context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; | |
2468 | context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; | |
2469 | context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; | |
2470 | } | |
2471 | ||
2472 | /** | |
2473 | * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally | |
2474 | * @signr: signal value | |
2475 | * | |
2476 | * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we | |
2477 | * should record the event for investigation. | |
2478 | */ | |
2479 | void audit_core_dumps(long signr) | |
2480 | { | |
2481 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
2482 | u32 sid; | |
2483 | uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid; | |
2484 | gid_t gid; | |
2485 | unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); | |
2486 | ||
2487 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
2488 | return; | |
2489 | ||
2490 | if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ | |
2491 | return; | |
2492 | ||
2493 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); | |
2494 | current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); | |
2495 | audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", | |
2496 | auid, uid, gid, sessionid); | |
2497 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); | |
2498 | if (sid) { | |
2499 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
2500 | u32 len; | |
2501 | ||
2502 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) | |
2503 | audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); | |
2504 | else { | |
2505 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); | |
2506 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
2507 | } | |
2508 | } | |
2509 | audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); | |
2510 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); | |
2511 | audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); | |
2512 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
2513 | } |