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1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support | |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. | |
5 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | |
6 | * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation | |
7 | * All Rights Reserved. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
10 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
11 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
12 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
13 | * | |
14 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
15 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
16 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
17 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
18 | * | |
19 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
20 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | |
21 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> | |
24 | * | |
25 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, | |
26 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. | |
27 | * | |
28 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in | |
29 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by | |
30 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. | |
31 | * | |
32 | * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, | |
33 | * 2006. | |
34 | * | |
35 | * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was | |
36 | * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. | |
37 | * | |
38 | * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional | |
39 | * filesystem information. | |
40 | * | |
41 | * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> | |
42 | * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. | |
43 | */ | |
44 | ||
45 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
46 | #include <asm/types.h> | |
47 | #include <asm/atomic.h> | |
48 | #include <linux/fs.h> | |
49 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
50 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
51 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
52 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
53 | #include <linux/mount.h> | |
54 | #include <linux/socket.h> | |
55 | #include <linux/mqueue.h> | |
56 | #include <linux/audit.h> | |
57 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
58 | #include <linux/time.h> | |
59 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
60 | #include <linux/compiler.h> | |
61 | #include <asm/unistd.h> | |
62 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
63 | #include <linux/list.h> | |
64 | #include <linux/tty.h> | |
65 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> | |
66 | #include <linux/highmem.h> | |
67 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> | |
68 | #include <linux/capability.h> | |
69 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> | |
70 | ||
71 | #include "audit.h" | |
72 | ||
73 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | |
74 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | |
75 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | |
76 | ||
77 | /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */ | |
78 | #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1 | |
79 | ||
80 | /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */ | |
81 | #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 | |
82 | ||
83 | /* number of audit rules */ | |
84 | int audit_n_rules; | |
85 | ||
86 | /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ | |
87 | int audit_signals; | |
88 | ||
89 | struct audit_cap_data { | |
90 | kernel_cap_t permitted; | |
91 | kernel_cap_t inheritable; | |
92 | union { | |
93 | unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */ | |
94 | kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */ | |
95 | }; | |
96 | }; | |
97 | ||
98 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and | |
99 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved | |
100 | * pointers at syscall exit time). | |
101 | * | |
102 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ | |
103 | struct audit_names { | |
104 | const char *name; | |
105 | int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */ | |
106 | unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */ | |
107 | unsigned long ino; | |
108 | dev_t dev; | |
109 | umode_t mode; | |
110 | uid_t uid; | |
111 | gid_t gid; | |
112 | dev_t rdev; | |
113 | u32 osid; | |
114 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; | |
115 | unsigned int fcap_ver; | |
116 | }; | |
117 | ||
118 | struct audit_aux_data { | |
119 | struct audit_aux_data *next; | |
120 | int type; | |
121 | }; | |
122 | ||
123 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 | |
124 | ||
125 | /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ | |
126 | #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 | |
127 | ||
128 | struct audit_aux_data_execve { | |
129 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
130 | int argc; | |
131 | int envc; | |
132 | struct mm_struct *mm; | |
133 | }; | |
134 | ||
135 | struct audit_aux_data_pids { | |
136 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
137 | pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
138 | uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
139 | uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
140 | unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
141 | u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; | |
142 | char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; | |
143 | int pid_count; | |
144 | }; | |
145 | ||
146 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { | |
147 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
148 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; | |
149 | unsigned int fcap_ver; | |
150 | struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; | |
151 | struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; | |
152 | }; | |
153 | ||
154 | struct audit_aux_data_capset { | |
155 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
156 | pid_t pid; | |
157 | struct audit_cap_data cap; | |
158 | }; | |
159 | ||
160 | struct audit_tree_refs { | |
161 | struct audit_tree_refs *next; | |
162 | struct audit_chunk *c[31]; | |
163 | }; | |
164 | ||
165 | /* The per-task audit context. */ | |
166 | struct audit_context { | |
167 | int dummy; /* must be the first element */ | |
168 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ | |
169 | enum audit_state state, current_state; | |
170 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ | |
171 | int major; /* syscall number */ | |
172 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ | |
173 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ | |
174 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ | |
175 | u64 prio; | |
176 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ | |
177 | int name_count; | |
178 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; | |
179 | char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */ | |
180 | struct path pwd; | |
181 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ | |
182 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
183 | struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids; | |
184 | struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr; | |
185 | size_t sockaddr_len; | |
186 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ | |
187 | pid_t pid, ppid; | |
188 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; | |
189 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; | |
190 | unsigned long personality; | |
191 | int arch; | |
192 | ||
193 | pid_t target_pid; | |
194 | uid_t target_auid; | |
195 | uid_t target_uid; | |
196 | unsigned int target_sessionid; | |
197 | u32 target_sid; | |
198 | char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; | |
199 | ||
200 | struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; | |
201 | struct list_head killed_trees; | |
202 | int tree_count; | |
203 | ||
204 | int type; | |
205 | union { | |
206 | struct { | |
207 | int nargs; | |
208 | long args[6]; | |
209 | } socketcall; | |
210 | struct { | |
211 | uid_t uid; | |
212 | gid_t gid; | |
213 | mode_t mode; | |
214 | u32 osid; | |
215 | int has_perm; | |
216 | uid_t perm_uid; | |
217 | gid_t perm_gid; | |
218 | mode_t perm_mode; | |
219 | unsigned long qbytes; | |
220 | } ipc; | |
221 | struct { | |
222 | mqd_t mqdes; | |
223 | struct mq_attr mqstat; | |
224 | } mq_getsetattr; | |
225 | struct { | |
226 | mqd_t mqdes; | |
227 | int sigev_signo; | |
228 | } mq_notify; | |
229 | struct { | |
230 | mqd_t mqdes; | |
231 | size_t msg_len; | |
232 | unsigned int msg_prio; | |
233 | struct timespec abs_timeout; | |
234 | } mq_sendrecv; | |
235 | struct { | |
236 | int oflag; | |
237 | mode_t mode; | |
238 | struct mq_attr attr; | |
239 | } mq_open; | |
240 | struct { | |
241 | pid_t pid; | |
242 | struct audit_cap_data cap; | |
243 | } capset; | |
244 | struct { | |
245 | int fd; | |
246 | int flags; | |
247 | } mmap; | |
248 | }; | |
249 | int fds[2]; | |
250 | ||
251 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
252 | int put_count; | |
253 | int ino_count; | |
254 | #endif | |
255 | }; | |
256 | ||
257 | static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask) | |
258 | { | |
259 | int n = ACC_MODE(flags); | |
260 | if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT)) | |
261 | n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE; | |
262 | return n & mask; | |
263 | } | |
264 | ||
265 | static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) | |
266 | { | |
267 | unsigned n; | |
268 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) | |
269 | return 0; | |
270 | n = ctx->major; | |
271 | ||
272 | switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { | |
273 | case 0: /* native */ | |
274 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && | |
275 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) | |
276 | return 1; | |
277 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && | |
278 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) | |
279 | return 1; | |
280 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && | |
281 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) | |
282 | return 1; | |
283 | return 0; | |
284 | case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ | |
285 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && | |
286 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) | |
287 | return 1; | |
288 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && | |
289 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) | |
290 | return 1; | |
291 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && | |
292 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) | |
293 | return 1; | |
294 | return 0; | |
295 | case 2: /* open */ | |
296 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); | |
297 | case 3: /* openat */ | |
298 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); | |
299 | case 4: /* socketcall */ | |
300 | return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); | |
301 | case 5: /* execve */ | |
302 | return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; | |
303 | default: | |
304 | return 0; | |
305 | } | |
306 | } | |
307 | ||
308 | static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which) | |
309 | { | |
310 | unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT; | |
311 | mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT; | |
312 | ||
313 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) | |
314 | return 0; | |
315 | ||
316 | if (index >= ctx->name_count) | |
317 | return 0; | |
318 | if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1) | |
319 | return 0; | |
320 | if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT) | |
321 | return 0; | |
322 | return 1; | |
323 | } | |
324 | ||
325 | /* | |
326 | * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; | |
327 | * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. | |
328 | * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. | |
329 | * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, | |
330 | * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, | |
331 | * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. | |
332 | * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. | |
333 | */ | |
334 | ||
335 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
336 | static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) | |
337 | { | |
338 | if (!ctx->prio) { | |
339 | ctx->prio = 1; | |
340 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; | |
341 | } | |
342 | } | |
343 | ||
344 | static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) | |
345 | { | |
346 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; | |
347 | int left = ctx->tree_count; | |
348 | if (likely(left)) { | |
349 | p->c[--left] = chunk; | |
350 | ctx->tree_count = left; | |
351 | return 1; | |
352 | } | |
353 | if (!p) | |
354 | return 0; | |
355 | p = p->next; | |
356 | if (p) { | |
357 | p->c[30] = chunk; | |
358 | ctx->trees = p; | |
359 | ctx->tree_count = 30; | |
360 | return 1; | |
361 | } | |
362 | return 0; | |
363 | } | |
364 | ||
365 | static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) | |
366 | { | |
367 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; | |
368 | ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); | |
369 | if (!ctx->trees) { | |
370 | ctx->trees = p; | |
371 | return 0; | |
372 | } | |
373 | if (p) | |
374 | p->next = ctx->trees; | |
375 | else | |
376 | ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; | |
377 | ctx->tree_count = 31; | |
378 | return 1; | |
379 | } | |
380 | #endif | |
381 | ||
382 | static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, | |
383 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) | |
384 | { | |
385 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
386 | struct audit_tree_refs *q; | |
387 | int n; | |
388 | if (!p) { | |
389 | /* we started with empty chain */ | |
390 | p = ctx->first_trees; | |
391 | count = 31; | |
392 | /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ | |
393 | if (!p) | |
394 | return; | |
395 | } | |
396 | n = count; | |
397 | for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { | |
398 | while (n--) { | |
399 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); | |
400 | q->c[n] = NULL; | |
401 | } | |
402 | } | |
403 | while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { | |
404 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); | |
405 | q->c[n] = NULL; | |
406 | } | |
407 | ctx->trees = p; | |
408 | ctx->tree_count = count; | |
409 | #endif | |
410 | } | |
411 | ||
412 | static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) | |
413 | { | |
414 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; | |
415 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { | |
416 | q = p->next; | |
417 | kfree(p); | |
418 | } | |
419 | } | |
420 | ||
421 | static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) | |
422 | { | |
423 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
424 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; | |
425 | int n; | |
426 | if (!tree) | |
427 | return 0; | |
428 | /* full ones */ | |
429 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { | |
430 | for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) | |
431 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) | |
432 | return 1; | |
433 | } | |
434 | /* partial */ | |
435 | if (p) { | |
436 | for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) | |
437 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) | |
438 | return 1; | |
439 | } | |
440 | #endif | |
441 | return 0; | |
442 | } | |
443 | ||
444 | /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ | |
445 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 | |
446 | * otherwise. */ | |
447 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
448 | struct audit_krule *rule, | |
449 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
450 | struct audit_names *name, | |
451 | enum audit_state *state) | |
452 | { | |
453 | const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk); | |
454 | int i, j, need_sid = 1; | |
455 | u32 sid; | |
456 | ||
457 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
458 | struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; | |
459 | int result = 0; | |
460 | ||
461 | switch (f->type) { | |
462 | case AUDIT_PID: | |
463 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); | |
464 | break; | |
465 | case AUDIT_PPID: | |
466 | if (ctx) { | |
467 | if (!ctx->ppid) | |
468 | ctx->ppid = sys_getppid(); | |
469 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); | |
470 | } | |
471 | break; | |
472 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
473 | result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val); | |
474 | break; | |
475 | case AUDIT_EUID: | |
476 | result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val); | |
477 | break; | |
478 | case AUDIT_SUID: | |
479 | result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val); | |
480 | break; | |
481 | case AUDIT_FSUID: | |
482 | result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val); | |
483 | break; | |
484 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
485 | result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val); | |
486 | break; | |
487 | case AUDIT_EGID: | |
488 | result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val); | |
489 | break; | |
490 | case AUDIT_SGID: | |
491 | result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val); | |
492 | break; | |
493 | case AUDIT_FSGID: | |
494 | result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val); | |
495 | break; | |
496 | case AUDIT_PERS: | |
497 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); | |
498 | break; | |
499 | case AUDIT_ARCH: | |
500 | if (ctx) | |
501 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); | |
502 | break; | |
503 | ||
504 | case AUDIT_EXIT: | |
505 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
506 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); | |
507 | break; | |
508 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: | |
509 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { | |
510 | if (f->val) | |
511 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); | |
512 | else | |
513 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); | |
514 | } | |
515 | break; | |
516 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: | |
517 | if (name) | |
518 | result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), | |
519 | f->op, f->val); | |
520 | else if (ctx) { | |
521 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
522 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { | |
523 | ++result; | |
524 | break; | |
525 | } | |
526 | } | |
527 | } | |
528 | break; | |
529 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: | |
530 | if (name) | |
531 | result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), | |
532 | f->op, f->val); | |
533 | else if (ctx) { | |
534 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
535 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { | |
536 | ++result; | |
537 | break; | |
538 | } | |
539 | } | |
540 | } | |
541 | break; | |
542 | case AUDIT_INODE: | |
543 | if (name) | |
544 | result = (name->ino == f->val); | |
545 | else if (ctx) { | |
546 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
547 | if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) { | |
548 | ++result; | |
549 | break; | |
550 | } | |
551 | } | |
552 | } | |
553 | break; | |
554 | case AUDIT_WATCH: | |
555 | if (name) | |
556 | result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); | |
557 | break; | |
558 | case AUDIT_DIR: | |
559 | if (ctx) | |
560 | result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); | |
561 | break; | |
562 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
563 | result = 0; | |
564 | if (ctx) | |
565 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val); | |
566 | break; | |
567 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: | |
568 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: | |
569 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: | |
570 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: | |
571 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: | |
572 | /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating | |
573 | a temporary error. We simply treat this as a | |
574 | match for now to avoid losing information that | |
575 | may be wanted. An error message will also be | |
576 | logged upon error */ | |
577 | if (f->lsm_rule) { | |
578 | if (need_sid) { | |
579 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); | |
580 | need_sid = 0; | |
581 | } | |
582 | result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, | |
583 | f->op, | |
584 | f->lsm_rule, | |
585 | ctx); | |
586 | } | |
587 | break; | |
588 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: | |
589 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: | |
590 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: | |
591 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: | |
592 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: | |
593 | /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR | |
594 | also applies here */ | |
595 | if (f->lsm_rule) { | |
596 | /* Find files that match */ | |
597 | if (name) { | |
598 | result = security_audit_rule_match( | |
599 | name->osid, f->type, f->op, | |
600 | f->lsm_rule, ctx); | |
601 | } else if (ctx) { | |
602 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
603 | if (security_audit_rule_match( | |
604 | ctx->names[j].osid, | |
605 | f->type, f->op, | |
606 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { | |
607 | ++result; | |
608 | break; | |
609 | } | |
610 | } | |
611 | } | |
612 | /* Find ipc objects that match */ | |
613 | if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) | |
614 | break; | |
615 | if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, | |
616 | f->type, f->op, | |
617 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) | |
618 | ++result; | |
619 | } | |
620 | break; | |
621 | case AUDIT_ARG0: | |
622 | case AUDIT_ARG1: | |
623 | case AUDIT_ARG2: | |
624 | case AUDIT_ARG3: | |
625 | if (ctx) | |
626 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); | |
627 | break; | |
628 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: | |
629 | /* ignore this field for filtering */ | |
630 | result = 1; | |
631 | break; | |
632 | case AUDIT_PERM: | |
633 | result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); | |
634 | break; | |
635 | case AUDIT_FILETYPE: | |
636 | result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); | |
637 | break; | |
638 | } | |
639 | ||
640 | if (!result) { | |
641 | put_cred(cred); | |
642 | return 0; | |
643 | } | |
644 | } | |
645 | ||
646 | if (ctx) { | |
647 | if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) | |
648 | return 0; | |
649 | if (rule->filterkey) { | |
650 | kfree(ctx->filterkey); | |
651 | ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
652 | } | |
653 | ctx->prio = rule->prio; | |
654 | } | |
655 | switch (rule->action) { | |
656 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
657 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
658 | } | |
659 | put_cred(cred); | |
660 | return 1; | |
661 | } | |
662 | ||
663 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is | |
664 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task | |
665 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. | |
666 | */ | |
667 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) | |
668 | { | |
669 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
670 | enum audit_state state; | |
671 | ||
672 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
673 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { | |
674 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) { | |
675 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) | |
676 | *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
677 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
678 | return state; | |
679 | } | |
680 | } | |
681 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
682 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
683 | } | |
684 | ||
685 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the | |
686 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is | |
687 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit | |
688 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). | |
689 | */ | |
690 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
691 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
692 | struct list_head *list) | |
693 | { | |
694 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
695 | enum audit_state state; | |
696 | ||
697 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) | |
698 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; | |
699 | ||
700 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
701 | if (!list_empty(list)) { | |
702 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); | |
703 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
704 | ||
705 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
706 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && | |
707 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, | |
708 | &state)) { | |
709 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
710 | ctx->current_state = state; | |
711 | return state; | |
712 | } | |
713 | } | |
714 | } | |
715 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
716 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
717 | } | |
718 | ||
719 | /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been | |
720 | * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash | |
721 | * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[]. | |
722 | * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). | |
723 | */ | |
724 | void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) | |
725 | { | |
726 | int i; | |
727 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
728 | enum audit_state state; | |
729 | ||
730 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) | |
731 | return; | |
732 | ||
733 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
734 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) { | |
735 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); | |
736 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
737 | struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i]; | |
738 | int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); | |
739 | struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; | |
740 | ||
741 | if (list_empty(list)) | |
742 | continue; | |
743 | ||
744 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
745 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && | |
746 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) { | |
747 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
748 | ctx->current_state = state; | |
749 | return; | |
750 | } | |
751 | } | |
752 | } | |
753 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
754 | } | |
755 | ||
756 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
757 | int return_valid, | |
758 | long return_code) | |
759 | { | |
760 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
761 | ||
762 | if (likely(!context)) | |
763 | return NULL; | |
764 | context->return_valid = return_valid; | |
765 | ||
766 | /* | |
767 | * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual | |
768 | * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific | |
769 | * signal handlers | |
770 | * | |
771 | * This is actually a test for: | |
772 | * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || | |
773 | * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) | |
774 | * | |
775 | * but is faster than a bunch of || | |
776 | */ | |
777 | if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && | |
778 | (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && | |
779 | (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) | |
780 | context->return_code = -EINTR; | |
781 | else | |
782 | context->return_code = return_code; | |
783 | ||
784 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) { | |
785 | audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); | |
786 | audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); | |
787 | } | |
788 | ||
789 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; | |
790 | return context; | |
791 | } | |
792 | ||
793 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) | |
794 | { | |
795 | int i; | |
796 | ||
797 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
798 | if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { | |
799 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" | |
800 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" | |
801 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", | |
802 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
803 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, | |
804 | context->name_count, context->put_count, | |
805 | context->ino_count); | |
806 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { | |
807 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
808 | context->names[i].name, | |
809 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); | |
810 | } | |
811 | dump_stack(); | |
812 | return; | |
813 | } | |
814 | #endif | |
815 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
816 | context->put_count = 0; | |
817 | context->ino_count = 0; | |
818 | #endif | |
819 | ||
820 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { | |
821 | if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put) | |
822 | __putname(context->names[i].name); | |
823 | } | |
824 | context->name_count = 0; | |
825 | path_put(&context->pwd); | |
826 | context->pwd.dentry = NULL; | |
827 | context->pwd.mnt = NULL; | |
828 | } | |
829 | ||
830 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) | |
831 | { | |
832 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
833 | ||
834 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { | |
835 | context->aux = aux->next; | |
836 | kfree(aux); | |
837 | } | |
838 | while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { | |
839 | context->aux_pids = aux->next; | |
840 | kfree(aux); | |
841 | } | |
842 | } | |
843 | ||
844 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, | |
845 | enum audit_state state) | |
846 | { | |
847 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); | |
848 | context->state = state; | |
849 | context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; | |
850 | } | |
851 | ||
852 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) | |
853 | { | |
854 | struct audit_context *context; | |
855 | ||
856 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
857 | return NULL; | |
858 | audit_zero_context(context, state); | |
859 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); | |
860 | return context; | |
861 | } | |
862 | ||
863 | /** | |
864 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task | |
865 | * @tsk: task | |
866 | * | |
867 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context | |
868 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the | |
869 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is | |
870 | * needed. | |
871 | */ | |
872 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
873 | { | |
874 | struct audit_context *context; | |
875 | enum audit_state state; | |
876 | char *key = NULL; | |
877 | ||
878 | if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) | |
879 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ | |
880 | ||
881 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); | |
882 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
883 | return 0; | |
884 | ||
885 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { | |
886 | kfree(key); | |
887 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); | |
888 | return -ENOMEM; | |
889 | } | |
890 | context->filterkey = key; | |
891 | ||
892 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
893 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); | |
894 | return 0; | |
895 | } | |
896 | ||
897 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) | |
898 | { | |
899 | struct audit_context *previous; | |
900 | int count = 0; | |
901 | ||
902 | do { | |
903 | previous = context->previous; | |
904 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { | |
905 | ++count; | |
906 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" | |
907 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", | |
908 | context->serial, context->major, | |
909 | context->name_count, count); | |
910 | } | |
911 | audit_free_names(context); | |
912 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); | |
913 | free_tree_refs(context); | |
914 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
915 | kfree(context->filterkey); | |
916 | kfree(context->sockaddr); | |
917 | kfree(context); | |
918 | context = previous; | |
919 | } while (context); | |
920 | if (count >= 10) | |
921 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); | |
922 | } | |
923 | ||
924 | void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) | |
925 | { | |
926 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
927 | unsigned len; | |
928 | int error; | |
929 | u32 sid; | |
930 | ||
931 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); | |
932 | if (!sid) | |
933 | return; | |
934 | ||
935 | error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); | |
936 | if (error) { | |
937 | if (error != -EINVAL) | |
938 | goto error_path; | |
939 | return; | |
940 | } | |
941 | ||
942 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); | |
943 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
944 | return; | |
945 | ||
946 | error_path: | |
947 | audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context"); | |
948 | return; | |
949 | } | |
950 | ||
951 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context); | |
952 | ||
953 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk) | |
954 | { | |
955 | char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)]; | |
956 | struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm; | |
957 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
958 | ||
959 | /* tsk == current */ | |
960 | ||
961 | get_task_comm(name, tsk); | |
962 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); | |
963 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); | |
964 | ||
965 | if (mm) { | |
966 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
967 | vma = mm->mmap; | |
968 | while (vma) { | |
969 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
970 | vma->vm_file) { | |
971 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", | |
972 | &vma->vm_file->f_path); | |
973 | break; | |
974 | } | |
975 | vma = vma->vm_next; | |
976 | } | |
977 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
978 | } | |
979 | audit_log_task_context(ab); | |
980 | } | |
981 | ||
982 | static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, | |
983 | uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, | |
984 | u32 sid, char *comm) | |
985 | { | |
986 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
987 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
988 | u32 len; | |
989 | int rc = 0; | |
990 | ||
991 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); | |
992 | if (!ab) | |
993 | return rc; | |
994 | ||
995 | audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid, | |
996 | uid, sessionid); | |
997 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { | |
998 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); | |
999 | rc = 1; | |
1000 | } else { | |
1001 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); | |
1002 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
1003 | } | |
1004 | audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); | |
1005 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); | |
1006 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1007 | ||
1008 | return rc; | |
1009 | } | |
1010 | ||
1011 | /* | |
1012 | * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't | |
1013 | * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being | |
1014 | * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry) | |
1015 | * | |
1016 | * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when | |
1017 | * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting | |
1018 | * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to | |
1019 | * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space | |
1020 | * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was. | |
1021 | */ | |
1022 | static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context, | |
1023 | struct audit_buffer **ab, | |
1024 | int arg_num, | |
1025 | size_t *len_sent, | |
1026 | const char __user *p, | |
1027 | char *buf) | |
1028 | { | |
1029 | char arg_num_len_buf[12]; | |
1030 | const char __user *tmp_p = p; | |
1031 | /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */ | |
1032 | size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5; | |
1033 | size_t len, len_left, to_send; | |
1034 | size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; | |
1035 | unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0; | |
1036 | int ret; | |
1037 | ||
1038 | /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */ | |
1039 | len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; | |
1040 | ||
1041 | /* | |
1042 | * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings | |
1043 | * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar | |
1044 | * for strings that are too long, we should not have created | |
1045 | * any. | |
1046 | */ | |
1047 | if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) { | |
1048 | WARN_ON(1); | |
1049 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); | |
1050 | return -1; | |
1051 | } | |
1052 | ||
1053 | /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */ | |
1054 | do { | |
1055 | if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN) | |
1056 | to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; | |
1057 | else | |
1058 | to_send = len_left; | |
1059 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send); | |
1060 | /* | |
1061 | * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just | |
1062 | * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- | |
1063 | * space yet. | |
1064 | */ | |
1065 | if (ret) { | |
1066 | WARN_ON(1); | |
1067 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); | |
1068 | return -1; | |
1069 | } | |
1070 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; | |
1071 | has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send); | |
1072 | if (has_cntl) { | |
1073 | /* | |
1074 | * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only | |
1075 | * send half as much in each message | |
1076 | */ | |
1077 | max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2; | |
1078 | break; | |
1079 | } | |
1080 | len_left -= to_send; | |
1081 | tmp_p += to_send; | |
1082 | } while (len_left > 0); | |
1083 | ||
1084 | len_left = len; | |
1085 | ||
1086 | if (len > max_execve_audit_len) | |
1087 | too_long = 1; | |
1088 | ||
1089 | /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */ | |
1090 | for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) { | |
1091 | int room_left; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len) | |
1094 | to_send = max_execve_audit_len; | |
1095 | else | |
1096 | to_send = len_left; | |
1097 | ||
1098 | /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */ | |
1099 | room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent; | |
1100 | if (has_cntl) | |
1101 | room_left -= (to_send * 2); | |
1102 | else | |
1103 | room_left -= to_send; | |
1104 | if (room_left < 0) { | |
1105 | *len_sent = 0; | |
1106 | audit_log_end(*ab); | |
1107 | *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); | |
1108 | if (!*ab) | |
1109 | return 0; | |
1110 | } | |
1111 | ||
1112 | /* | |
1113 | * first record needs to say how long the original string was | |
1114 | * so we can be sure nothing was lost. | |
1115 | */ | |
1116 | if ((i == 0) && (too_long)) | |
1117 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num, | |
1118 | has_cntl ? 2*len : len); | |
1119 | ||
1120 | /* | |
1121 | * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already | |
1122 | * filled buf above when we checked for control characters | |
1123 | * so don't bother with another copy_from_user | |
1124 | */ | |
1125 | if (len >= max_execve_audit_len) | |
1126 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send); | |
1127 | else | |
1128 | ret = 0; | |
1129 | if (ret) { | |
1130 | WARN_ON(1); | |
1131 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); | |
1132 | return -1; | |
1133 | } | |
1134 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; | |
1135 | ||
1136 | /* actually log it */ | |
1137 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num); | |
1138 | if (too_long) | |
1139 | audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i); | |
1140 | audit_log_format(*ab, "="); | |
1141 | if (has_cntl) | |
1142 | audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send); | |
1143 | else | |
1144 | audit_log_string(*ab, buf); | |
1145 | ||
1146 | p += to_send; | |
1147 | len_left -= to_send; | |
1148 | *len_sent += arg_num_len; | |
1149 | if (has_cntl) | |
1150 | *len_sent += to_send * 2; | |
1151 | else | |
1152 | *len_sent += to_send; | |
1153 | } | |
1154 | /* include the null we didn't log */ | |
1155 | return len + 1; | |
1156 | } | |
1157 | ||
1158 | static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, | |
1159 | struct audit_buffer **ab, | |
1160 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) | |
1161 | { | |
1162 | int i; | |
1163 | size_t len, len_sent = 0; | |
1164 | const char __user *p; | |
1165 | char *buf; | |
1166 | ||
1167 | if (axi->mm != current->mm) | |
1168 | return; /* execve failed, no additional info */ | |
1169 | ||
1170 | p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start; | |
1171 | ||
1172 | audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc); | |
1173 | ||
1174 | /* | |
1175 | * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just | |
1176 | * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size | |
1177 | * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg() | |
1178 | * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe. | |
1179 | */ | |
1180 | buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1181 | if (!buf) { | |
1182 | audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n"); | |
1183 | return; | |
1184 | } | |
1185 | ||
1186 | for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) { | |
1187 | len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i, | |
1188 | &len_sent, p, buf); | |
1189 | if (len <= 0) | |
1190 | break; | |
1191 | p += len; | |
1192 | } | |
1193 | kfree(buf); | |
1194 | } | |
1195 | ||
1196 | static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) | |
1197 | { | |
1198 | int i; | |
1199 | ||
1200 | audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); | |
1201 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { | |
1202 | audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]); | |
1203 | } | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | ||
1206 | static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) | |
1207 | { | |
1208 | kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted; | |
1209 | kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable; | |
1210 | int log = 0; | |
1211 | ||
1212 | if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { | |
1213 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); | |
1214 | log = 1; | |
1215 | } | |
1216 | if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { | |
1217 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); | |
1218 | log = 1; | |
1219 | } | |
1220 | ||
1221 | if (log) | |
1222 | audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver); | |
1223 | } | |
1224 | ||
1225 | static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) | |
1226 | { | |
1227 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
1228 | int i; | |
1229 | ||
1230 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); | |
1231 | if (!ab) | |
1232 | return; | |
1233 | ||
1234 | switch (context->type) { | |
1235 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { | |
1236 | int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; | |
1237 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); | |
1238 | for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) | |
1239 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, | |
1240 | context->socketcall.args[i]); | |
1241 | break; } | |
1242 | case AUDIT_IPC: { | |
1243 | u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; | |
1244 | ||
1245 | audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", | |
1246 | context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode); | |
1247 | if (osid) { | |
1248 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
1249 | u32 len; | |
1250 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { | |
1251 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); | |
1252 | *call_panic = 1; | |
1253 | } else { | |
1254 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); | |
1255 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
1256 | } | |
1257 | } | |
1258 | if (context->ipc.has_perm) { | |
1259 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1260 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, | |
1261 | AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); | |
1262 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1263 | "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", | |
1264 | context->ipc.qbytes, | |
1265 | context->ipc.perm_uid, | |
1266 | context->ipc.perm_gid, | |
1267 | context->ipc.perm_mode); | |
1268 | if (!ab) | |
1269 | return; | |
1270 | } | |
1271 | break; } | |
1272 | case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: { | |
1273 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1274 | "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " | |
1275 | "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", | |
1276 | context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, | |
1277 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, | |
1278 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, | |
1279 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, | |
1280 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); | |
1281 | break; } | |
1282 | case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: { | |
1283 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1284 | "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " | |
1285 | "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", | |
1286 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, | |
1287 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, | |
1288 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, | |
1289 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, | |
1290 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); | |
1291 | break; } | |
1292 | case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: { | |
1293 | audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", | |
1294 | context->mq_notify.mqdes, | |
1295 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); | |
1296 | break; } | |
1297 | case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { | |
1298 | struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; | |
1299 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1300 | "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " | |
1301 | "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", | |
1302 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, | |
1303 | attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, | |
1304 | attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); | |
1305 | break; } | |
1306 | case AUDIT_CAPSET: { | |
1307 | audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); | |
1308 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); | |
1309 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); | |
1310 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); | |
1311 | break; } | |
1312 | case AUDIT_MMAP: { | |
1313 | audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd, | |
1314 | context->mmap.flags); | |
1315 | break; } | |
1316 | } | |
1317 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1318 | } | |
1319 | ||
1320 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) | |
1321 | { | |
1322 | const struct cred *cred; | |
1323 | int i, call_panic = 0; | |
1324 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
1325 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
1326 | const char *tty; | |
1327 | ||
1328 | /* tsk == current */ | |
1329 | context->pid = tsk->pid; | |
1330 | if (!context->ppid) | |
1331 | context->ppid = sys_getppid(); | |
1332 | cred = current_cred(); | |
1333 | context->uid = cred->uid; | |
1334 | context->gid = cred->gid; | |
1335 | context->euid = cred->euid; | |
1336 | context->suid = cred->suid; | |
1337 | context->fsuid = cred->fsuid; | |
1338 | context->egid = cred->egid; | |
1339 | context->sgid = cred->sgid; | |
1340 | context->fsgid = cred->fsgid; | |
1341 | context->personality = tsk->personality; | |
1342 | ||
1343 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); | |
1344 | if (!ab) | |
1345 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
1346 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", | |
1347 | context->arch, context->major); | |
1348 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) | |
1349 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); | |
1350 | if (context->return_valid) | |
1351 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", | |
1352 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", | |
1353 | context->return_code); | |
1354 | ||
1355 | spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); | |
1356 | if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name) | |
1357 | tty = tsk->signal->tty->name; | |
1358 | else | |
1359 | tty = "(none)"; | |
1360 | spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); | |
1361 | ||
1362 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
1363 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" | |
1364 | " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" | |
1365 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" | |
1366 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", | |
1367 | context->argv[0], | |
1368 | context->argv[1], | |
1369 | context->argv[2], | |
1370 | context->argv[3], | |
1371 | context->name_count, | |
1372 | context->ppid, | |
1373 | context->pid, | |
1374 | tsk->loginuid, | |
1375 | context->uid, | |
1376 | context->gid, | |
1377 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, | |
1378 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty, | |
1379 | tsk->sessionid); | |
1380 | ||
1381 | ||
1382 | audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); | |
1383 | audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); | |
1384 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1385 | ||
1386 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { | |
1387 | ||
1388 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); | |
1389 | if (!ab) | |
1390 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
1391 | ||
1392 | switch (aux->type) { | |
1393 | ||
1394 | case AUDIT_EXECVE: { | |
1395 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux; | |
1396 | audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi); | |
1397 | break; } | |
1398 | ||
1399 | case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { | |
1400 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; | |
1401 | audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); | |
1402 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); | |
1403 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); | |
1404 | audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); | |
1405 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); | |
1406 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); | |
1407 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); | |
1408 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); | |
1409 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); | |
1410 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); | |
1411 | break; } | |
1412 | ||
1413 | } | |
1414 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1415 | } | |
1416 | ||
1417 | if (context->type) | |
1418 | show_special(context, &call_panic); | |
1419 | ||
1420 | if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { | |
1421 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); | |
1422 | if (ab) { | |
1423 | audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", | |
1424 | context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); | |
1425 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1426 | } | |
1427 | } | |
1428 | ||
1429 | if (context->sockaddr_len) { | |
1430 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); | |
1431 | if (ab) { | |
1432 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); | |
1433 | audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, | |
1434 | context->sockaddr_len); | |
1435 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1436 | } | |
1437 | } | |
1438 | ||
1439 | for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { | |
1440 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; | |
1441 | ||
1442 | for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) | |
1443 | if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], | |
1444 | axs->target_auid[i], | |
1445 | axs->target_uid[i], | |
1446 | axs->target_sessionid[i], | |
1447 | axs->target_sid[i], | |
1448 | axs->target_comm[i])) | |
1449 | call_panic = 1; | |
1450 | } | |
1451 | ||
1452 | if (context->target_pid && | |
1453 | audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, | |
1454 | context->target_auid, context->target_uid, | |
1455 | context->target_sessionid, | |
1456 | context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) | |
1457 | call_panic = 1; | |
1458 | ||
1459 | if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { | |
1460 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); | |
1461 | if (ab) { | |
1462 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); | |
1463 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1464 | } | |
1465 | } | |
1466 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { | |
1467 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i]; | |
1468 | ||
1469 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); | |
1470 | if (!ab) | |
1471 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
1472 | ||
1473 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); | |
1474 | ||
1475 | if (n->name) { | |
1476 | switch(n->name_len) { | |
1477 | case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: | |
1478 | /* log the full path */ | |
1479 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
1480 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name); | |
1481 | break; | |
1482 | case 0: | |
1483 | /* name was specified as a relative path and the | |
1484 | * directory component is the cwd */ | |
1485 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd); | |
1486 | break; | |
1487 | default: | |
1488 | /* log the name's directory component */ | |
1489 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
1490 | audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name, | |
1491 | n->name_len); | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | } else | |
1494 | audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); | |
1495 | ||
1496 | if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) { | |
1497 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu" | |
1498 | " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" | |
1499 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", | |
1500 | n->ino, | |
1501 | MAJOR(n->dev), | |
1502 | MINOR(n->dev), | |
1503 | n->mode, | |
1504 | n->uid, | |
1505 | n->gid, | |
1506 | MAJOR(n->rdev), | |
1507 | MINOR(n->rdev)); | |
1508 | } | |
1509 | if (n->osid != 0) { | |
1510 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
1511 | u32 len; | |
1512 | if (security_secid_to_secctx( | |
1513 | n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { | |
1514 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); | |
1515 | call_panic = 2; | |
1516 | } else { | |
1517 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); | |
1518 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
1519 | } | |
1520 | } | |
1521 | ||
1522 | audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); | |
1523 | ||
1524 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1525 | } | |
1526 | ||
1527 | /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ | |
1528 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); | |
1529 | if (ab) | |
1530 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1531 | if (call_panic) | |
1532 | audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); | |
1533 | } | |
1534 | ||
1535 | /** | |
1536 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context | |
1537 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free | |
1538 | * | |
1539 | * Called from copy_process and do_exit | |
1540 | */ | |
1541 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
1542 | { | |
1543 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1544 | ||
1545 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); | |
1546 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1547 | return; | |
1548 | ||
1549 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit | |
1550 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. | |
1551 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this | |
1552 | * in the context of the idle thread */ | |
1553 | /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ | |
1554 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) | |
1555 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); | |
1556 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) | |
1557 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); | |
1558 | ||
1559 | audit_free_context(context); | |
1560 | } | |
1561 | ||
1562 | /** | |
1563 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry | |
1564 | * @arch: architecture type | |
1565 | * @major: major syscall type (function) | |
1566 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 | |
1567 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 | |
1568 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 | |
1569 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 | |
1570 | * | |
1571 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the | |
1572 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or | |
1573 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the | |
1574 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, | |
1575 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it | |
1576 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it | |
1577 | * be written). | |
1578 | */ | |
1579 | void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, | |
1580 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, | |
1581 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) | |
1582 | { | |
1583 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; | |
1584 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
1585 | enum audit_state state; | |
1586 | ||
1587 | if (unlikely(!context)) | |
1588 | return; | |
1589 | ||
1590 | /* | |
1591 | * This happens only on certain architectures that make system | |
1592 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of | |
1593 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new | |
1594 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you | |
1595 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) | |
1596 | * | |
1597 | * i386 no | |
1598 | * x86_64 no | |
1599 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S) | |
1600 | * | |
1601 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner | |
1602 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. | |
1603 | */ | |
1604 | if (context->in_syscall) { | |
1605 | struct audit_context *newctx; | |
1606 | ||
1607 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1608 | printk(KERN_ERR | |
1609 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" | |
1610 | " entering syscall=%d\n", | |
1611 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); | |
1612 | #endif | |
1613 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); | |
1614 | if (newctx) { | |
1615 | newctx->previous = context; | |
1616 | context = newctx; | |
1617 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; | |
1618 | } else { | |
1619 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we | |
1620 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname | |
1621 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is | |
1622 | * to abandon auditing. */ | |
1623 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
1624 | } | |
1625 | } | |
1626 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); | |
1627 | ||
1628 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
1629 | return; | |
1630 | ||
1631 | context->arch = arch; | |
1632 | context->major = major; | |
1633 | context->argv[0] = a1; | |
1634 | context->argv[1] = a2; | |
1635 | context->argv[2] = a3; | |
1636 | context->argv[3] = a4; | |
1637 | ||
1638 | state = context->state; | |
1639 | context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; | |
1640 | if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { | |
1641 | context->prio = 0; | |
1642 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); | |
1643 | } | |
1644 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
1645 | return; | |
1646 | ||
1647 | context->serial = 0; | |
1648 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; | |
1649 | context->in_syscall = 1; | |
1650 | context->current_state = state; | |
1651 | context->ppid = 0; | |
1652 | } | |
1653 | ||
1654 | void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child) | |
1655 | { | |
1656 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
1657 | struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context; | |
1658 | if (!p || !ctx) | |
1659 | return; | |
1660 | if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) | |
1661 | return; | |
1662 | p->arch = ctx->arch; | |
1663 | p->major = ctx->major; | |
1664 | memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv)); | |
1665 | p->ctime = ctx->ctime; | |
1666 | p->dummy = ctx->dummy; | |
1667 | p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall; | |
1668 | p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1669 | p->ppid = current->pid; | |
1670 | p->prio = ctx->prio; | |
1671 | p->current_state = ctx->current_state; | |
1672 | } | |
1673 | ||
1674 | /** | |
1675 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call | |
1676 | * @valid: success/failure flag | |
1677 | * @return_code: syscall return value | |
1678 | * | |
1679 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as | |
1680 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from | |
1681 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit | |
1682 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, | |
1683 | * free the names stored from getname(). | |
1684 | */ | |
1685 | void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code) | |
1686 | { | |
1687 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; | |
1688 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1689 | ||
1690 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); | |
1691 | ||
1692 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1693 | return; | |
1694 | ||
1695 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) | |
1696 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); | |
1697 | ||
1698 | context->in_syscall = 0; | |
1699 | context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; | |
1700 | ||
1701 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) | |
1702 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); | |
1703 | ||
1704 | if (context->previous) { | |
1705 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; | |
1706 | context->previous = NULL; | |
1707 | audit_free_context(context); | |
1708 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; | |
1709 | } else { | |
1710 | audit_free_names(context); | |
1711 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); | |
1712 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
1713 | context->aux = NULL; | |
1714 | context->aux_pids = NULL; | |
1715 | context->target_pid = 0; | |
1716 | context->target_sid = 0; | |
1717 | context->sockaddr_len = 0; | |
1718 | context->type = 0; | |
1719 | context->fds[0] = -1; | |
1720 | if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { | |
1721 | kfree(context->filterkey); | |
1722 | context->filterkey = NULL; | |
1723 | } | |
1724 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
1725 | } | |
1726 | } | |
1727 | ||
1728 | static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) | |
1729 | { | |
1730 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
1731 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1732 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; | |
1733 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; | |
1734 | int count; | |
1735 | if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) | |
1736 | return; | |
1737 | context = current->audit_context; | |
1738 | p = context->trees; | |
1739 | count = context->tree_count; | |
1740 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
1741 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); | |
1742 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1743 | if (!chunk) | |
1744 | return; | |
1745 | if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) | |
1746 | return; | |
1747 | if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { | |
1748 | printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); | |
1749 | audit_set_auditable(context); | |
1750 | audit_put_chunk(chunk); | |
1751 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); | |
1752 | return; | |
1753 | } | |
1754 | put_tree_ref(context, chunk); | |
1755 | #endif | |
1756 | } | |
1757 | ||
1758 | static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) | |
1759 | { | |
1760 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE | |
1761 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1762 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; | |
1763 | const struct dentry *d, *parent; | |
1764 | struct audit_chunk *drop; | |
1765 | unsigned long seq; | |
1766 | int count; | |
1767 | ||
1768 | context = current->audit_context; | |
1769 | p = context->trees; | |
1770 | count = context->tree_count; | |
1771 | retry: | |
1772 | drop = NULL; | |
1773 | d = dentry; | |
1774 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
1775 | seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); | |
1776 | for(;;) { | |
1777 | struct inode *inode = d->d_inode; | |
1778 | if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) { | |
1779 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; | |
1780 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); | |
1781 | if (chunk) { | |
1782 | if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { | |
1783 | drop = chunk; | |
1784 | break; | |
1785 | } | |
1786 | } | |
1787 | } | |
1788 | parent = d->d_parent; | |
1789 | if (parent == d) | |
1790 | break; | |
1791 | d = parent; | |
1792 | } | |
1793 | if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ | |
1794 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1795 | if (!drop) { | |
1796 | /* just a race with rename */ | |
1797 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); | |
1798 | goto retry; | |
1799 | } | |
1800 | audit_put_chunk(drop); | |
1801 | if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { | |
1802 | /* OK, got more space */ | |
1803 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); | |
1804 | goto retry; | |
1805 | } | |
1806 | /* too bad */ | |
1807 | printk(KERN_WARNING | |
1808 | "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); | |
1809 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); | |
1810 | audit_set_auditable(context); | |
1811 | return; | |
1812 | } | |
1813 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1814 | #endif | |
1815 | } | |
1816 | ||
1817 | /** | |
1818 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list | |
1819 | * @name: name to add | |
1820 | * | |
1821 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. | |
1822 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). | |
1823 | */ | |
1824 | void __audit_getname(const char *name) | |
1825 | { | |
1826 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1827 | ||
1828 | if (IS_ERR(name) || !name) | |
1829 | return; | |
1830 | ||
1831 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
1832 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
1833 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", | |
1834 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
1835 | dump_stack(); | |
1836 | #endif | |
1837 | return; | |
1838 | } | |
1839 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); | |
1840 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; | |
1841 | context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; | |
1842 | context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1; | |
1843 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1844 | context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0; | |
1845 | ++context->name_count; | |
1846 | if (!context->pwd.dentry) | |
1847 | get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); | |
1848 | } | |
1849 | ||
1850 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request | |
1851 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname | |
1852 | * | |
1853 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, | |
1854 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. | |
1855 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). | |
1856 | */ | |
1857 | void audit_putname(const char *name) | |
1858 | { | |
1859 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1860 | ||
1861 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
1862 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
1863 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
1864 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", | |
1865 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
1866 | if (context->name_count) { | |
1867 | int i; | |
1868 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
1869 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
1870 | context->names[i].name, | |
1871 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); | |
1872 | } | |
1873 | #endif | |
1874 | __putname(name); | |
1875 | } | |
1876 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1877 | else { | |
1878 | ++context->put_count; | |
1879 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { | |
1880 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" | |
1881 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" | |
1882 | " put_count=%d\n", | |
1883 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
1884 | context->serial, context->major, | |
1885 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, | |
1886 | context->put_count); | |
1887 | dump_stack(); | |
1888 | } | |
1889 | } | |
1890 | #endif | |
1891 | } | |
1892 | ||
1893 | static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context, | |
1894 | const struct inode *inode) | |
1895 | { | |
1896 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) { | |
1897 | if (inode) | |
1898 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "audit: name_count maxed, losing inode data: " | |
1899 | "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n", | |
1900 | MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), | |
1901 | MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), | |
1902 | inode->i_ino); | |
1903 | ||
1904 | else | |
1905 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n"); | |
1906 | return 1; | |
1907 | } | |
1908 | context->name_count++; | |
1909 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1910 | context->ino_count++; | |
1911 | #endif | |
1912 | return 0; | |
1913 | } | |
1914 | ||
1915 | ||
1916 | static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry) | |
1917 | { | |
1918 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; | |
1919 | int rc; | |
1920 | ||
1921 | memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); | |
1922 | memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); | |
1923 | name->fcap.fE = 0; | |
1924 | name->fcap_ver = 0; | |
1925 | ||
1926 | if (!dentry) | |
1927 | return 0; | |
1928 | ||
1929 | rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps); | |
1930 | if (rc) | |
1931 | return rc; | |
1932 | ||
1933 | name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; | |
1934 | name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; | |
1935 | name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); | |
1936 | name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; | |
1937 | ||
1938 | return 0; | |
1939 | } | |
1940 | ||
1941 | ||
1942 | /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ | |
1943 | static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, | |
1944 | const struct inode *inode) | |
1945 | { | |
1946 | name->ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1947 | name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | |
1948 | name->mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1949 | name->uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1950 | name->gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1951 | name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
1952 | security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); | |
1953 | audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); | |
1954 | } | |
1955 | ||
1956 | /** | |
1957 | * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup | |
1958 | * @name: name being audited | |
1959 | * @dentry: dentry being audited | |
1960 | * | |
1961 | * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). | |
1962 | */ | |
1963 | void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry) | |
1964 | { | |
1965 | int idx; | |
1966 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1967 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1968 | ||
1969 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1970 | return; | |
1971 | if (context->name_count | |
1972 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name | |
1973 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) | |
1974 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
1975 | else if (context->name_count > 1 | |
1976 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name | |
1977 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) | |
1978 | idx = context->name_count - 2; | |
1979 | else { | |
1980 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no | |
1981 | * associated name? */ | |
1982 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) | |
1983 | return; | |
1984 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
1985 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1986 | } | |
1987 | handle_path(dentry); | |
1988 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode); | |
1989 | } | |
1990 | ||
1991 | /** | |
1992 | * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects | |
1993 | * @dentry: dentry being audited | |
1994 | * @parent: inode of dentry parent | |
1995 | * | |
1996 | * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode | |
1997 | * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. | |
1998 | * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. | |
1999 | * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after | |
2000 | * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object | |
2001 | * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during | |
2002 | * unsuccessful attempts. | |
2003 | */ | |
2004 | void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry, | |
2005 | const struct inode *parent) | |
2006 | { | |
2007 | int idx; | |
2008 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2009 | const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; | |
2010 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
2011 | const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; | |
2012 | int dirlen = 0; | |
2013 | ||
2014 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
2015 | return; | |
2016 | ||
2017 | if (inode) | |
2018 | handle_one(inode); | |
2019 | ||
2020 | /* parent is more likely, look for it first */ | |
2021 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { | |
2022 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; | |
2023 | ||
2024 | if (!n->name) | |
2025 | continue; | |
2026 | ||
2027 | if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && | |
2028 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { | |
2029 | n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */ | |
2030 | found_parent = n->name; | |
2031 | goto add_names; | |
2032 | } | |
2033 | } | |
2034 | ||
2035 | /* no matching parent, look for matching child */ | |
2036 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { | |
2037 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; | |
2038 | ||
2039 | if (!n->name) | |
2040 | continue; | |
2041 | ||
2042 | /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */ | |
2043 | if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) || | |
2044 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { | |
2045 | if (inode) | |
2046 | audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode); | |
2047 | else | |
2048 | n->ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
2049 | found_child = n->name; | |
2050 | goto add_names; | |
2051 | } | |
2052 | } | |
2053 | ||
2054 | add_names: | |
2055 | if (!found_parent) { | |
2056 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent)) | |
2057 | return; | |
2058 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
2059 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
2060 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent); | |
2061 | } | |
2062 | ||
2063 | if (!found_child) { | |
2064 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) | |
2065 | return; | |
2066 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
2067 | ||
2068 | /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent | |
2069 | * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in | |
2070 | * audit_free_names() */ | |
2071 | if (found_parent) { | |
2072 | context->names[idx].name = found_parent; | |
2073 | context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; | |
2074 | /* don't call __putname() */ | |
2075 | context->names[idx].name_put = 0; | |
2076 | } else { | |
2077 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
2078 | } | |
2079 | ||
2080 | if (inode) | |
2081 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode); | |
2082 | else | |
2083 | context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
2084 | } | |
2085 | } | |
2086 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); | |
2087 | ||
2088 | /** | |
2089 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values | |
2090 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task | |
2091 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context | |
2092 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context | |
2093 | * | |
2094 | * Also sets the context as auditable. | |
2095 | */ | |
2096 | int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, | |
2097 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) | |
2098 | { | |
2099 | if (!ctx->in_syscall) | |
2100 | return 0; | |
2101 | if (!ctx->serial) | |
2102 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); | |
2103 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; | |
2104 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; | |
2105 | *serial = ctx->serial; | |
2106 | if (!ctx->prio) { | |
2107 | ctx->prio = 1; | |
2108 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; | |
2109 | } | |
2110 | return 1; | |
2111 | } | |
2112 | ||
2113 | /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ | |
2114 | static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); | |
2115 | ||
2116 | /** | |
2117 | * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid | |
2118 | * @task: task whose audit context is being modified | |
2119 | * @loginuid: loginuid value | |
2120 | * | |
2121 | * Returns 0. | |
2122 | * | |
2123 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). | |
2124 | */ | |
2125 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) | |
2126 | { | |
2127 | unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); | |
2128 | struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context; | |
2129 | ||
2130 | if (context && context->in_syscall) { | |
2131 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
2132 | ||
2133 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); | |
2134 | if (ab) { | |
2135 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " | |
2136 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u" | |
2137 | " old ses=%u new ses=%u", | |
2138 | task->pid, task_uid(task), | |
2139 | task->loginuid, loginuid, | |
2140 | task->sessionid, sessionid); | |
2141 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
2142 | } | |
2143 | } | |
2144 | task->sessionid = sessionid; | |
2145 | task->loginuid = loginuid; | |
2146 | return 0; | |
2147 | } | |
2148 | ||
2149 | /** | |
2150 | * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open | |
2151 | * @oflag: open flag | |
2152 | * @mode: mode bits | |
2153 | * @attr: queue attributes | |
2154 | * | |
2155 | */ | |
2156 | void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) | |
2157 | { | |
2158 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2159 | ||
2160 | if (attr) | |
2161 | memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); | |
2162 | else | |
2163 | memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); | |
2164 | ||
2165 | context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; | |
2166 | context->mq_open.mode = mode; | |
2167 | ||
2168 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; | |
2169 | } | |
2170 | ||
2171 | /** | |
2172 | * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive | |
2173 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor | |
2174 | * @msg_len: Message length | |
2175 | * @msg_prio: Message priority | |
2176 | * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time | |
2177 | * | |
2178 | */ | |
2179 | void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, | |
2180 | const struct timespec *abs_timeout) | |
2181 | { | |
2182 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2183 | struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; | |
2184 | ||
2185 | if (abs_timeout) | |
2186 | memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)); | |
2187 | else | |
2188 | memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec)); | |
2189 | ||
2190 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; | |
2191 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; | |
2192 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; | |
2193 | ||
2194 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; | |
2195 | } | |
2196 | ||
2197 | /** | |
2198 | * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify | |
2199 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor | |
2200 | * @notification: Notification event | |
2201 | * | |
2202 | */ | |
2203 | ||
2204 | void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) | |
2205 | { | |
2206 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2207 | ||
2208 | if (notification) | |
2209 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; | |
2210 | else | |
2211 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; | |
2212 | ||
2213 | context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; | |
2214 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; | |
2215 | } | |
2216 | ||
2217 | /** | |
2218 | * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute | |
2219 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor | |
2220 | * @mqstat: MQ flags | |
2221 | * | |
2222 | */ | |
2223 | void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) | |
2224 | { | |
2225 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2226 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; | |
2227 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; | |
2228 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; | |
2229 | } | |
2230 | ||
2231 | /** | |
2232 | * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object | |
2233 | * @ipcp: ipc permissions | |
2234 | * | |
2235 | */ | |
2236 | void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) | |
2237 | { | |
2238 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2239 | context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; | |
2240 | context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; | |
2241 | context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; | |
2242 | context->ipc.has_perm = 0; | |
2243 | security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); | |
2244 | context->type = AUDIT_IPC; | |
2245 | } | |
2246 | ||
2247 | /** | |
2248 | * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions | |
2249 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes | |
2250 | * @uid: msgq user id | |
2251 | * @gid: msgq group id | |
2252 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) | |
2253 | * | |
2254 | * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). | |
2255 | */ | |
2256 | void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) | |
2257 | { | |
2258 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2259 | ||
2260 | context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; | |
2261 | context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; | |
2262 | context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; | |
2263 | context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; | |
2264 | context->ipc.has_perm = 1; | |
2265 | } | |
2266 | ||
2267 | int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
2268 | { | |
2269 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; | |
2270 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2271 | ||
2272 | if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy)) | |
2273 | return 0; | |
2274 | ||
2275 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); | |
2276 | if (!ax) | |
2277 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2278 | ||
2279 | ax->argc = bprm->argc; | |
2280 | ax->envc = bprm->envc; | |
2281 | ax->mm = bprm->mm; | |
2282 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE; | |
2283 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
2284 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
2285 | return 0; | |
2286 | } | |
2287 | ||
2288 | ||
2289 | /** | |
2290 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall | |
2291 | * @nargs: number of args | |
2292 | * @args: args array | |
2293 | * | |
2294 | */ | |
2295 | void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) | |
2296 | { | |
2297 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2298 | ||
2299 | if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) | |
2300 | return; | |
2301 | ||
2302 | context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; | |
2303 | context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; | |
2304 | memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
2305 | } | |
2306 | ||
2307 | /** | |
2308 | * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair | |
2309 | * @fd1: the first file descriptor | |
2310 | * @fd2: the second file descriptor | |
2311 | * | |
2312 | */ | |
2313 | void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) | |
2314 | { | |
2315 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2316 | context->fds[0] = fd1; | |
2317 | context->fds[1] = fd2; | |
2318 | } | |
2319 | ||
2320 | /** | |
2321 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto | |
2322 | * @len: data length in user space | |
2323 | * @a: data address in kernel space | |
2324 | * | |
2325 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
2326 | */ | |
2327 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) | |
2328 | { | |
2329 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2330 | ||
2331 | if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) | |
2332 | return 0; | |
2333 | ||
2334 | if (!context->sockaddr) { | |
2335 | void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); | |
2336 | if (!p) | |
2337 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2338 | context->sockaddr = p; | |
2339 | } | |
2340 | ||
2341 | context->sockaddr_len = len; | |
2342 | memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); | |
2343 | return 0; | |
2344 | } | |
2345 | ||
2346 | void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) | |
2347 | { | |
2348 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2349 | ||
2350 | context->target_pid = t->pid; | |
2351 | context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); | |
2352 | context->target_uid = task_uid(t); | |
2353 | context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); | |
2354 | security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); | |
2355 | memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); | |
2356 | } | |
2357 | ||
2358 | /** | |
2359 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem | |
2360 | * @sig: signal value | |
2361 | * @t: task being signaled | |
2362 | * | |
2363 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) | |
2364 | * and uid that is doing that. | |
2365 | */ | |
2366 | int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) | |
2367 | { | |
2368 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; | |
2369 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; | |
2370 | struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; | |
2371 | uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); | |
2372 | ||
2373 | if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { | |
2374 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { | |
2375 | audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid; | |
2376 | if (tsk->loginuid != -1) | |
2377 | audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; | |
2378 | else | |
2379 | audit_sig_uid = uid; | |
2380 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); | |
2381 | } | |
2382 | if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) | |
2383 | return 0; | |
2384 | } | |
2385 | ||
2386 | /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly | |
2387 | * in audit_context */ | |
2388 | if (!ctx->target_pid) { | |
2389 | ctx->target_pid = t->tgid; | |
2390 | ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); | |
2391 | ctx->target_uid = t_uid; | |
2392 | ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); | |
2393 | security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); | |
2394 | memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); | |
2395 | return 0; | |
2396 | } | |
2397 | ||
2398 | axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; | |
2399 | if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { | |
2400 | axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
2401 | if (!axp) | |
2402 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2403 | ||
2404 | axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; | |
2405 | axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; | |
2406 | ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; | |
2407 | } | |
2408 | BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); | |
2409 | ||
2410 | axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; | |
2411 | axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); | |
2412 | axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; | |
2413 | axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); | |
2414 | security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); | |
2415 | memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); | |
2416 | axp->pid_count++; | |
2417 | ||
2418 | return 0; | |
2419 | } | |
2420 | ||
2421 | /** | |
2422 | * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps | |
2423 | * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed | |
2424 | * @new: the proposed new credentials | |
2425 | * @old: the old credentials | |
2426 | * | |
2427 | * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not | |
2428 | * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall | |
2429 | * | |
2430 | * -Eric | |
2431 | */ | |
2432 | int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, | |
2433 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) | |
2434 | { | |
2435 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; | |
2436 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2437 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; | |
2438 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
2439 | ||
2440 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); | |
2441 | if (!ax) | |
2442 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2443 | ||
2444 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; | |
2445 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
2446 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
2447 | ||
2448 | dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); | |
2449 | get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); | |
2450 | dput(dentry); | |
2451 | ||
2452 | ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; | |
2453 | ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; | |
2454 | ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); | |
2455 | ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; | |
2456 | ||
2457 | ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; | |
2458 | ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; | |
2459 | ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; | |
2460 | ||
2461 | ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; | |
2462 | ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; | |
2463 | ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; | |
2464 | return 0; | |
2465 | } | |
2466 | ||
2467 | /** | |
2468 | * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall | |
2469 | * @pid: target pid of the capset call | |
2470 | * @new: the new credentials | |
2471 | * @old: the old (current) credentials | |
2472 | * | |
2473 | * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the | |
2474 | * audit system if applicable | |
2475 | */ | |
2476 | void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, | |
2477 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) | |
2478 | { | |
2479 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2480 | context->capset.pid = pid; | |
2481 | context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; | |
2482 | context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; | |
2483 | context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; | |
2484 | context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; | |
2485 | } | |
2486 | ||
2487 | void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) | |
2488 | { | |
2489 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
2490 | context->mmap.fd = fd; | |
2491 | context->mmap.flags = flags; | |
2492 | context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; | |
2493 | } | |
2494 | ||
2495 | /** | |
2496 | * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally | |
2497 | * @signr: signal value | |
2498 | * | |
2499 | * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we | |
2500 | * should record the event for investigation. | |
2501 | */ | |
2502 | void audit_core_dumps(long signr) | |
2503 | { | |
2504 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
2505 | u32 sid; | |
2506 | uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid; | |
2507 | gid_t gid; | |
2508 | unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); | |
2509 | ||
2510 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
2511 | return; | |
2512 | ||
2513 | if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ | |
2514 | return; | |
2515 | ||
2516 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); | |
2517 | current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); | |
2518 | audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", | |
2519 | auid, uid, gid, sessionid); | |
2520 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); | |
2521 | if (sid) { | |
2522 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
2523 | u32 len; | |
2524 | ||
2525 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) | |
2526 | audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); | |
2527 | else { | |
2528 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); | |
2529 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); | |
2530 | } | |
2531 | } | |
2532 | audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); | |
2533 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); | |
2534 | audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); | |
2535 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
2536 | } | |
2537 | ||
2538 | struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) | |
2539 | { | |
2540 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
2541 | if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) | |
2542 | return NULL; | |
2543 | return &ctx->killed_trees; | |
2544 | } |